On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action

References

• Anscombe, G. E. M. 1957. Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Anscombe, G. E. M. 1975. “The First Person.” In Mind & Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, edited by Samuel Guttenplan, 45–65. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ayers, M. 1991. Locke, Vol. 2. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Bermúdez, José Luis. (1995) 2018. “Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View.” In The Bodily Self, edited by José Luis Bermúdez, 53–76. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bermúdez, José Luis. 1998. The Paradox of Self-consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bermúdez, José Luis. (2003) 2018. “The Elusiveness Thesis, Immunity to Error Through Misidentification, and Privileged Access.” In The Bodily Self, edited by José Luis Bermúdez, 97–123. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bermúdez, José Luis. (2005) 2018. “The Phenomenology of Bodily Awareness.” In The Bodily Self, edited by José Luis Bermúdez, 125–154. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bermúdez, José Luis. 2011. “Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Self, edited by Saul Gallagher, 157–179. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bermúdez, José Luis. 2017. Understanding ‘I’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Boyle, Alexandria. 2018. “Mirror Self-Recognition and Self-Identification.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2): 284–303. doi:10.1111/phpr.12370.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bradley, Adam. 2021. “The Feeling of Bodily Ownership.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2): 359–379. doi:10.1111/phpr.12657.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brewer, Bill. 1995. “Bodily Awareness and the Self.” In The Body and the Self, edited by José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Eilan, 291–309. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cassam, Quassim. 1995. “Introspection and Bodily Self-ascription.” In The Body and the Self, edited by José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Elian, 311–336. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cassam, Quassim. 1997. Self and World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cassam, Quasssim. 2011. “The Embodied Self.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Self, edited by Saul Gallagher, 139–157. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cole, Jonathan. 1991. Pride and a Daily Marathon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cole, Jonathan. 2016. Losing Touch: A Man Without His Body. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cole, Jonathan, and Jacques Paillard. 1995. “Living Without Touch and Peripheral Information about Body Position and Movement: Studies with Deafferented Subjects.” In The Body and the Self, edited by José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Eilan, 245–266. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Evans, Gareth. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Evans, Nathan, Steven Gale, Aaron Shurger, and Olaf Blanke. 2015. “Visual Feedback Dominates the Sense of Agency for Brain-Machine Actions.” PLoS ONE 10 (6): e0130019. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130019.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frege, Gottlob. 1956. “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 65 (259): 289–311. doi:10.1093/mind/65.1.289.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gallagher, Shaun. 2005. How the Body Shapes the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gallagher, Shaun, and Jonathan Cole. 1995. “Body Image and Body Schema in a Deafferented Subject.” The Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (4): 369–389.
   Google Scholar
• Gibson, James J. 1966. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
   Google Scholar
• Gibson, James J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
   Google Scholar
• Guillot, Marie. 2016. “Thinking of Oneself as the Thinker: The Concept of Self and the Phenomenology of Intellection.” Philosophical Explorations 19 (2): 138–160. doi:10.1080/13869795.2016.1176232.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Howe, Kathleen A. 2018. “Proprioceptive Awareness and Practical Unity.” Teorema 37 (3): 65–81. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=6561773.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ingram, H. A., P. van Donkelaar, J. Cole, J. L. Vercher, G. M. Gauthier, and R. C. Miall. 2000. “The Role of Proprioception and Attention in a Visuomotor Adaptation Task.” Experimental Brain Research 132 (1): 114–126. doi:10.1007/s002219900322.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Künne, Wolfgang. 1997. “First Person Propositions: A Fregean Account.” In Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes, edited by Wolfgang Künne, Albert Newen, and Martin Andaschus, 49–69. Stanford, CA: CSLI.
   Google Scholar
• Lajoie, Y., J. Paillard, N. Teasdale, C. Bard, M. Fleaury, R. Forget, and Y. Lamarre. 1992. “Mirror Drawing in a Deafferented Patient and Normal Subjects: Visoproprioceptive Conflict.” Neurology 42 (5): 1104–1104. doi:10.1212/WNL.42.5.1104.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Longworth, Guy. 2013. “Sharing Thoughts About Oneself.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 113 (1): 57–81. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00345.x.
   Google Scholar
• Ludlow, Peter. 2019. Interperspectival Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Martin, M. G. F. 1993. “Sense Modalities and Spatial Properties.” In Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology, edited by Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen McCarthy, and Bill Brewer, 206–218. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Martin, M. G. F. 1995. “Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership.” In In The Body and The Self, edited by José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Eilan, 267–289. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Martin, M. G. F. 1997. “Self-Observation.” European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2): 119–140. doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00032.
   Google Scholar
• Miall, R. Chris, and Jonathan Cole. 2007. “Evidence for Stronger Visuo-Motor Than Visuo-Proprioceptive Conflict During Mirror Drawing Performed by a Deafferented Subject and Control Subjects.” Experimental Brain Research 176 (3): 432–439. doi:10.1007/s00221-006-0626-0.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morgan, Daniel. 2019. “Thinking About the Body as Subject.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4): 435–457. doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1482432.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• O’Shaughnessy, Brian. 1980. The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• O’Shaughnessy, Brian. 1989. “The Sense of Touch.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1): 37–58. doi:10.1080/00048408912343671.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• O’Shaughnessy, Brian. 1995. “Proprioception and the Body Image.” In The Body and the Self, edited by José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Eilan, 175–203. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Paillard, Jacques. 1999. “Body Schema and Body Image: A Double Dissociation in Deafferented Patients.” In Motor Control, Today and Tomorrow, edited by Gantcho N. Gantchev, Shigemi Mori, and Jean Massion, 197–214. Sofia: Academic Publishing House.
   Google Scholar
• Peacocke, Cristopher. 2014. The Mirror of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Perry, Jerry. 1977. “Frege on Demonstratives.” The Philosophical Review 86 (4): 474–497. doi:10.2307/2184564.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Perry, Jerry. 1979. “The Problem of the Essential Indexical.” Noûs 13 (1): 3–21. doi:10.2307/2214792.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pryor, James. 1999. “Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.” Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2): 271–304. doi:10.5840/philtopics1999261/246.
   Google Scholar
• Rödl, Sebastian. 2007. Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schwenkler, John. 2013. “The Objects of Bodily Awareness.” Philosophical Studies 162 (2): 465–472. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9777-3.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shoemaker, Sydney. 1968. “Self-reference and Self-awareness.” The Journal of Philosophy 65 (19): 555–567. doi:10.2307/2024121.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Skiba, Lukas. 2017. “Frege’s Unthinkable Thoughts.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3): 333–343. doi:10.1093/arisoc/aox011.
   Google Scholar
• Verdejo, Víctor M. 2018. “Thought Sharing, Communication and Perspectives About the Self.” Dialectica 72 (4): 487–507. doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12250.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Verdejo, Víctor M. 2021a. “Perspectives on De Se Immunity.” Synthese 198 (10): 10089–10107. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03122-7.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Verdejo, Víctor M. 2021b. “The Second Person Perspective.” Erkenntnis 86 (6): 1693–1711. doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00177-4.
   Google Scholar
• Verdejo, Víctor M. manuscript. “Self-Knowledge by Observation”.
   Google Scholar
• Vignemont, Frédérique. 2016. “Bodily Affordances and Bodily Experiences.” In Perceptual and Emotional Embodiment: Foundations of Embodied Cognition, Vol. 1, edited by Yann Coello, and Martin H. Fisher, 149–164. Abingdon: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Vignemont, Frédérique. 2018. Mind the Body. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wong, Hong Yu. 2014. “On the Multimodality of Body Perception in Action.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (11/12): 130–139.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wong, Hong Yu. 2015. “On the Significance of Bodily Awareness for Bodily Action.” The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261): 790–812. doi:10.1093/pq/pqv007.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wong, Hong Yu. 2016. “The Body Schema as a Condition of Possibility for Action.” In Perceptual and Emotional Embodiment: Foundations of Embodied Cognition, Vol. 1, edited by Yann Coello and Martin H. Fisher, 135–148. Abingdon: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Wong, Hong Yu. 2017. “On Proprioception in Action: Multimodality versus Deafferentation.” Mind & Language 32 (3): 259–282. doi:10.1111/mila.12142.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wong, Hong Yu. 2018. “Embodied Agency.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3): 584–612. doi:10.1111/phpr.12392.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar