Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts

References

• Boghossian, Paul. 1989. “The Rule-Following Considerations.” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 98 (392): 507–549. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCVIII.392.507.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boghossian, Paul. 2012. “Blind Rule-Following.” In Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Annalisa Coliva, 27–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Byrne, Alex. 1998. “Interpretivism.” European Review of Philosophy 3: 199–223.
   Google Scholar
• Child, William. 1994. Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Oxford: Oxford Uniervsity Press.
   Google Scholar
• Curry, Devin Sanchez. 2020. “Interpretivism and Norms.” Philosophical Studies 177 (4): 905–930. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1212-6.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1978. “Intending.” In Philosophy of History and Action, edited by Yirmiyahu Yovel, 41–60. Dordretch: D. Reidel.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1982. “Rational Animals.” Dialectica 36 (4): 317–328. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1982.tb01546.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1984. “First Person Authority.” Dialectica 38: 101–112. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01238.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1986. “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.” In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernie Lepore, 307–319. Cambridge, M.A.: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1987. “Knowing One’s Own Mind.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3): 441–458. https://doi.org/10.2307/3131782.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1991. “Three Varieties of Knowledge.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30: 153–166. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100007748.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1992. “The Second Person.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1): 255–267. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1992.tb00154.x.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1994. “The Social Aspect of Language.” In The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, edited by Brian McGuinness, 1–16. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1999. “The Emergence of Thought.” Erkenntnis 51 (1): 7–17.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 2000. “Truth Rehabilitated.” In Rorty and His Critics, edited by R. B. Brandom, 65–74. Cambridge, M.A.: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 2001. “What Thought Requires.” In The Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by João Branquinho, 121–132. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• DeLancey, Craig. 2004. Passionate Engines. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dennett, Daniel. 1979. “True Believers.” In Scientific Explanation, edited by A. F. Heath, 150–167. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Daniel Dennett (1987), The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MIT Press), 13–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Fodor, Jerry, and Ernie Lepore. 1992. Holism: A Shopper’s Guide. Cambridge, M.A.: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Glüer, Kathrin. 2006. “Triangulation.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernie Lepore, and Barry Smith, 1006–1019. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Glüer, Kathrin. 2011. Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Holton, Richard. 1992. “Response-Dependence and Infallibility.” Analysis 52 (3): 180–184. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/52.3.180.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hossein Khani, Ali. 2018a. “Quine on the Indeterminacy of Translation: A Dilemma for Davidson.” Dialectica 72 (1): 101–120. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12217.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hossein Khani, Ali. 2018b. “Review of ‘Donald Davidson’s Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry’, by Claudine Verheggen and Robert Myers (NY: Routledge, 2016).” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (1): 113–117. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2018.1415695.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hossein Khani, Ali. 2019. “Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s Sceptical Paradox: A Trilemma for Davidson.” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1): 21–37. https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20181304.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hossein Khani, Ali. 2020. “Davidson’s Wittgenstein.” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (5): 1–26.
   Google Scholar
• Hossein Khani, Ali. 2021a. “The Indeterminacy of Translation and Radical Interpretation.” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP). https://iep.utm.edu/indeterm.
   Google Scholar
• Hossein Khani, Ali. 2021b. “Interpretationism and Judgement-Dependence.” Synthese 198 (10): 9639–9659. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02670-8.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hossein Khani, Ali. 2022. “Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 61 (2): 369–391. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217321000214.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hossein Khani, Ali. 2023a. “Intention, Judgement-Dependence, and Self-Deception.” Res Philosophica 100 (2): 203–226. https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2259.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hossein Khani, Ali. 2023b. “The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism.” Acta Analytica 38 (1): 161–183. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00509-0.
   Google Scholar
• Johnston, Mark. 1989. “Dispositional Theories of Value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63: 139–174.
   Google Scholar
• Johnston, Mark. 1992. “How to Speak of the Colors.” Philosophical Studies 68 (3): 221–263. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00694847.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Johnston, Mark. 1993. “Objectivity Disfigured.” In Reality, Representation, and Projection, edited by Crispin Wright, and John Haldane. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kriegel, Uriah. 2011. The Sources of Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ludwig, Kirk, and Ernie Lepore. 2005. Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Miller, Alexander. 1989. “An Objection to Wright’s Treatment of Intention.” Analysis 49 (4): 169–173. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/49.4.169.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Miller, Alexander. 2007. “Another Objection to Wright’s Treatment of Intention.” Analysis 67 (3): 257–263. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/67.3.257.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mölder, Bruno. 2010. Mind Ascribed. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Pettit, Philip. 1991. “Realism and Response-Dependence.” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 100 (4): 587–626.
   Google Scholar
• Pettit, Philip. 1998. “Terms, Things and Response-Dependence.” European Review of Philosophy 3: 55–66.
   Google Scholar
• Powell, Mark. 1998. “Realism or Response-Dependence.” European Review of Philosophy 3: 1–13.
   Google Scholar
• Railton, Peter. 1998. “Red, Bitter, Good.” European Review of Philosophy 3: 67–84.
   Google Scholar
• Verheggen, Claudine, and Robert Myers. 2016. Donald Davidson’s Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. MS: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Wright, Crispin. 1988. “Moral Values, Projection and Secondary Qualities.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62 (1): 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/62.1.1.
   Google Scholar
• Wright, Crispin. 1992. Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wright, Crispin. 2001. Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wright, Crispin. 2012. “Replies.” In Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge, edited by Annalisa Coliva, 377–486. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar