Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies

References

• Allen, K. 2016. A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Alston, W. P. 1999. “Back to the Theory of Appearing.” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 181–203.
   Google Scholar
• Averill, E. W. 1992. “The Relational Nature of Color.” Philosophical Review 101 (3): 551–588. https://doi.org/10.2307/2186057
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bourget, D. 2020. “Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.” In Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar, edited by A. Sullivan, 137–166. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Butchvarov, P. 1980. “Adverbial Theories of Consciousness.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 261–280. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00407.x
   Google Scholar
• Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 1997. “Colors and Reflectances.” In Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color, edited by A. Byrne, and D. R. Hilbert, 263–288. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2007. “Color Primitivism.” Erkenntnis 66 (1-2): 73–105. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9028-8
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Campbell, J. 1993. “A Simple View of Colour.” In Reality, Representation, and Projection, edited by J. Haldane, and C. Wright, 257–268. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Campbell, J. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Campbell, J. 2005. “Transparency versus Revelation in Color Perception.” Philosophical Topics 33 (1): 105–115. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20053313
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, D. J. 2010. “Perception and the Fall from Eden.” In The Character of Consciousness, 381–454. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cohen, J. 2009. The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cohen, J. 2012. “Precis of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.” Analytic Philosophy 53 (3): 288–296. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2153-960X.2012.00568.x
   Google Scholar
• Crane, T. 2006. “Is There a Perceptual Relation?” In Perceptual Experience, edited by T. S. Gendler, and J. Hawthorne, 126–146. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ducasse, C. J. 1942. “Moore’s Refutation of Idealism.” In The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, edited by P. A. Schilpp, 223–251. 1st ed. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Fish, W. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Foster, J. 2000. The Nature of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gert, J. 2010. “Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual.” Nous 44 (4): 669–690. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00753.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gert, J. 2013. “Color Constancy and Dispositionalism.” Philosophical Studies 162 (2): 183–200. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9754-x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gert, J. 2017. Primitive Colors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Harman, G. 1990. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.” Philosophical Perspectives 4: 31–52. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214186
   Google Scholar
• Hatfield, G. 2016. “Perceiving as Having Subjectively Conditioned Appearances.” Philosophical Topics 44 (2): 149–178. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201644221
   Google Scholar
• Kriegel, U. 2007. “Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.” Philosophical Perspectives 21: 307–340. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Langsam, H. 1997. “The Theory of Appearing Defended.” Philosophical Studies 87 (1): 33–59. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1002994402591
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Langsam, H. 2000. “Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions.” Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198): 68–75. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00168
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Langsam, H. 2017. “The Intuitive Case for Naïve Realism.” Philosophical Explorations 20 (1): 106–122. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2016.1222627
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Levin, J. 2000. “Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense.” Philosophical Studies 100 (2): 151–174. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018660204635
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Papineau, D. 2021. The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pautz, A. 2010. “Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?” In Perceiving the World, edited by B. Nanay, 254–309. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Peacocke, C. 2008. “Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1): 7–24.
   Google Scholar
• Shoemaker, S. 1990. “Qualities and Qualia: What’s in the Mind?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (supp.): 109–131. https://doi.org/10.2307/2108035
   Google Scholar
• Smith, A. D. 2002. The Problem of Perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. 2005. “Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions About Colours.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2): 235–251. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2005.00174.x
   Google Scholar