239
Views
1
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Original Articles

Diamonds and Civil Conflicts in Africa—the Conflicts in Central Africa and West Africa

Pages 171-193 | Published online: 08 Jun 2015

  • The diamond business is an enormous enterprise. At the consumer level, the market value of diamonds as jewellery was worth about US$56 billion in 1999. See I Smillie, L Gberie and R Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (Complete Report) (Canada: Partnership Africa, 2000), p 15.
  • The different rebel groups in the DRC, the CAR, Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia all had substantial earnings from mineral resources—gold, diamonds, coltan, timber, etc.
  • The Republic of the Congo gained independence from France in 1960, and for about 30 years experimented with a Marxist form of government. In 1992, a democratically elected government was formed. Civil war in 1997 restored a former Marxist President.
  • The CAR gained independence from France in 1960. A civilian government was installed in 1993 after 30 years of political upheaval and bad governance. The role of diamonds in the CAR's multiple coups is not clear, but diamonds undoubtedly served as a source of financing for both legitimate and military opposition to the ruling regime.
  • This is understandable considering the extremely difficult nature of counter-insurgencies. The most evident complexity that confronts a government in counter-insurgency is getting its army to fight. People prefer not to risk getting killed. See Paul Collier, ‘Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy’, World Bank Policy Papers, 15 June 2000, p 2.
  • In fact, group grievance and intense political conflict are not in themselves dangerous. They are indeed the usual substance of democratic politics.
  • UNCTAD, Statistical Profiles of LDCs, 2001 at http://www.unctad.org/en/pub/ldcprofiles2001.en.htm. See also the UNDP Human Development Report, 2001.
  • See http://www.professionaljeweler.com/archives/hottopics/congo.html: ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’.
  • The UN mission in the DRC (MONUC) would coordinate international support for the elections.
  • Despite the unwieldy nature of the Government, the real test for the budding democracy may emanate from the sons of the former leaders of the country—Lumumba, Mobutu Sese Seko and Kabila.
  • See http://www.professionaljeweler.com/archives/hottopics/angola.html: ‘Angola: Opportunity Missed’.
  • The presidents of Togo and Burkina Faso were specifically mentioned in a UN report on ‘conflict diamonds’ presented by Canadian ambassador Robert Fowler—http://specials.ft.com/ln/diamonds/monday2.htm.
  • A Rough Trade (London: Global Witness, 1998), p 3.
  • See http://www.professionaljeweler.com/archives/hottopics/sierraleone.html: ‘Sierra Leone: A Diamond History’.
  • The United Nations initially authorised a peacekeeping force of up to 6,000 troops, half of which were to be contributed by ECOWAS and the balance were expected from Kenya, India and Zambia. See, generally, John L Hirsch, ‘Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy’, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Colorado, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001).
  • At that time, the rebels still controlled about 90 per cent of the country's diamond mining areas. The Security Council banned rebel diamond exports as part of a campaign to help the Government reassert its control over the entire country. This ban matches a diamond embargo imposed on UNITA in Angola in 1998, which had only a modest effect on curbing smuggling.
  • See further Terrence Lyons, ‘Liberia's Path from Anarchy to Elections’, Foreign Policy Studies—http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/lyons/1998ch.htm.
  • By December 2003, the UN peacekeeper (UNOMIL) had arrived and its strength was 7,080—half of the 15,000 full strength.
  • The sharp increase in the price of coltan in 2000 greatly assisted RCD-Goma's war effort, and a monopoly on the export of this precious mineral was created. When the price of coltan fell precipitously in 2001, the rebels faced financial constraints. The RCD-Goma thereafter sought new ways to exploit its territory, including the extortion of funds from relief organisations. See generally, Jeroen Cuvelier and Tim Raeymaekers, ‘Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: European Companies and the Coltan Trade’, IPIS, January 2002.
  • See B Møller, Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa, a background paper for the Danida Conference on Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building in Africa, Maputo, 28–29 June 2001, p 3.
  • Seethe UNDP Human Development Report, 2001. See also Making New Technologies Work for Human Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p 257.
  • Around the world, the share of income that accrues to the government as tax revenue rises with income. For example, most OECD governments receive around 40 per cent of national income as tax revenue. In the very poor economies the government raises around six per cent of national income as taxation. See I Smillie, L Gberie and R Hazleton, supra n 1, p 14.
  • See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper 2355 (2000), pp 10–11.
  • The interests and involvement of these parties are usually buried under layers of secrecy.
  • See Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources of the DRC—http://daccess-ods.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/621/79/pdf.
  • The Centre for Public Integrity, ‘Making a Killing: The Business of War’—http://www.public-i.org/dtaweb/report.sdp?ReportID=469.
  • This is the best known and probably most successful of these private military companies. It was initially based in South Africa and relied on both black and white soldiers who had fought for South Africa's apartheid regime. EO was disbanded in 1999 as the South African Government outlawed its citizens from fighting in foreign wars.
  • This was published in a report on private military companies. See ‘Dogs of War into Doves of Peace’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/world/africa/2403517.stm—11 November 2002.
  • For instance, the UK Foreign Enlistment Act 1870 with its last prohibition in 1896. In 1976, Lord Diplock's commission of inquiry concluded that the Act was unworkable and recommended changes. Over 25 years later, no new legislation has been drafted. See Amnesty International, ‘Killing for Gain’, Amnesty Magazine, July-August 1998, p 2. Paradoxically, the UK has had a long history of unfettered trade in mercenaries and military training through brokers and consultants such as Sandline International. In the US, the CIA hired mercenaries for use in the DRC and Angola. See ‘Dogs of War into Doves of Peace’, supra n 28.
  • See ‘Dogs of War into Doves of Peace’, the British Foreign Office report on private military companies, supra n 28.
  • War veterans from apartheid South Africa, Ukraine, the Israeli Defence Force, US Special Forces and the British Special Air Services.
  • See generally, Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T Klare and Laura W Reed (eds), Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995).
  • Amnesty International, ‘Killing for Gain”, Amnesty Magazine, July-August 1998, p 2. Such brokers brokered arms deals that contributed to the genocide in Rwanda and some have been caught on film arranging deals for electroshock batons.
  • Senior Zimbabwean army officers were on the board of the company that formed a joint venture with Oryx to exploit the concession—reported by the Financial Times on Monday, 10 July 2000. See http://specials.ft.com/ln/diamonds/monday3.htm.
  • The negative publicity created for the diamond industry by the campaign of these NGOs forced the industry to formulate measures to clamp down on diamonds from the conflict countries.
  • See ‘Conflicts in Africa’, at http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Africa/SierraLeone.asp.
  • See generally ‘Is it Time Up for UN in Africa?’ in the New Vision of 7 March 2002.
  • See generally ‘Other Facets—News and Visions on the International Effort to End Conflict Diamonds’, Issue Number 8 (November 2002), p 1.
  • Following Savimbi's resumption of war after his failed 1992 national election bid, UNITA captured Angola's premier diamond reserves. In the first two years of renewed conflict, UNITA is believed to have earned around US$2 billion from diamond mining.
  • The UNDP is assisting MONUC to finalise an interim plan for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of children.
  • The US, for instance, refused to offer more than a token support in the immediate aftermath of Taylor's departure.
  • See Report of the Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/357), at www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2001/357e.pdf.
  • See Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Elections and War. The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). See also Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets. The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999) and Saul Newman, Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies. Mostly Ballots. Rarely Bullets (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996).
  • See James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict. An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995). See also Miriam Fendius Elman, Paths to Peace. Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
  • Spencer R Weart, Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Other (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
  • This is not to imply that men do not exhibit these social norms or that all women exhibit them. Generally speaking, these are the norms that are associated with women in Africa.
  • For the first time since the FSA acquired the new powers, it imposed a fine of £750,000 on the Royal Bank of Scotland for breaching money-laundering rules. This was announced on BBC News of 17 December 2002—http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2582537.stm.
  • B Møller, supra n 20, p 12.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.