Fixing internalism about perceptual content

References

• Bach, Kent. 2007. “Searle against the World: How Can Experiences Find Their Objects?” In John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, 64–78. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Barwise, Jon, and John Etchemendy. 1987. The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Brogaard, Berit. 2010a. “Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception.” In A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven Hales, 137–158. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Brogaard, Berit. 2010b. “Strong Representationalism and Centered Content.” Philosophical Studies 151: 373–392. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9437-z.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Burge, Tyler. 1991. “Vision and Intentional Content.” In John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore, and Robert Van Gulick, 195–214. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, David. 2004. “The Representational Character of Experience.” In The Future for Philosophy, edited by Brian Leiter, 153–181. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, David. 2006. “Perception and the Fall from Eden.” In Perceptual Experience, edited by Tamar Szabo Gendler, and John Hawthorne, 49–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chisholm, Roderick. 1981. The First Person. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Egan, Andy. 2006a. “Appearance Properties?” Noûs 40 (3): 495–521. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00621.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Egan, Andy. 2006b. “Secondary Qualities and Self-Location.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 97–119. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00492.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Feit, Neil. 2008. Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Grice, Herbert P., and Alan R. White. 1961. “The Causal Theory of Perception.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35 (Supplementary Volume): 121–168. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/35.1.121.
   Google Scholar
• Kaplan, David. 1989. “Demonstratives.” In Themes from Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, 481–563. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David. 1979. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.” The Philosophical Review 88 (4): 513–543. doi:10.2307/2184843.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Loar, Brian. 1976. “The Semantics of Singular Terms.” Philosophical Studies 30: 353–377. doi:10.1007/BF00372537.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Magidor, Ofra. 2015. “The Myth of the De Se.” Philosophical Perspectives 29: 249–283. doi:10.1111/phpe.12065
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McGinn, Colin. 1982. The Character of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ninan, Dilip. 2013. “Self-Location and Other-Location.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2): 301–331. doi:10.1111/phpr.12051.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Peacocke, Christopher. 1992. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Putnam, Hilary. 1975. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7: 131–193.
   Google Scholar
• Recanati, François. 2007. Perspectival Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schellenberg, Susanna. 2014. “The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience.” In Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, 199–219. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Searle, John R. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Searle, John R. 2015. Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Soteriou, Matthew. 2000. “The Particularity of Visual Perception.” European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2): 173–189. doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00107.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stalnaker, Robert. 1981. “Indexical Belief.” Synthese 49 (1): 129–151. doi:10.1007/BF01063917.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stalnaker, Robert. 2008. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tye, Michael. 2014. “What Is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience?” In Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, 291–309. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar