- Examples of the regions where joint development is in use are: the Artic, the Bay of Biscay, Africa, the Caribbean, Southwest Adantic and the Middle East. The largest number is in Asia.
- Examples of joint development as an alternative or in addition to boundaries are Iceland/Norway, France/Spain, Jamaica/Colombia, UK/Norway, Senegal/Guinea Bissau, Nigeria/Sao Tome, Czechoslovakia/Austria, Sudan/Saudi Arabia, Qatar/Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia/Bahrain, Australia/Indonesia, Japan/Korea, Malaysia/Thailand, Malaysia/Vietnam, Australia/East Timor, Netherlands/Germany, Argentina/UK. See United Nations Treaty Series, www.un.org; JI Charney and L M Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, vols I, II and III (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993).
- IF Shihata and W T Onorato, ‘Joint Development of International Petroleum Resources in Undefined and Disputed Areas’ in G Blake et al (eds), Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospect (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp 433 at 449 (‘Shihata and Onorato’).
- Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, 11 December 1989, entered into force 9 February 1991, ATS 1991 No 9; 29 ILM 1990 469 (hereinafter the ‘Timor Gap Treaty’).
- H Fox et al (eds), Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas, vol I (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1989) (‘BIICL Agreement’).
- See n 54 below and accompanying text; and n 71 below and accompanying text.
- Treaty on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Two States, the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome e Principe, 21 February 2001, www.nigeriasaotomejda.com (the ‘Nigeria-Sao Tome Treaty’).
- See W T Onorato, ‘Joint Development in the International Petroleum Sector: The Yemeni Variant’ (1990) 39 Int'l and Comp LQ653 at 660 (the ‘Yemeni Variant’).
- Examples are the Qatar/Abu Dhabi; and the Saudi Arabia/Bahrain Joint Development Agreements, which lacked an international joint commission. Nevertheless, both arrangements were successful. The Qatar/Abu Dhabi agreement came on stream in 1975 with estimated reserves of 95 million barrels while the Saudi Arabia/Bahrain agreement governed some 17 production wells, which had a peak production of some 332 million barrels. See Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 54 and 56.
- See n 4 above.
- S Kaye, ‘The Timor Gap Treaty: Creative Solutions and International Conflict’ (1994) 16 Sydney L Rev 72 (‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict’).
- This means a median line drawn through the centre of the coasts of adjoining or opposite states.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 1l above, at 72 citing the Agreement between the Government of the Common Wealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia establishing certain Seabed Boundaries, 18 May 1971, entered into force 8 November 1973, (1975) 974 UNTS 307.
- A huge steep cleft or declivity more than 550 nautical miles long and on the average of 40 miles wide with a depth of over 10,000 feet lying approximately 40 to 60 nautical miles off the island of Timor and 250 to 350 nautical miles from the closest part of Australia (Melville Island). See ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 73; Australian Year Book of International Law 1970–73, pp 145–146; G Triggs and D Bialek, ‘The New Timor Sea Treaty and Interim Arrangements for Joint Development of Petroleum Resources of the Timor Gap’ (2002) 3 Melbourne J Int'l L 322 at 324.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 73.
- The boundary line ran west until it met the eastern end of the Timor trough. See Ibid. See also Map 1.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 74.
- Ibid at 75.
- Ibid.
- Australian mining companies were active in oil exploration in the gap in the early 1960s, and in 1974, the first oil and gas discoveries in the Timor Gap were announced and established the potential for the continental shelf in the area yielding significant quantities of oil and gas. See ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 76.
- I Townsend- Gault and W G Stormont, Offshore Petroleum Joint Development Arrangements: Functional Instrument? Compromise? Obligation?’ in G Blake et al (eds), The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources (London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), pp 55 at 66.
- Ibid at 79; A Bergin, ‘The Australian-Indonesian Timor Gap Maritime Boundary Agreement’ (1990) 5(4) Int'l J of Est and C L 383 at 385. See Map 1, Areas A, B and C.
- W T Onorato and MJ Valencia, ‘International Co-operation for Petroleum Development: The Timor Gap Treaty’ (1990) 5(1) ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal 28 (‘International Co-operation’); see below for further discussions on this issue.
- Portugal's claim to East Timor and, by implication, the disputed area.
- A centre for research, publications and insight into all aspects of international and comparative law and for their practical application worldwide. Online BIICL home page, www.biicl.org.
- Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 387.
- A working group was set up by the BIICL to investigate joint development agreements between states in offshore maritime zones. The research team for the project was formed when the Leverhulme Foundation made a research grant to fund the project.
- Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 1.
- Ibid at 2.
- Ibid at 12.
- H Fox, Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas, vol II (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1990), p 3 (‘Fox vol II’).
- The Nigeria-Sao Tome Treaty, n 7 above; the Timor Sea Treaty, Australia Treaty Series (2003) 13, which replaces the Timor Gap Treaty; the Memorandum of Understanding for the exploration and exploitation of Petroleum in the Gulf of Thailand between Malaysia and Vietnam, 5 June 1992 in Ted L McDorman, Malaysia-Vietnam, Report No 5–19, in J I Charney and L M Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, vol III (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), p 2335 at 2341; Maritime Delimitation Treaty between Colombia and Jamaica, 12 November 1993, in Kaldone G Nweihed, Colombia-Jamaica, Report No 218, International Maritime Boundaries, p 2179 at 2200; Management and Cooperation Agreement between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, 14 October 1993 and the Protocol of Agreement relating to the Organisation and Operation of the Agency for Management and Cooperation between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, 12 June 1995 Law Sea Bull, July 1996 at 40 and 42, and in J R Victor Prescott, Guinea-Bissau—Senegal, Report No 44(4) and (5) International Maritime Boundaries 2251 at 2257; Joint Declaration on Cooperation over Offshore Activities in the Southwest Atlantic between Argentina and United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, (1996) 35 ILM 301; The Guyana-Barbados Exclusive Economic Zone Co-operation Treaty, 2 December 2003. The Nigeria-Sao Tome Treaty used some of the options in the BIICL framework. See ‘Nigeria/Sao Tome and Principe Treaty of 2001: an analysis’ below.
- See n 7 above.
- T Umar, ‘The Nigeria-Sao Tome & Principe Joint Development Zone: A Unique Investment Opportunity,’ AAPG-Houston, 13 March 2002, online Nigeria-Sao Tome JDA home page, www.nigeriasaotomejda.com, accessed 12 April 2005. Nigeria claimed an adjusted median line based on geomorphological factors.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- JDA Roadshow Presentation: Overview of the JDZ,’ online Nigeria-Sao Tome JDA home page, www.nigeriasaotomejda.com, accessed 12 April 2005 (‘JDA Road show Presentation’).
- A more compromising claim line. See Map 2.
- ‘JDA Roadshow Presentation,’ n 37 above.
- Ibid.
- The exact quantity of the deposits was unknown.
- Oil country hot line-news briefs from the industry, online: Find Articles, www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3159/is_7_221/ai_63791201/ (last modified July 2000). See also Nigeria Monthly Energy Chronology (2002-2004) www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nigiachron.html, 14 May (accessed 2 October 2005).
- Ibid. The Nigerian Government is pursuing an ambitious policy of increasing its crude reserves from 30 billion barrels to 40 billion barrels and of totally eradicating gas. See C S Peterside, ‘What Happens in Nigeria When the Oil Wells Run Dry,’ Energy Bulletin, online: www.energybulletin.net/(6 November 2004).
- ‘How Nigeria Can Help Sao Tome,’ vol 9, issue 14, Wednesday, 21 July 2004 Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections online, www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nta42947.htm, accessed 19 October 2004 (‘How Nigeria Can Help Sao Tome’).
- Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and accounts for approximately 20 per cent of West Africa's people. It measures about 923,768 sq km with a population of 133 million in 2003. The GDP estimate in 2003 is $43 billion. Its export earnings amounts to $21.4 billion of which oil and gas accounted for more than 98 per cent and about 83 per cent of federal government revenue. In 2002 Nigeria's proven oil reserves were estimated to be 25 billion barrels; natural gas reserves were well over 100 trillion cubic feet. In 2003 its crude oil production was averaging around 2.2 million barrels per day and Nigeria provides about 7–9 per cent of overall US oil imports and ranks as the fifth-largest source for US imported oil. See online US Department of State Bureau of African Affairs Background Note: Nigeria—Profile, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm, January 2005.
- Sao Tome and Principe is Africa's smallest country, made up of two small volcanic islands. It measures about 1,001 sq km with a population of 137,599 in 2001. The GDP estimate in 2002 was $55 million. Its export earnings amount to $5.03 million of which cocoa accounted for about 95 per cent. It also has petroleum but not yet exploited. See Ibid Sao Tome and Principe—Profile, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5434.htm, April 2005.
- See n 23 above.
- See n 11 above.
- See n 59 below.
- See n 62 below.
- See n 63 below.
- See n 66 below.
- See n 73 below.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 1.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11above, at 95.
- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 1994) (UNCLOS), which provides that states should make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11above, at 95.
- C Robson, ‘Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs: Legal Issues and Solutions’ in G Blake et al, n 21 above, at 14.
- J Holmes, ‘End the Moratorium: The Timor Gap Treaty as a Model for the Complete Resolution of the Western Gap in the Gulf of Mexico’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 925 at 949–50.
- Ibid at 952.
- Charney and Alexander vol I, n 2 above, at 1107 Annex to Report No 5–13.
- D Ong, ‘The 1979 and 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agreements: A Model for International Legal Co-operation in Common Offshore Petroleum Deposits?’ (1999) 14(2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 207 at 245 (‘The 1979 and 1990 Malaysia Thailand Joint Development Agreements’). Ong, in this article, acknowledged the Timor Gap Treaty but neither discussed its model role nor referred to the issue.
- I Townsend-Gault, ‘Joint Development of Offshore Mineral Resources—Progress and Prospects for the Future’ (1988) 12 Natural Resources Forum 275 at 282 (‘Progress and Prospects’). See also Townsend-Gault and Stormont, n 21 above, at 51–2, 71.
- ‘Progress and Prospects,’ n 63 above, at 282–3.
- Ibid at 283.
- M Miyoshi, ‘The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ (1999) 2(5) International Boundary Research Unit Maritime Briefing 41 (‘Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas’); M Miyoshi, ‘Some Comments on Legal Aspects of Precedents for Joint Development’ (1981) 6(11) Energy 1359.
- Shihata and Onorato, n 3 above, at 442.
- Ibid.
- K Freeman, ‘Joint Development Zones: How to Negotiate and Structure a Joint Development Agreement’ (September 2003) online Kendall Freeman home page, www.kendallfreeman.com, accessed 12 April 2005.
- Ibid.
- Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 388; Fox vol II n 31 above, at 3.
- Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 14.
- T H Wälde, ‘Financial and Contractual Perspectives in Negotiating Joint Petroleum Development Agreements’ in Fox vol II, n 31 above, at 156 and 157.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 28. The antecedents to the Timor Gap Treaty are all the joint development agreements prior to 1989 such as the Abu Dhabi-Qatar, France-Spain, Japan-Korea, Sudan-Saudi Arabia, Netherlands-Germany, Czechoslovakia-Austria Agreements.
- D Ong, ‘The New Timor Sea Arrangement 2001: Is Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits Mandated under International Law? (2002) 17(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 79 at 94; Townsend-Gault and Stormont, n 21 above, at 71; ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 95; S Kaye, ‘The Timor Gap Treaty’ (1999) 14(2) Natural Resources and Environment 92; F M Auburn, D Ong and V L Forbes, ‘Dispute Resolution and The Timor Gap Treaty’ (1994) Occasional Paper No 35 IOCPS 2.
- Robson, n 58 above, at 14; M Miyoshi, ‘Is Joint Development Possible in the South China Sea?’ (1998) 13 Ocean Year Book 610 at 610 (‘Is Joint Development Possible’).
- See text accompanying n 92.
- See text accompanying n 93.
- ‘Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas,’ n 66 above, at 18–19.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 5. See Map 1.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid at 6 citing Art 4(1) (b) and (2)(b) of the Timor Gap Treaty. Indonesia accounts for ten per cent of the petroleum tax revenue collected in area C while Australia accounts for 16 per cent of the same in area B.
- Holmes, n 59 above, at 947, citing Art 2(2) (b) of the Treaty.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 79.
- Article 2(3) of the Timor Gap Treaty.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 79. See also ‘International Co-operation,’ n 24 above, at 6 citing Art 2(3) and (4) of the Timor Gap Treaty.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 79.
- Ibid at 84 citing Art 5(2), (3) and (4) of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 5(5) of the Treaty.
- Ibid at 85.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 7. The JA is to have such legal capacities under the laws of both states as are necessary for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its functions.
- Ibid.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 85 citing Art 9 of the Treaty.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 8 citing Art 9(5).
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 86 citing Art 7(3) of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 11(1) and (2) of the Treaty.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 26–7.
- The claims of Portugal to East Timor and the Timor Gap.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 9.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11above, at 86 citing Art 2 Annex B of the Treaty.
- Ibid at 87 citing Art 4(3) and (4) Annex B of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 4(5) Annex B of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Arts 7, 22 and 48 of Annex B of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Arts 15, 17, 18, 20, 25, 27 and 30 of Annex B of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Arts 29 and 36(4) of Annex B of the Treaty.
- Ibid at 88 citing Arts 37 (1) and 34 of Annex B of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 48 of Annex B of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 5(1) of Annex B of the Treaty.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 15.
- Ibid at 18.
- Ibid citing Section 7.9 Annex C of the Treaty.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 88 citing Section 7.2 and 7.10 Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Section 7.3 Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Section 7.5 Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid at 89 citing Section 2.2 Annex C of the Treaty.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 15.
- Ibid citing Section 2.2(1)-(6) Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Section 3.1–3 Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Section 3.6 Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid at 16 citing Section 4.4(2) Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Section 4.4(3) Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Section 4.4(4) Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Section 4.4(5) Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Section 5.5 Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16 Annex C of the Treaty.
- Ibid at 20 citing Art 2 Annex D of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 3 Annex D of the Treaty.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 84 citing Arts 9, 10 and 11 (2) Annex D of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 4 Annex D of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Arts 5, 6, 7, 8 and 12 Annex D of the Treaty.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 21 citing Arts 14 and 15 Annex D of the Treaty.
- Robson, n 58 above, at 14; ‘Is Joint Development Possible,’ n 77 above, at 610.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11above, at 89.
- Ibid.
- Ibid citing W Martin and D Pickersgill, ‘The Timor Gap Treaty’ (1991) 32 Harv Int'l LJ 566 at 572.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 81 citing Art 23(1) of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 23(2), (3) and (4) of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 23(5) of the Treaty.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 9 citing Art 24(1) of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 24(2) of the Treaty.
- Ibid at 10 citing Art 24(3) and (4) of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 24(5), (6) and (7) of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 25 of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 26 of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 27(1)-(5) of the Treaty.
- Ibid citing Art 28 of the Treaty.
- ‘Creative Solutions and International Conflict,’ n 11 above, at 83 citing Art 29 of the Treaty.
- The Treaty has a limited life span of 40 years and successive terms of 20 years if the two states have not agreed on a permanent boundary. See Ibid at 89 citing Art 33 of the Treaty.
- Ibid.
- Ibid citing Art 30(1) and (2) of the Treaty.
- ‘International Co-operation,’ n 23 above, at 11 citing Arts 12–20 of the Treaty.
- Ibid at 24.
- Robson, n 58 above, at 19.
- Ibid.
- Townsend-Gault and Stormont, n 21 above, at 71.
- Ibid at 72.
- See n 5 above.
- Fox vol II, n 31 above, at viii.
- Ibid..
- Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 14.
- Ibid at 25.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid at U.
- Ibid at 26.
- Ibid at 11.
- Ibid at 12. The joint development of hard minerals was not included. The working group preferred to work in detail on an agreement that would broadly meet the requirements of one industry, to drawing general provisions to cover all types of production of minerals. They felt that the oil industry and the hard minerals industry were organised so differently with a different order of priorities that any agreement that managed to meet the requirements of both industries would be of such generality as to be of small practical utility to either.
- Ibid at 13.
- Ibid.
- Fox vol II, n 31 above, at ix.
- Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 193.
- Ibid.
- Ibid citing Art 3 (1) of the BIICL agreement. This is the main objective of the concept of joint development of petroleum resources.
- Ibid at 194. This is one of the elements of flexibility adopted by the BIICL agreement to demonstrate its nature as a checklist. The flexibility in the method of resource sharing is suitable where the circumstances are unknown.
- This is because of the spirit of compromise inherent in joint development that aims to bypass disputes and enable development and exploitation of resources.
- Ibid at 195 citing Arts 3(1) and 5(8) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid citing Art 3(2) of the BIICL agreement. This allows the parties to choose the content of their agreement.
- Ibid citing Art 3(3) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 196 citing Art 3(4) of the BIICL agreement. The parties are allowed a choice but the choice is limited here since it must comply with international standards.
- See Arts 3(5) and 24 of the BIICL agreement, which provide that the joint development of the zone shall be carried out with due respect for the rights of other states in the area. Portugal has claims over the Timor Gap and the area in dispute as a result its claim of ownership of East Timor.
- Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 197 citing Art 25(3) of the BIICL agreement.
- This is a check on the whims of either state party, and in the event of trivialities.
- Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 197 citing Art 22(4) of the BIICL agreement.
- Article 4(1) of the BIICL agreement.
- Fox et al, vol I, n 5 above, at 309 citing Art 5(1) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid citing Art 5(2) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 310 citing Art 5(5) of the BIICL agreement. The parties are allowed the choice of any other time they may require.
- Ibid citing Art 5 (6) of the BIICL agreement. The JC maybe the sole development authority and may delegate some or all of its administrative functions to either state party, or either state party may be the sole development authority, or both states parties may be concurrent or joint development authorities: Art 7(5) of the BIICL agreement. Where the JC is not the development authority, its functions are limited and a secretariat may not be necessary in order to save cost.
- Ibid citing Art 5(7) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 311 citing Art 5(3) and (4) of the BIICL agreement. This is a good idea because the members of the JC do not have to be experts in such matters and therefore may not have the requisite knowledge in dealing with such issues.
- Ibid the experts are not members of the JC. They merely have an advisory role.
- Ibid at 313.
- Ibid citing Art 5(10) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid citing Art 6(2) (a) and (b) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid citing Art 6(2) (c) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 314 citing Art 6(2) (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid citing Art 6(2) (h) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 198. This is a major element of flexibility.
- Ibid citing Arts 7(1) and 10 of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 199 citing Art 7(2) and (4) of the BIICL agreement. The JC shall take into account such factors as the size and location of the zone, its known characteristics (geological structure or environmental sensitivity), the degree of commercial interest in petroleum activities and the number of potential licensing areas.
- Ibid citing Art 7(5) and (6) of the BIICL agreement. The agreement aims at a single system of law and regulation governing activities in each development area. Thus the agreement provides that where the JC is the sole development authority for the zone or any development area, the JC should endeavour to agree that the law of either state party should apply. In the event of failure to agree, the law of the state party whose national is the contractor shall apply. Where a state party is the sole development authority, its laws shall apply. Where both states parties are concurrent or joint development authorities, the holders of the development contracts over the same contract area shall enter into an operating agreement and the law of the state party whose national is the operator shall apply.
- Ibid.
- Ibid at 201 citing Art 11 of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 203 citing Arts 8 and 9 of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 204 citing Art 16(1) of the BIICL agreement. This is to encourage development.
- Ibid citing Art 16(2) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid citing Arts 17 and 19 of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 202 citing Art 18 of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 204 citing Arts 20–22 of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid at 205 citing Art 23(1) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid citing Art 23(2) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid citing Art 23(3) of the BIICL agreement.
- Ibid citing Art 25(2) and (3) of the BIICL agreement.
- See n 7 above.
- ‘How Nigeria Can Help Sao Tome,’ n 44 above.
- ‘JDA Roadshow Presentation,’ n 37 above.
- See n 45 above.
- See n 46 above.
- ‘JDA Roadshow Presentation,’ n 37 above.
- Ibid Art 2 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- The BIICL agreement makes room for sharing of resources based on other factors other than equality.
- Ibid Arts 3.1 and 3.3 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- See n 180 above and accompanying text.
- Ibid Art 4 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty. The clause is also known as ‘without prejudice’ clause.
- Articles 6 and 7.2 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Articles 7.1 and 7.3 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Articles 7.4 and 7.6 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty. This provision is neither in the Timor Gap Treaty nor the BIICL agreement.
- Article 8.2 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty. See also n 91 above and accompanying text.
- Ibid.
- Article 9.2 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty. The JA under the Timor Gap Treaty also has such juridical personality.
- Articles 9.3 and 9.6 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Articles 9.4 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty. See also n 95 above and accompanying text.
- Article 9.6 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 10.1 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Ibid. This provision is neither in the Timor Gap Treaty nor in the BIICL agreement.
- Articles 10.3, 10.4 and 10.6 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Articles 10.5 and 10.7 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 14 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 11 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 15 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty; nn 196 and 97 above, and accompanying texts.
- Article 17 of the Treaty; n 99 above and accompanying text.
- Articles 19 and 20 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 21 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 22 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty; n 208 above, and accompanying text.
- Articles 23–30 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 40 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty; n 148 above, and accompanying text.
- Ibid.
- Article 40.3 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 42 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Articles 36 and 37 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 31 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Articles 45 and 46 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty. Article 45.1 provides that in the exercise of their rights and powers under the Treaty, the states parties shall take into account the rights and freedoms of other states in respect of the zone as provided under generally accepted principles of international law. The BIICL agreement also has the provision on third states, see n 183 above and accompanying text.
- Article 47 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 48 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Articles 49.2 and 49.4 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Articles 49.1 and 52 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 51 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 52.2 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- Article 5 of Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty.
- See clause 2 Appendix of the Treaty.
- Ibid cl 3.
- Article 2 of the BIICL agreement.
- ‘JDA Roadshow Presentation,’ n 37 above.
- Portugal claimed that any agreement with Indonesia by Australia over the area in dispute was invalid because Indonesia's occupation of East Timor was illegal.
- See n 84 above and accompanying text.
- See n 177 above and accompanying text. Such reasons could range from the recognition of which state has a stronger case in the dispute (as in the case of East Timor and Australia in the Timor Sea Treaty), to the size, experience, or expertise of the state parties (as in the Nigeria-Sao Tome JDA). The list of the reasons why the parties may agree to an apportionment other than equality is not exhaustive. It varies according to the needs of the state parties in each case; therefore the reasons for such unequal sharing need not be the same.
- See n 224 above and accompanying text.
- See nn 45 and 46 above.
- See n 237 above and accompanying text. The zone of cooperation in the Nigeria-Sao Tome arrangement is not tripartite in nature.
- See n 267 above.
- Article 7(6) of the BIICL agreement.
- Article 21 of the Nigeria-Sao Tome Treaty.
- Articles 2(4) and 33(3) of Timor Gap Treaty.
- Article 4(3) of the BIICL agreement.
- The claims by Portugal to East Timor and therefore to the zone of cooperation.
- See nn 183 and 255 above and accompanying texts.
- See n 153 above and accompanying text.
- See text accompanying nn 213–215 above.
- Article 48 of Nigeria-Sao Tome Treaty.
- See text accompanying nn 257–259 above.
- See G Triggs and D Bialek, ‘Current Legal Developments: Australia’ (2002) 17 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 423 at 425. See also D Bialek, ‘The New Timor Sea Treaty (TST): Opinion regarding Australia's Declarations of 21 March 2002 pursuant to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of justice and Article 298(1) (a) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ online, www.etan.org/news/2002a/05gap.htm accessed 10 December 2004. Dean Bialek stated that Australia has a strong view… that any maritime boundary dispute is best settled by negotiation ‘Changes to International Dispute Resolution,’ Joint Media Release of the Attorney-General Daryl Williams and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, 25 March 2002 cited. However, the generally-accepted view on Australia's declaration pursuant to Art 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of justice and Art 298(1) (a) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea seems to be that Australia knew that it had a weaker case in its maritime boundary dispute with East Timor, and thus withdrew from the third party/adjudicatory dispute settlement method under the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea in order to protect itself.
- See n 261 above and accompanying text.
- See n 260 above and accompanying text.
- As in the Nigeria/Sao Tome Treaty. See n 260 above and accompanying text.
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law
Volume 25, 2007 - Issue 1