Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible?

References

• Aizawa, Kenneth. 2018. “Extended Cognition, Trust and Glue, and Knowledge.” In Extended Epistemology, edited by Duncan Pritchard, Andy Clark, J. Adam Carter, Orestis Palermos, and Jesper Kallestrup. Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0004.
   Google Scholar
• Audi, Robert. 2015. Rational Belief: Structure, Grounds, and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• BonJour, Laurence. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
   Google Scholar
• Breyer, Daniel S. 2013. “Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4): 503–528. doi:10.1111/papq.12011.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Breyer, Daniel, and John Greco. 2008. “Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief: Response to Bernecker.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1): 173–184. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40041158. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00121.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carter, J. Adam. 2018. “Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition.” In The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, 1st ed., edited by Heather Battaly, 420–432. New York, London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315712550-35.
   Google Scholar
• Carter, J. Adam, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, and Duncan Pritchard, eds. 2018. Extended Epistemology. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Carter, J. Adam, Andy Clark, and Orestis Palermos. 2018. “New Humans?” In In Extended Epistemology, First edition, edited by J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, and Duncan Pritchard. Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Carter, J. Adam, and Bolesław Czarnecki. 2016. “Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259–273. doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9738-x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carter, J. Adam, and Jesper Kallestrup. 2020. “Varieties of Cognitive Integration.” Noûs 54 (4): 867–890. doi:10.1111/nous.12288.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carter, J Adam, and Duncan Pritchard. 2019. “The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement.” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 44 (2): 220–242. doi:10.1093/jmp/jhy040.
   Google Scholar
• Chisholm, Roderick M. 1977. Theory of Knowledge. 2nd ed. Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.
   Google Scholar
• Clark, Andy. 2001. “Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind.” Mind & Language 16 (2): 121–145. doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00162.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clark, Andy. 2003. Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Clark, Andy. 2008. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Philosophy of Mind. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Clark, Andy. 2010. “Coupling, Constitution, and the Cognitive Kind: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa.” In The Extended Mind, edited by Richard Menary, 81–99. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0005.
   Google Scholar
• Clark, Andy. 2013. “Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future of Cognitive Science.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3): 181–204. doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000477.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clark, Andy. 2015. “What ‘Extended Me’ Knows.” Synthese 192 (11): 3757–3775. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0719-z.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clark, Andy. 2016. “Attention Alters Predictive Processing.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39: e234. doi:10.1017/S0140525X15002472.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clark, Andy. 2017. “How to Knit Your Own Markov Blanket:How to Knit Your Own Markov Blanket:: Resisting the Second Law with Metamorphic Minds: Resisting the Second Law with Metamorphic Minds.” Philosophy and Predictive Processing, doi:10.15502/9783958573031.
   Google Scholar
• Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. 1998. “The Extended Mind.” Analysis 58 (1): 7–19. doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Colombetti, Giovanna, and Tom Roberts. 2015. “Extending the Extended Mind: The Case for Extended Affectivity.” Philosophical Studies 172 (5): 1243–1263. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0347-3.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Colombo, Matteo. 2013. “Constitutive Relevance and the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.” Philosophical Psychology 26 (4): 547–570. doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.667623.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dennett, Daniel C. 1969. Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Drayson, Zoe. 2010. “Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind.” Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4): 367–377. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.05.002.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drayson, Zoe. 2012. “The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.” Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 1–18. doi:10.1111/phpe.12014.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Greco, John. 2003. “Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 466–480. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00275.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Greco, John. 2007. “The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge.” Philosophical Issues 17 (1): 57–69. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00122.x.
   Google Scholar
• Greco, John. 2010. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511844645.
   Google Scholar
• Greco, John, and Ernest Sosa1999. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Malden, Mass: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Hernández-Orallo, José, and Karina Vold. 2019. “AI Extenders: The Ethical and Societal Implications of Humans Cognitively Extended by AI.” In Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 507–513. Honolulu HI USA: ACM. doi:10.1145/3306618.3314238.
   Google Scholar
• Hetherington, Stephen. 2012. “The Extended Knower.” Philosophical Explorations 15 (2): 207–218. doi:10.1080/13869795.2012.670721.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hohwy, Jakob. 2013. The Predictive Mind. First edition. Oxford, New York, United Kingdom: NY: United States of America: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hohwy, Jakob. 2014. “The-Self Evidencing Brain.” Noûs 48 (1). doi:10.1111/nous.12062.
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Hornsby, Jennifer. 2000. “Personal and sub-Personal; A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction.” Philosophical Explorations 3 (1): 6–24. doi:10.1080/13869790008520978.
   Google Scholar
• Hutton, Eric L. 2018. “Extended Knowledge and Confucian Tradition.” In Extended Epistemology, edited by Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard. New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0011.
   Google Scholar
• Kornblith, Hilary. 1983. “Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action.” The Philosophical Review 92 (1): 33–48. doi:10.2307/2184520.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kornblith, Hilary. 2012. On Reflection. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lehrer, Keith. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lynch, Michael Patrick. 2014. “Neuromedia, Extended Knowledge and Understanding.” Philosophical Issues 24: 299–313. doi:10.1111/phis.12035.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McDowell, John. 1994. “The Content of Perceptual Experience.” The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 44 (175): 190–205. doi:10.2307/2219740.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Menary, Richard, ed. 2010. The Extended Mind. Life and Mind. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Menary, Richard, ed. 2013. “Cognitive Integration, Enculturated Cognition and the Socially Extended Mind.” Cognitive Systems Research 25–26 (December): 26–34. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.05.002.
   Google Scholar
• Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. http://archive.org/details/isbn_9780674664791.
   Google Scholar
• Palermos, Spyridon Orestis. 2011. “Belief-Forming Processes, Extended.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4): 741–765. doi:10.1007/s13164-011-0075-y.
   Google Scholar
• Palermos, Spyridon Orestis. 2014. “Knowledge and Cognitive Integration.” Synthese 191 (8): 1931–1951. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0383-0.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Palermos, Spyridon Orestis. 2015. “Active Externalism, Virtue Reliabilism and Scientific Knowledge.” Synthese 192 (9): 2955–2986. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0695-3.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Palermos, Spyridon Orestis. 2016. “Spreading the Credit: Virtue Reliabilism and Weak Epistemic Anti-Individualism.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 305–334. doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9741-2.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Palermos, Spyridon Orestis. 2020. “Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism.” Erkenntnis, April. doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00258-9.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Palermos, Spyridon Orestis. 2021. “System Reliabilism and Basic Beliefs: Defeasible, Undefeated and Likely to be True.” Synthese 199 (3-4): 6733–6759. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03090-y.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Peels, Rik. 2017. Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2007. “Anti-Luck Epistemology,” 22.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2008. “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited.” Metaphilosophy 39 (1): 66–88. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24439957. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00522.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2009. Knowledge. doi:10.1057/9780230242241.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2010. “Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis.” Synthese 175: 133–151. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40801360. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9738-y.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2012. “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.” Journal of Philosophy 109 (3): 247–279. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43820700. doi:10.5840/jphil201210939.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2014. “The Modal Account of Luck.” Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5): 594–619. doi:10.1111/meta.12103.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2016. Epistemology. 2nd edition. Palgrave Philosophy Today. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2017. “Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue: Resolving the Gettier Problem.” In . Vol. 1, edited by Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter D Klein. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2018a. “Neuromedia and the Epistemology of Education.” Metaphilosophy 49 (3): 328–349. doi:10.1111/meta.12295.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2018b. “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat.” Synthese 195 (7): 3065–3077. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1074-4.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pritchard, Duncan. 2018c. “Extended Virtue Epistemology.” Inquiry 61 (5-6): 632–647. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1355842.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Proust, Joëlle. 2014. “Epistemic Action, Extended Knowledge, and Metacognition.” Philosophical Issues 24 (1): 364–392. doi:10.1111/phis.12038.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rowlands, Mark. 2010. The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rupert, Robert D. 2009. Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. Philosophy of Mind. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sosa, Ernest. 1988. “Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge.” Mind, New Series 97 (386): 153–188. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255164. doi:10.1093/mind/XCVII.386.153.
   Google Scholar
• Sosa, Ernest, and Alvin Plantinga. 1993. “Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology.” Noûs 27 (1): 51. doi:10.2307/2215895.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Steup, Matthias. 1999. “A Defense of Internalism.” In The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed., edited by L. Pojman. Australia; Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Stich, Stephen. 1978. “Beliefs and Subdoxastic States.” Philosophy of Science 45 (4): 499–518. doi:10.1086/288832.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Vaesen, Krist. 2011. “Knowledge Without Credit, Exhibit 4: Extended cognition.” Synthese 181 (3): 515–529. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9744-0.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wallisch, Pascal. 2017. “Illumination Assumptions Account for Individual Differences in the Perceptual Interpretation of a Profoundly Ambiguous Stimulus in the Color Domain: “the Dress”.” Journal of Vision 17 (4): 5. doi:10.1167/17.4.5.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wheeler, Michael. 2010. “In Defense of Extended Functionalism.” In The Extended Mind, edited by Richard Menary, 245–270. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0010.
   Google Scholar
• Wheeler, Michael. 2018. “Knowledge, Credit, and the Extended Mind, or What Calvisius Sabinus Got Right.” In Extended Epistemology, edited by Duncan Pritchard, Andy Clark, J. Adam Carter, Orestis Palermos, and Jesper Kallestrup. Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0004.
   Google Scholar
• Wikforss, Åsa. 2014. “Extended Belief and Extended Knowledge.” Philosophical Issues 24: 460–481. doi:10.2307/26611116.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Witzel, Christoph, Chris Racey, and J. Kevin O’Regan. 2017. “The Most Reasonable Explanation of “the Dress”: Implicit Assumptions About Illumination.” Journal of Vision 17 (2): 1. doi:10.1167/17.2.1.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar