The Irreversibility Paradox: What Makes for Enduring Arms Control and Disarmament

References

• American Journal of Law. 2017. “Russia Suspends Bilateral Agreement with United States Disposal of Weapons-Grade Plutonium.” https://www.jstor.org/stable/26568831.
   Google Scholar
• Anthony, I. 2011. Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament. SIPRI.
   Google Scholar
• Arms Control Association. 2023. Factsheet: New START at a Glance. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NewSTART.
   Google Scholar
• Bugos, S. 2022. Russia Further Pauses New START Inspections. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-09/news/russia-further-pauses-new-start-inspections.
   Google Scholar
• Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. 2021. Fact Sheet: Disposal of Weapons-Grade Plutonium: Current Plans and Controversy. https://armscontrolcenter.org/mox-fuel-program-current-plans-and-controversy/.
   Google Scholar
• Cliff, D. 2011. Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament, Practical Steps Against Nuclear Rearmament. Vertic.
   Google Scholar
• Coe, A., and J. Vaynman. 2019. “Why Arms Control is so Rare.” The American Political Science Review 114 (2): 342–355. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541900073X.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Egeland, K. 2022. “A Theory of Nuclear Disarmament: Cases, Analogies, and the Role of the Non-Proliferation Regime.” Contemporary Security Policy 43:106–133. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1978159.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gwadera, Z. 2022. “Report: Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament.” Wilton Park.
   Google Scholar
• International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification. 2018. “Food-For-Thought Paper: Achieving Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament.”
   Google Scholar
• Koch, S. J. 2012. Case Studies: The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University.
   Google Scholar
• Lazaroff, T. 2014. “Netanyahu Urges Germany Not to Allow Iran to Enrich Uranium,” The Jerusalem Post. 25 February 2014. https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Netanyahu-urges-Germany-not-to-allow-Iran-to-enrich-uranium-343555.
   Google Scholar
• Leitenberg, M., and R. Zilinskas. 2012. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History. Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Meselson, Matthew, and R. Jullian. 2008. “The Yellow Rain Affair.” In Terrorism, War, or Disease, edited by A. Clunan, et al.
   Google Scholar
• Mutimer, D. 2011. “From Arms Control to Denuclearization: Governmentality and the Abolitionist Desire.” Contemporary Security Policy 32:57–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.556844.
   Google Scholar
• Nations, U. 1975. “Article XII, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.” https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/BWC-text-English-1.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Nikitin. 2016. Recent Developments in U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation. Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/IN10594.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Oberdorfer, D., and L. Cannon. 1987. Summit Declared a ‘Success’. Washington Post.
   Google Scholar
• Pelopidas, B. 2015. “Renunciation, Reversal, and Restraint.” In Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy, edited by J. Pilat and N. E. Busch, 45–55. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Podvig, P. 2023. “Google Forms Survey with the Authors.” Online. January.
   Google Scholar
• Pompeo, M. 2019. U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State Press Statement.
   Google Scholar
• Ritchie, N. 2022. “Contestation of Nuclear Ontologies: Resisting Nuclearism and Reimagining the Politics of Nuclear Disarmament.” International Relations. 004711782211229. https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221122959.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rodriguez, J. L. 2023. “Report: Moving Forward on Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament.” Wilton Park.
   Google Scholar
• Sagan, S. 2010. “Shared Responsibility for Nuclear Disarmament.” In Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate. American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
   Google Scholar
• Senate, U. S. 2010. Roll Call Vote 111th Congress – 2nd. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1112/vote_111_2_00298.htm.
   Google Scholar
• United Nations. 2000. Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document. NPT/CONF.2000/28, New York.
   Google Scholar
• United Nations. 2023. Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures. https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of State. 2009. Statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense. Official Translation. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/140408.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of State. 2010a. Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement Factsheet. www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Dept_of_State_2000_Plutonium_Management_and_Disposition_Agreement_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of State. 2010b. U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. International Panel on Fissile Materials. https://fissilematerials.org/blog/2010/05/us-russian_plutonium_mana.html.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of State. 2022. Factsheet: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Disarmament. “US Delegation to the Tenth Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference.” https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/NPT-Disarmament-Pillar-Fact-Sheet-7.27.2022.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of State. 2023. “Report to the Senate on the Status of Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons Negotiations.” US Department of State.
   Google Scholar
• US Senate. 2010. “Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate 111th Congress, 2nd Session. Responses to Secretary Clinton to Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar.” https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/022410_Transcript_Foreign%20Policy%20Priorities%20in%20the%20FY11%20Intl%20Affairs%20Budget.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Vaynman, J. 2021. “Better Monitoring and Better Spying: The Implications of Emerging Technology for Arms Control.” Texas National Security Review 4 (4): 33–56.
   Google Scholar
• Wheeler, N. J. 2018. Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Williams, H. W. 2019. “Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic Stability: Scenarios for Limiting Hypersonic Glide Vehicles.” Journal of Strategic Studies 42 (6): 789–813. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1627521.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wilson, G. 1987. “Sen. Nunn Urges Escape Clause for INF Treaty.” Washington Post. 25 April 1987. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/04/25/sen-nunn-urges-escape-clause-for-inf-treaty/32fac37f-f377-4b6a-996e-54e499f0cf80/.
   Google Scholar
• Woolf, A., and P. Podvig. 2019. Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance Resolution in U.S.-Russian Arms Control. UNIDIR.
   Google Scholar
• Zarimpas, N. 2003. Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Zhao, T. 2023. “Google Forms Survey with the Authors.” Online. January.
   Google Scholar