Citizens’ preferences and the future of Europe: a case for the ‘five scenarios’ as deliberative entry-points in mini-publics

ABSTRACT

Mini publics have become cornerstones of the European Union’s Future of Europe (FoE) initiative. However, weaknesses in their designs bring their political influence into question. Often-unsystematic in design, they fail to strengthen participants' understandings of the issues under evaluation and induce silo-thinking and the formation of pseudo-preferences. These come at a cost to informed and deliberatively deduced recommendations which speak to underlying functional/operational technicalities which fundamentally determine the form and delivery of policy interests. Guided by the adage that form follows function, this paper argues that mini publics pertaining to the FoE must primarily encourage participants to think about the ways policies are made in the EU before they formulate policy recommendations. To do this, they must consider the EU’s overall form (or prospective forms). Utilising data from focus group analysis, the paper demonstrates that scenario (vignette) models are conducive to strengthening participants’ understandings of both existing and alternative EU forms, and their functional consequences for EU policies, thus enabling them to formulate concrete and potentially deliverable policy recommendations. Subsequently, the paper encourages organisers of relevant mini-publics to employ the European Commission’s ‘Five Scenarios for the FoE’ as entry-points to strengthen the deliberative quality and democratic outputs of such exercises.

KEYWORDS:

• Future of Europe
• deliberation
• participation
• preferences
• policy
• five scenarios

Introduction

The European Union’s (EU) Future of Europe (FoE) initiative is rooted in the Bratislava and Rome Declarations which were signed by European leaders in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The initiative is built on the long-standing principles of incorporating citizens into shaping Europe’s future direction. Since its launch, multiple mini publics have been hosted across the Union. The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) 2021–2022 was the latest, yet seemingly most transnational of these interactions to date. Despite the growth in participatory democracy in the EU, and simultaneous utterances of a so-called ‘deliberative turn’ or ‘deliberative wave’, this paper argues that exercises in participatory democracy on the FoE are continuously strained by methodological inadequacies. Whilst there is an abundance of quantitative data that captures general attitudes toward the EU (see Eurobarometer 2006, 2012, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2021, 2022), there is minimal data which effectively captures EU citizens’ preferences in terms of European governance (decision-making procedures); simply because they are rarely inferred. As evident from the conclusions of European Citizens Dialogues (CDs) on the FoE, and the recent CoFoE, the designs of these exercises lead participants (intentionally or unintentionally) to silo-think and proffer predominantly policy-focused pseudo-preferences based on ideal outcomes, rather than critically formed concrete recommendations informed by contemporary and/or prospective institutional/policy-making constraints in the EU. EU leaders cannot deliver satisfactory policies when they fundamentally lack understanding of citizens’ deeper preferences for European integration and decision-making. Lacking such intel fundamentally leads to a knowledge deficit across the elite sphere which necessarily misinforms the blueprint for the EU’s future.

There is a need for a collective research agenda between the EU and deliberative democracy scholarships whereby practical lessons are drawn from the scale of existing deliberative experiments (Cengiz 2018, 585). This paper contributes toward such an agenda by calling for operational changes in participatory/deliberative spaces, or mini publics (see Fung 2015) which can strengthen the input-output legitimacy between citizens and elites regarding the future direction of the EU. Whilst multiple measures can be taken to improve deliberation, this paper suggests a rarely considered but effective method for enhancing the deliberative experience in such spaces. Supported by data collated from focus groups in the form of scenario workshops, this paper argues that scenario (vignette) models are conducive to establishing much-needed critical ‘entry-points’ to strengthen deliberation, and citizens recommendations for the FoE, by enhancing their understanding of the EU’s functioning. It suggests that the European Commission’s Five Scenarios for the FoE are particularly appropriate entry-points for such an endeavour. Inspired by scholarship in the fields of climate, and environmental policies, scenario models strengthen participants knowledge and understanding of policy-making constraints inherent in current and prospective models of EU integration. Such knowledge is a vital prerequisite to any exercise in formulating policy recommendations for elite viewing, and through engagement with such entry-points as the Five Scenarios, participants would not only be better positioned to inform the future architecture of the European Union in structural (institutional) and functional (policymaking) terms but could also be better equipped to refine their policy preferences, in turn strengthening their policy-based recommendations.

Future of Europe debate

The debate on the FoE necessarily predates the establishment of the European Community via the Treaty of Paris (1951). An ongoing process, it is fuelled by the fact that the European project was created without a specific institutional or functional end in sight. In the words of Robert Schuman ‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan’ but would be incremental and gradualist in approach based on the convergence of national wills’ over time and subject to collective responses to functional challenges (europa.eu 2020). If European integration remains open-ended without a definitive ‘end’ in sight, then a perpetual debate on its future trajectory is to be expected.

The debate tends to draw greatest attention from policymakers (and citizens) during times of crises, which bring into question the economic and political viability of the Union, and/or its ability to sustain itself. Functional pressures throughout the Union have often prompted member-states to judiciously alter EU treaties. These changes manifest in institutional and policy-making developments which fashion the intergovernmental cum supranational make-up of EU integration and governance, especially experienced since the early 1990s (Moravcsik 1998). However, influenced by institutional and policy-making shortcomings implicit in these models of governance and policy delivery, a post-functionalist turn has emerged across Europe and its various manifestations are now urging scholars, decision-makers, and citizens, to rethink the future of the EU along constitutional lines (Crum 2023).

A democratic deficit exists in the EU (Cengiz 2018), and its origins are largely attributed to the competing cleavages underlying the EU’s constitutional make-up. A unique interplay between supranational and intergovernmental institutions, the EU represents 27 sovereign nation-states; each seeking to maximise their own national interests/preferences whilst navigating formal and informal systemic constraints and functional pressures. From a liberal-intergovernmentalist perspective (Moravcsik 1998), the form and functioning of the EU is shaped by the carefully considered transferal of competences from intergovernmental institutions to supranational institutions by member-states, whilst the same actors simultaneously safe-guard the asymmetrical competences of institutions which satisfy sovereignty concerns. A product of grand bargains between 27 party-based and ideologically/strategically motivated governments, it is expected that the decision-making procedures and subsequent policies will not satisfy the expectations of the Unions 448 million citizens.

Representative democracy in the EU is suffering a legitimation crisis due to the disconnect between citizens inputs and representatives’ outputs (see Cengiz 2018), and the post-functionalist phenomenon of constraining dissensus across the EU is symptomatic of this. However, whilst constraining dissensus exposes the legitimacy gap in EU’s representative democracy, it also becomes an opportunity for remedy. Citizens continue to expect the EU to deliver effective policies despite losing confidence in the system (Balosin, in Radeljić 2014, 275), and research suggests that citizens who are dissatisfied with representative democracy are more likely to support democratic innovations such as participatory/deliberative spaces (Pilet et al. 2023). Scholars have suggested the need to explore hybrid multi-modal representative democratic models by combining and synthesising sortition-based participatory/deliberative democratic models (mini publics) with traditional electoral models to close this gap in democratic representation (Cengiz 2018; Deligiaouri and Suiter 2023). They view deliberative democracy as a compliment to representative democracy and a means for citizens to play a role in informing the agenda-setting powers and policy decisions of elected representatives. Alternatively, others call for a complete severance between the two models of democracy; viewing the former as being at risk of becoming collateral damage through association with the inherent crisis of the latter (see Landemore 2017). In turn, they call for a radical rethinking of the whole concept of representative democracy, free from elections, and interest aggregation through elite representation. Whether complimentary or standalone, deliberative/participatory models are not without their own representative shortcomings; quantitatively in terms of the numerical representation of the wider public, and qualitatively in terms of their demographic representation and operational designs (Cengiz 2018; Deligiaouri and Suiter 2023). Nevertheless, in a system whereby 27 national governments formulate and administer region-wide policies impacting 448 million citizens, organised participatory spaces which strengthen democratic representation is a necessary good to improve the EU’s ability to deliver effective policy, and strengthen its legitimacy. Whilst advocating the complimentary role which deliberative/participatory models of democracy can make to traditional representative democracy, one recognises that the former is only instrumental in treating the legitimacy gap experienced by the latter, if the former is sufficiently designed and operated in such a way that citizens contributions are pragmatically formed, deemed legitimate by elites, and technically deliverable.

European participatory initiatives

The initiative for citizen participation in shaping (and delivering) EU policies finds its origins in the European Commission’s 2001 whitepaper on European Governance (Lindgren and Persson 2011, 5). Initially, national governments, and their sub-governmental units were deemed responsible for establishing spaces for policy debate and informing publics on EU policies (see Balosin, in Radeljić 2014, 274,278). However, this proposition detracted from the creation of an authentic transnational public space conducive to fostering effective debate on EU matters.

Participatory/deliberative spaces have increased across Europe in recent years, and observers cite a ‘deliberative wave’ or ‘deliberative turn’ across the Union (Pilet et al. 2023). Whilst the vast majority have been nationally or locally organised, there is an emergence in multi-lateral and multi-dimensional spaces following the Bratislava (2016) and Rome Declarations (2017). Such spaces have become systematic litmus tests which policymakers routinely initiate to supposedly inform their policy positions for the future or Europe. However, the designs of participatory exercises on the FoE tend to suggest that the EU can be reformed through the aggregation of a multitude of broad recommendations that can fill gaps in EU policy and its delivery. Public recommendations on EU policies hold some weight from an epistemological perspective, as they allow us to discern what the EU is doing well, where there is space for improvement, and where there is space for nourishing the link between the EU citizenry and Brussels. However, policy-focused recommendations alone are unlikely to reform the European project effectively. EU policies are fundamentally dependent on decision-making frameworks which are directly influenced by the underlying (and competing) forces of integration. This births policy-making frameworks which are necessarily fragmented and stifles the delivery of effective policies. These are rarely discussed within participatory spaces on FoE, and in the absence of such discussion, participants are often steered in ineffective directions when invited to ‘deliberate’ Europe’s future.

A not so ’deliberative turn’

… . democracy is not so much about the aggregation of preferences as about their formation (Lindgren and Persson 2011, 11)

Deliberation is a unique form of discourse generated through systematic design (Barabas 2004). A deliberative procedure activates critical reasoning skills (see Estlund and Landemore in Bächtiger et al, 2018) intent on producing meaningful democratic deliberative outputs (policy recommendations) via consensus. The procedure is most effective when it is reciprocal, other-regarding (Chapell 2012, 7) and future-regarding in scope (see Offe and Preuss, 1991 in Held 2006, 232). Preference transformation is an expectation held by its architects as a sign of deliberative success. Cognitive transformation of this kind is induced either through exposure to alternative opinions and/or previously unknown facts (Chapell 2012, 46–47), or through enhanced knowledge about policies, or the policy-making institutions (and constraints) responsible for policy formulation and implementation. Due to their level of technicality, participatory spaces are often not conducive to fostering deliberation (Fabbrini 2021, 9). Kuyper and Wolkenstein (2019, 661) argue that mini publics are rarely systematic and fail to nurture critically transformed or developed sets of policy (or institutional) preferences. As such, their designs bare responsibility for the cultivation of silo-thinking and pseudo-preferences (see Stokes in Elster 1998, 127).¹ For such exercises to be constructive, pseudo-preferences (and their aggregation) should be avoided. This requires designing mini publics in such a way that not only the make-up of the space is carefully designed, but the frameworks for critical thinking and consensus seeking is duly systematised. Although the systematic (and deliberative) dimensions of mini-publics on the FoE are improving in line with theoretical prescriptions pertaining to sampling, diversity, and inclusiveness, other-regardingness and reciprocity; they rarely effectively systematise ‘entry-points’ for critical thinking. Instead, participants are encouraged to share opinions or broad policy ideals often in flexible and unstructured ways.

Absence of deliberative entry-points

Despite the Rome Declaration (2017), and the European Commission’s Whitepaper on the Future of Europe (see European Commission 2017) which suggest that European citizens would be party to architecting Europe’s future form and functioning, research from Ireland shows that successive Citizens Dialogues on the Future of Europe did not support such endeavours (see Costello 2021).² Despite their so-called ‘best practice’ approach (EMI 2018), Ireland’s dialogues were not deliberative in the theoretical sense, and failed to generate of concrete recommendations. This helped avert pressure from policymakers to deliver policies which could not be delivered under current institutional frameworks (Costello 2021). As expected, the resulting national report was a mere archive of aggregated pseudo-preferences (see DFA 2018).

The European Commission’s Five Scenarios (see European Commission 2017) are natural entry-points for fostering deliberation on the future of Europe. They include options for carrying on, doing nothing more than the single market, allowing those who want more to do more, doing less more efficiently, and doing much more together. ³ Essentially, they range from the status-quo on one end of the spectrum, to a federal Europe on the other end, with a midway option pertaining to differentiated forms of integration. Omitting these options as entry-points in dialogues is not surprising. As a small member-state, Ireland has historically viewed differentiated integration with suspicion, and data show that such potentialities have rarely been discussed by Irish legislators (Telle, 2020:11–12). Small, peripheral, and or new member-states, tend to look negatively upon differentiated integration due to fears of being left behind through the integration process (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020).⁴ Putnam’s (1988) Two-Level Games metaphor may partially explain the choice of dialogue organisers to omit the scenarios from the dialogues. Afterall, mini publics may act as domestic constraints upon national elites, and whilst they can empower the agency of national executives in intergovernmental forums in the EU, they can also impede such agency; especially if there is a dissonance between publics and elites’ outlooks regarding integration.

A shift in focus?

Unlike the Citizens Dialogues on the FoE, the CoFoE explicitly intended to consider institutional changes in its debates without envisaging EU treaty change (Alemanno 2021, 486).⁵ Although reminiscent of the Conference of Messina, and the Convention on the Future of Europe (Fabbrini 2021, 4); the CoFoE was more participatory in design (Fabbrini 2021, 9). An attempt at creating an authentic transnational ‘deliberative’ space, it combined bottom-up (citizen based), as well as a top-down (elite based) decision-making framework for action (Fabbrini 2021, 2) and prospective institutional reforms would be subject to this deliberative nexus (Alemanno 2021, 486). Like previous participatory exercises, the CoFoE called for non-binding yet ‘concrete’ recommendations from citizens. Even if there was some potential to influence binding decisions, delivering policy in line with many of the recommendations would be difficult given their weak calibre, and the unwillingness of several member-states to initiate treaty change (The Irish Times 2022).

A large proportion of recommendations mimic the recommendations submitted to the Citizen’s Dialogues on the FoE across Europe (see European Commission 2021). The themes put to participants for consideration were too broad (CofoE Observatory 2022), and participants lacked basic knowledge of EU institutions and policy making processes (CofoE Observatory, 2022:5; Markowicz and Tosiek 2023).⁶ Many recommendations were dilute in character, vague in proposed implementation, provided little insight into how policy expectations ought to be delivered in the face of current institutional and legal constraints and arguably too aspirational (see CoFoE 2021a, 2021b, 2021c, 2021d, 2021e, 2022b). Some evidence indicates patterns in thinking along supranational (or federalist) lines particularly in the areas of foreign policy, defence, fiscal, economic, and health policies (CoFoE 2021a, 45; 2021b, 2021c).⁷ Overall, the general quality of the recommendations suggests that there was little or no consideration to ‘how’ policy preferences would be achieved in the face of current institutional and decision-making constraints, or what policy implications could arise from structural changes. The resulting recommendations are unlikely to inform the future trajectory of EU integration in a meaningful way (see Alemanno 2021, 489–490).

Of the circa. 325 measures spanning 9 topics, only 85 measures/recommendations related (in some way) to integration and governance-based recommendations (see CoFoE 2022a). According to the observatory ‘participants should have a grasp on the policy issues they are asked to debate, including the broader context, and the EU’s role and room of manoeuvre according to its legal competences’ and thus be enabled to ‘produce results that reflect the situation of EU policymaking’ (CofoE Observatory, 2022:7). In the absence of effective deliberative democratic techniques such as entry-points which open discourse pertaining to institutional frameworks, decision-making procedures, and/or future patterns of integration, there remains extensive scope for interpretive leeway amongst elites which runs the risk of delegitimising public input (Fabbrini 2021, 8).⁸

Systematising preference formation: scenario models as entry-points

European citizens desire participatory frameworks which are conducive to fostering close empirical relationships between their recommendations and policy and/or institutional outcomes (see Eurobarometer 2021). Recommendations reflect preferences, and the formation of preferences are impacted by deliberative designs. Therefore, it is arguable that mini-publics will work better if they provide participants with clearer entry-points to critically engage with the issue at hand, as opposed to a series of questions or broad themes (typical of current practice) that merely encourage silo-thinking and pseudo-preference formation. Building on the notion of ‘future-regarding’ thinking through a process of deliberative visioning (see Kallis et al. 2007), it is suggested that participants are best placed to cognitively tap into their critical faculties and formulate better judgments (Stewart and Shamdasani 2015, 13).⁹ Borrowing Dahl’s perspective of enlightened understanding, i.e. having adequate opportunities to arrive at personal judgements and preferred outcomes (see Lindgren and Persson 2011, 11), scenario frameworks/models can help participants to better understand contemporary, and future, integration options and their resulting decision spaces (see Dockerty et al. 2006, 103; Forni, 2016, 233). Subsequently, they can consider the likely impact of such frameworks, and their functional constraints, on the outcome-content of their policy priorities, and with this knowledge, they can refine their policy preferences with respect to those presupposed/envisioned constraints.

Kallis et al (2007, 980–981) suggests that scenario workshops, which employ deliberative visioning techniques (via scenario models), enable participants to work together toward collectively acceptable futures, and encourages participants to garner a systematic understanding of the problem at hand (putting aside biases), helping them reach common ground, and encouraging them to think carefully about their preferred direction prior to offering policy recommendations to elites. Participants should come to realise that (policy) form follows the (institutional) function to improve the quality and delivery of policy. ‘Using the visualisations, scientists and decision makers can navigate the decision space and potential objective trade-offs to facilitate discussion and consensus building’ (Forni et al. 2016, 232). If participants are enabled to explore, deliberate, and (re)formulate their policy preferences visually through systematised scenario-based entry-points, policymakers could have a stronger set of concrete ideas that better capture informed and critically deduced preferences. This approach is advocated by scholars such as Bickerton et al (2015a; 2015b), Piris (2012), and Wessel et al (2022, 19); the latter, who, for example, suggested that the CoFoE ought to have considered discussing and rethinking policy-making procedures in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to improve preference formulation and recommendations around associated policies.

Data collected through scenario workshops conducted for this study demonstrate that the utilisation of scenario frameworks is conducive to improving participants’ understandings of how Europe functions, and subsequently informing/sharpening their preferences pertaining to European integration.

‘Don’t debate. Deliberate’ scenario workshops

Scenario experiments are useful for enabling researchers to examine the impacts of operational choices on the deliberative process (Werner & Muradova, in Ercan et al, 2022:192). Workshops are often used with exploratory intent and are issue specific in scope (Stewart and Shamdasani 2015, 9). Due to systematic constraints associated with sampling procedures and representation, size, cost, and time restrictions etc., focus groups are unlikely to unearth deep insights about ‘a well-defined topic’ (Stewart and Shamdasani 2015, 10). However, self-contained focus groups (see Morgan 1997, 18), are useful alternatives to the large-scale/macro deliberative mini publics (see Elstub in Elstub and McLaverty 2014, 167; Fung 2015) especially for conducting hypothesis-driven quasi-experimental research with the aim of testing new approaches to developing critical deliberation and strengthening the quality of public recommendations on social issues.

Methodology

Under the project title ‘Don’t Debate, Deliberate’, four focus groups in the form of scenario- workshops were conducted on Zoom between March and May 2021. The objective was to explore the impact of narrative-based scenario frameworks/models on preference formation pertaining to the future of Europe debate. To reiterate, the European Commission’s Five Scenarios for the Future of Europe were chosen as entry-points for the exercise.¹⁰ Participants were recruited through a self-selection process following event postings on social media websites and invitations to members of charity organisations, political parties, social movements, and chambers of commerce.¹¹ The 22 (initial) participants were diverse in age, gender, educational attainment, socio-economic status, and nationality. All participants expressed pro-EU values, although to varying degrees. A total of 10 hours of deliberation was recorded.

Prior to the sessions, participants received briefing documents which contextualised the FoE debate, an additional document explaining the aims and objectives of the exercise, and a detailed account of the European Commission’s Five Scenarios for the FoE. Participants were also provided a document which succinctly explained the EU’s various policy-making procedures (see Wallace, Pollack, and Young 2015). One expected that this information would facilitate critical thinking and preference deduction by enabling participants to visualise and cognitively frame institutional power distribution in the EU, institutional decision-making constraints, and potential impacts on policy outcomes (substance and scale).

Participant preferences were first inferred through a non-systematic or traditional approach resembling those employed by citizen’s dialogues on the FoE and the CoFoE. This was then followed by a systematic scenario focused approach to changes in participants’ preferences; policy-based or otherwise.

Non-systematic/Traditional approach

The non-systematic approach to inferring policy preferences centred on two broad policy areas. Those being migration, and environmental policies. The questions put to citizens were broadly phrased with the intention to encourage pseudo-preferences. For example, the opening question on migration was structured as follows: ‘what are your views on Europe’s migration policy?’ and ‘do your views on migration policy relate to the single market, Schengen Agreement/area (i.e. legal migration), and/or inward migration from states beyond the EU (i.e. illegal migrants or Asylum seekers)?’ As expected, the style of responses was broad in content, lacked clarity, and lacked consideration for how preferred policies are made, and could be delivered. Additionally, they were often enveloped within broad digressive narratives that centred on critiquing ‘national’ governments’ approaches to migration or debating the ills of populism and populists’ attitudes. Few, if any, concrete (deliverable) institutional or even policy-based solutions were offered due to the process becoming one of opinion sharing/venting. Examples are as follows:

• ‘We need to set out a much fairer system of equitable distribution of refugees throughout the union, and I would agree that means Ireland ought to get a bigger role and with a more humane response’.

• ‘One thing that needs to be done in Europe is to address the points of the populists. Listen to what they are saying as to avoid them becoming too powerful, because the rhetoric worked in the UK’.

• I am a migrant. I am very pro-movement. Free movement is the most important thing of the EU’s existence, but I also think that we should have a little more control and why not have a separated institution which deals with all migration policies? The migration crisis is a good example that we need a separated institution that deals with all policies.

• ‘A more unified system that has the same standard for the asylum process so when treating asylum seekers everything would be fair because the current system is unfair’.

• ‘I think proper distribution of accepting migrants across the European Union instead of putting it all on Turkey and eastern states; but also having a more unified homogenised policy of better welfare supports particularly for migrants’.

Following the above contributions, the moderator injected narrower questions into the exercise to redirect the conversation toward solution-based thinking. These included: ‘What could the EU do to deal with matters of migration?’ and ‘Should all member states be bound by a common policy on migration?’ Subsequently there was some evidence of recommendations taking on a more solid character. These included:

• I think at some point we would possibly be looking at finding a home for a new policy within a new treaty. This may not be applicable, but we may need to look at a model of differentiated integration for our policies.

• ‘The allocation of migrants should be made based on the ability of a nation-state’s economy to accommodate refugees.

• I think the idea of a completely integrated and standard policy for all of Europe, and the whole idea of opt-in/opt-out is a good idea because we could have a one-size fits all migration policy but when you get onto the ground things get more difficult.

• ‘Differentiated integration counts on each country being its better self and aspiring to be a positive participant but leaves room for states to remain at the back of the queue … … .which constituents will not be happy about’

• I am quite optimistic as it doesn’t sound like it is everyone just doing the least possible thing. The interesting thing about this process is that each state has the option to decide what they want to agree on, and how far they want to go. It’s generally done though consensus – there is no voting process’.

• ‘I personally think greater inter-governmental co-ordination is a good thing around these decisions. I would prefer it to be dealt with by the Council rather than an independent agency which isn’t democratically accountable to the electorate’.

• I think we should give the EU more control over the migration policy and there should be an opt out/opt in thing. I think someone mentioned earlier that we could put this in a new European treaty. I think that would be better than just creating a new policy for it.

The findings demonstrate that there was a more solid set of contributions, and they focused less on policy contents. and more on the form of integration, which is a fundamental precedent to shaping policy content. Interestingly, the viewpoints indicated that not only where participants considering the contents of the briefing documents to consider the questions, but their answers were reminiscent of differentiated integration, which closely corresponds with Scenario 3 of the Five Scenarios. This was a welcome departure in consciousness. However, deliberation around the concept did not develop beyond the abstract level. Nevertheless, the potential for deeper critical examination of this ‘form’ and its potential to unlock opportunities for policy preference formation was garnering a presence within the participatory space. At this point, one believed that with the application of entry-points in the form of the Five Scenarios, participants could delve deeper into the forms of integration on offer, and perhaps establish a new departure point for refining their policy preference.

Systematic scenario model approach

Building on the initial exercise, narrative-centric scenario approach was employed using the Five Scenarios as deliberative entry-points. By using the frameworks, participants were encouraged to think critically, and deliberate the potential impacts each scenario may have for the delivery of their preferred policies, whilst also accounting for policy-linked consequences. This would ensure that participants were not just thinking about the ideal model that can best deliver their ideal (and possibly maximalist) policy preference but were factoring in how the chosen model may impact other/related policy preferences they hold. In turn, this could require an adjustment in preferences around the chosen model, and, consequently, the form of their initial policy priority. For example, Participant A initially desires a federal EU and the transferal of social policy competences to the EU level. However, they do not agree with the transferal of taxation competences to the EU to make social policy harmonisation a reality; therefore, they are tasked with reconsidering the functional model (scenario) of EU integration, and their preferences/expectations for social policy competences at the EU level.

The five scenarios: inferences and deductions

Participants considered Scenario 1 (Carrying On) as initially unviable, noting that the FoE debate finds its origins in the status-quo. They argued that this model lacks the potential to deliver EU policy in line with their ideal preferences on high political matters such as asylum rules and migration policies. It was a constraint on achieving common health and education standards, as it provides little opportunity for cooperation in these areas. One participant stated that they did not ‘think the way Europe is currently set up is working effectively’, and it feels like a ‘hotchpotch where certain countries can do certain things and some member-states can do others’. Another said that ‘we have different countries with their own agendas, and this is not good when trying to make common policies for 480 million people. There is something to be said for more centralisation to make policy-making more cohesive’. Another stated that ‘the scenario we are in today [Scenario 1] is just not conducive’ to delivering harmonised policies of a socialist nature due to the overwhelming capitalist nature of the EU and the culture of inter-state competition.

Participants criticised Scenario 2 (Nothing but the Single Market) for its overbearing focus on the single market. Although, recognised as potentially attractive to Eurosceptic states (in Eastern Europe) and capitalist bodies; participants argued that focusing on the Single Market will not address Europe’s decision-making and policy shortcomings, and would impede a strong and cohesive union. One participant said that ‘at least with Scenario 1, there is potential to advance social policy [not just economic]. This model is brazenly capitalist’. Another said that as ‘with a purely capitalist model with free movement, laissez-faire capitalism, and little focus on a united approach, big companies would have more power and less regulation’. It was assumed that this model was more state-centric rather than society-centric and would fail to deal with the broader policy issues facing the union in the 21st century. However, one participant endorsed the scenario stating that ‘it would be fine as long as associated policies [CAP, four freedoms etc] were kept the way they currently operate’.

Participants expressed concerns about Scenario 3 (Those who want More do More) because of its potential to add further complexity to the European model. One participant said that they felt ‘this may cause a lot more trouble for decision-making’. Whilst another said ‘in the beginning it would work but later it would create problems. For example, we are all living in a house, and some will do the cleaning and the washing. Sooner or later people will get upset at each other’. Likewise, another said that ‘Europe may lose control on those states [who choose to slow-down their speed of integration] and this will allow for chipping away at the Union over time’. Despite initial concerns, this scenario grew in appeal due to its perceived ability to allow (willing) member-states to integrate further in policy areas currently constrained by restrictive voting rules or procedures e.g. unanimous voting, and its potential to permit willing member-states to integrate further in policy areas within and outside the scope of current EU decision-making competences without being constraint by reluctant member-states.

Participants expressed mixed attitudes toward Scenario 4 (Doing Less More efficiently). They praised it for the potential to make decision-making in outstanding ‘high politics’ areas (foreign policy, migration, asylum) more efficient and effective, yet it was simultaneously criticised for its over-emphasis on high political issues at a cost to existing low politics policy areas in need of real solutions under the current status-quo. Concern was also raised about policy prioritisation. One participant said that they disliked the scenario but ‘that working on a few areas may lead to better decisions to achieve outstanding expectations. Yet, another said ‘the lack of focus on social harmonisation seemed odd’ and this scenario would ‘have implications for the democratic deficit’ due to its advancement of high politics issues at a cost to issues of ‘social value’, Likewise another said ‘I think the issues I hoped would be mentioned in this scenario, such as climate and social issues, were not there … .it flips to the opposite of what I hoped would be done’.

Initially, participants were attracted (in theory) to Scenario 5 (Doing much More Together) due to its federalist character. Some saw this as the ideal model for creating a truly democratic and cohesive Europe with common policies, values, and norms. However, following reflection, participants argued that the model showed little regard for different domestic contexts/conditions that exist across the EU, as well as divergent national interests regarding EU policy competences sourced in sovereignty concerns. Additionally, its maximalist features risked further undermining the EU by aggravating Eurosceptic states/nations. As deliberation progressed, one participant made it clear that they ’want to be part of a ‘federal state’. Another said that they wouldn’t ‘trust the EU to make the right decisions’ on policies such as migration and defence, whilst another said that although they liked the idea of harmonised standards on social policies ‘each country has so many different conditions going on within them’ and ‘those little details wouldn’t be reflected by standardised policy across 27 member-states’. Although perceived as an ideal model for the implementation of progressive and harmonised policies across Europe, participants harboured reservations about the possibility of losing national autonomy in key policy areas, as well as uncertainty around the consequences of enhanced EU competences in one policy area and what it may mean for national competences in another policy area which e.g. EU competences in health policy, and potential loss of national competences in taxation or fiscal policy

Agreed Position

Having considered the Five Scenarios, participants collectively agreed that a combination of Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 were the most viable options for the future of EU integration and governance. They agreed that this combination would enable the EU to maintain its institutional make-up, its current allocation of institutional power, its current policy-making procedures and guarantee member-states continued management of domestic policy competences. However, it would also give willing member-states the scope to advance policy and improve policy delivery in permitted policy areas without infringing on the autonomy of reluctant EU partners. One participant said that they ‘want to see a combination of scenarios that will pave the way for changes but not transform current structures 100%. The best combinations would be Scenarios 1 and 3’. Others agreed that this combination was a way of avoiding a move toward the unviable federalisation of EU structures and policy-making procedures whilst also overcoming some of the shortcomings of the status-quo. The is encapsulated in one participant’s response which reads ‘I was initially more taken by Scenario 5 in terms of the politically benevolent style of Europe it proposes … … however I would be worried about a federal Europe to be honest. Now I much prefer scenario 3’ Participants agreed that the combination would allow member-states to integrate at their own pace in different policy areas according to their domestic conditions and national preferences. And whilst this may lead to differential patterns of EU integration, it was expected to uphold the integrity of European integration and satiate Eurosceptic forces. However as one participant stated whilst it is a scenario to keep in mind. ‘it needs to be clear how far the willing are able to go in terms of differentiated integration as to protect the balance of power’.

Methodology and outcome

Engagement with the scenario model approach required participants to be future-regarding in their acknowledgment and critique of EU structures which have not previously been encouraged in mini-publics on the FoE. Having to explore and choose a viable option for EU integration initially caused hesitancy; not least when participants were required to forgo their (policy-focused) pseudo-preferences for a more function-centric ideal for Europe. The collective realisation that policy preferences must be generated in response to potential structural/functional options and their constraints led to doubts during the process. Nevertheless, data suggest that the process enabled participants to better understand the impacts that each scenario model may have on the character of EU policies and their delivery.

In agreeing a future of integration informed by a combination of Scenarios 1 and 3 respectively, participants showcased an appreciation for the influence of institutional constraints on policy creation and delivery. The exercise did not have the resources to examine the impact which a combination of Scenarios 1 and Scenario 3 would have on the refinement of participants' policy priorities and recommendations, but its method provides a window of opportunity for future deliberative exercises to explore this avenue. By utilising the Five Scenarios as deliberative entry-points in deliberative spaces, future practitioners of deliberative democracy may strengthen the deliberative character of such spaces and enhance the input legitimacy of citizens in the FoE debate, by enabling them to develop critically informed concrete policy recommendations which may be conducive to informing elite choices, and finally delivering tangible policy outcomes reflective of their recommendations.

Conclusion

Mini publics on the Future of Europe (FoE) have grown in popularity in the 21^st century in response to a rise in fragmenting forces. The Citizens Dialogues on the Future of Europe (FoE), and the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) are amongst the most recent and notable manifestations of these exercises putting citizens at the heart of shaping Europe’s future. However, due to systematic weaknesses, these exercises have failed to support the development and collation of concrete policy proposals from the European citizenry. Designed in such a way that induces silo thinking and the generation of pseudo-preferences, event participants have been disempowered in their opportunity to shape Europe’s future due to the broad calibre of their proposals, and the inability of elites to deliver such proposals under current systemic constraints. Driven by a principle that form follows function, this paper argued that by using scenario models, participants may be better enabled to systematically reformulate their policy preferences in response to current or future EU structural models (forms) and their resulting constraints. In doing so, they would be better positioned to offer policy recommendations of a more concrete and viable nature.

Data from scenario workshops conducted between March and May 2021 demonstrated that the European Commission’s Five Scenarios for the FoE as deliberative entry-points are conducive to strengthening the quality of deliberation on the FoE compared to common approaches. Not only did participants demonstrate improved knowledge of the EU, better critical engagement, and demonstrate potential to reach consensus on complex decisions; participants deduced clear and cogent preferences for the future form and functioning of the EU which previous exercises and studies have failed to capture. In developing knowledge of the Five Scenarios and evaluating their potential implications for governance in the EU and policy delivery, participants found an avenue to potentially strengthen their policy-specific preferences. Although further research is needed to examine the full potential of this method on the refinement of policy pseudo-preferences, it provides an opportunity to further explore the means to empower EU citizens to fashion concrete policy recommendations which are conducive to delivery, thus enhancing the input-output legitimacy of such mini-publics.

Acknowledgments

A special thanks to Ms Maisie McDonagh (Liverpool Hope University) for her assistance with the research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ireland, under their project Communicating Europe Initiative 2020. This was authorized by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simon Coveney.

Notes

1. Pseudo-preferences may often derive from moral, ethical, sentimental, or emotional factors rather than preferences which are strategically formulated in response to the institutional constraints that may impact policy content and delivery.

2. Costello’s research focuses predominantly on Ireland’s Citizens Dialogues on the Future of Europe but draws correlations with data from citizens dialogues across the EU (see European Commission 2019).

3. The five scenarios were first presented in the European Commission’s (2017) Whitepaper on the Future of Europe with the purpose of assisting public debate in shaping the EU’s trajectory.

4. Forms of DI have often been applied to new, and small member-states as risk mitigating instruments. DI permits such (less advanced) states to integrate at slower paces than established member-states. This offers such states opportunities to adapt gradually to the policy environments and expectations of their European integration.

5. Building on President Macron’s 2018 Sorbonne Speech the conference was adopted by the EC President’s 2019–2024 Political Guidelines, and later initiated via a Joint Declaration in March 2021 (see Alemanno 2021, 488–489; Eur-Lex, 2021; POEU 2019).

6. Costello (2021:9–10) identified similar shortcomings in Ireland’s Citizen’s dialogues on the FoE.

7. The Multilingual Digital Platforms of the CoFoE are an added dimension to collating data on public preferences on Europe which feed into debates undertaken by European Citizens’ Panel and the Conference Plenary.

8. The plenary consisted predominantly of representatives from the European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of the European Union.

9. Deliberative visioning in a two-stage process consisting of vision-making and action planning where participants deliberate and agree on a vision and consider ways to achieve/implement that vision through action planning (Kallis et al. 2007, 980).

10. The scenario workshops were funded by the 2020 Communicating Europe Initiative fund awarded by Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs’

11. Numbers in attendance varied between sessions. An average attendance of 16 participants was recorded.