Drivers and challenges of large-scale conversion policies to organic and agro-chemical free agriculture in South Asia

ABSTRACT

Addressing global environmental and food challenges necessitates holistic approaches that consider environmental, societal, and economic dimensions. This study examines three large-scale organic farming conversion programs and their associated policies in Sikkim, India, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. Sikkim stands as the world's first state to fully transition to organic agriculture, while Bhutan is embarking on a similar path, and Sri Lanka is implementing a toxin-free program. A qualitative analysis reveals key drivers and barriers in these large-scale conversions. Five crucial factors for successful transitions to large-scale organic farming emerge: effective institutional leadership, affordable third-party certification, phased reduction of agrochemicals through clear political pathways, development of extension networks, market access with price premiums, and the provision of organic inputs. Key drivers include improving rural livelihoods, upscaling traditional farming practices, addressing health concerns related to agrochemicals, and preserving natural resources. Significant challenges include shortages of organic inputs, limited market access, inadequate food supply, a lack of knowledge about alternative practices and inputs, and high certification costs. In addressing these factors and challenges, policymakers and scientists can better navigate the complex landscape of large-scale organic farming conversion.

KEYWORDS:

• Organic farming
• Sustainability
• Agricultural and food policy
• Transformation of agri-food systems

1. Introduction

As stated in the ‘UN Food Systems Summit’, a major change in food systems is needed to solve the dilemma of providing enough food to feed the growing population and minimize the destructive impacts of food production on the environment (Jouzi et al., 2022; UNFSS, 2021). Organic agriculture (OA)¹ is considered one strategy for the challenge of the food system transition to a sustainable system (Altieri & Rosset, 1996; Muller et al., 2017; Seufert et al., 2012; Veisi et al., 2017). The literature shows that organic farming can conflict with food security (D. J. Connor, 2008; David J. Connor, 2018; I. P. Singh & Grover, 2011) and results in higher production costs (Łuczka et al., 2021). In contrast, other studies contend that despite lower productivity, organic farms can be more profitable (Grovermann et al., 2021; Nieberg & Offermann, 2003; Reddy et al., 2022; Zhen et al., 2023). Therefore, there are arguments to promote OA, particularly in regions with a comparative advantage or where there is particularly strong support for it, whether from society, policy, or other actors (Seufert, 2012). To develop organic farming in such regions, the complex nature of the challenges calls for public policies to offer coherent, participatory, and comprehensive solutions (UNFSS, 2021; World Future Council, 2020).

As awareness and demand for organic products constantly rise, the global farmland under OA reached 71.5 million hectares, i.e. 1.5% of global farmland (Willer et al., 2020). Asia makes up 9% of global organic farmland, but only 0.4% of the region’s farmland is under OA. In Asia, OA expanded with an annual average growth rate of 6.9% between 2008 and 2018 (Willer et al., 2020, p. 214). The development of OA in this continent may be further boosted by large-scale conversion policies of transforming the agricultural sector at the national or sub-national level, either partially or entirely, to organic agriculture.

Sikkim in India, the first state to go fully organic worldwide in 2016 and globally the first region with large-scale policies towards 100% organic, followed their belief that full conversion to OA would preserve the ecosystem and the health of its citizens (IFOAM Asia, 2019). Bhutan, being the first carbon-negative country worldwide (Munawar, 2016; A. Singh & Singh, 2017), took its ambition to the next level striving to be the world leader in environmental sustainability and the first country to make a complete transition to OA (Willer et al., 2020). Other countries and states released similar policies to convert whole or parts of their land as organic, for example, Indonesia’s 1000 Organic Villages, China’s Areas for the Demonstration of National Organic Product Certification, Kyrgyzstan’s 10-year plan to switch to 100% organic agriculture, and The Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF) (Koner & Laha, 2021) in India (Bharucha et al., 2020; Khadse & Rosset, 2019).

Few studies have investigated barriers and driving factors of large-scale conversion to organic farming and related policies to date. Some studies in Bhutan (e.g. Neuhoff et al., 2014) argue that complete conversion to OA with the current policies is the best option for developing the country, as the benefit-cost return is significantly higher in the conventional farming system (Tashi & Wangchuk, 2016a). Beyond this, Feuerbacher et al. (2018) concluded that a full transition to OA would significantly reduce Gross Domestic Product (GDP), welfare loss, and impacts on food security and self-sufficiency. Other studies in Sri Lanka (Marambe & Herath, 2020; Weerahewa et al., 2017) found that the glyphosate and herbicide ban had various negative consequences, including higher crop production costs, lower crop yields, depreciation of the domestic currency, and increased use of illegally imported glyphosate products.

In this regard, the key drivers supporting the large-scale adoption of OA reported in the literature are environmental awareness, health, economic, and employment benefits (Yangzom & Singh, 2019), farmers’ awareness of OA methods, health concerns, low cost of production and market opportunities (Thinley & Tashi, 2020), and cost-effectiveness (Clausen & Olteanu, 2019; Yadav et al., 2018). Previous studies have mentioned these drivers by analyzing one of the three isolated large-scale conversion policies.

In Sikkim, Chettri (2015) and Phukan et al. (2018) found that the market would profit from banning inorganic imports from other states. Also, Rao (2017) sees a need for the supply of organic inputs and marketing, introducing more crops for diversification and reducing farmers’ risks. In this respect, Chettri (2015) suggested regular training from the government in Sikkim. On the other hand, there are other shortages, such as a lack of infrastructure, including a structured market system, inadequate irrigation, and transportation facilities (Chettri, 2015; Kumar et al., 2018; Phukan et al., 2018; Sharma et al., 2017), lack of market information systems (Kumar et al., 2018; Yadav et al., 2018), labour scarcity and high labour costs, as well as, non-availability of credit, and low market value. Significant institutional constraints include the non-availability of crop insurance and lack of marketing and insufficient training programmes. Moreover, major bio-physical constraints include the incidence of insects, pests, and diseases and weak extension systems (Sharma et al., 2017), limiting the successful implementation of the large-scale conversion programme. In addition, studies in Sikkim identified a gap in information on both the consumer and farmer sides about advantages and market demand (Kumar et al., 2018).

In Bhutan, Feuerbacher et al. (2018) argued that improved organic farming practices, combined with access to markets with price premiums, can increase the economics of a large-scale conversion to organic. Additionally, Dendup (2018) describes that value-adding in the form of organic branding and certification will make it easier for farmers to compete in international markets and get premium product prices. Likewise, challenges such as lack of trustworthy policy mechanisms, inadequate human capacity, and infrastructure hurdles (Tashi & Wangchuk, 2016b) scarcity and high prices of organic inputs (McCrae-Hokenson, 2014; Tashi & Wangchuk, 2016a), the lack of policies on pesticides, fertilizers and certification, lack of markets and cheaper imported goods from India, rural to urban migration that causes labour shortage and expensive external labour that subsistence farmers cannot afford (Feuerbacher & Luckmann, 2023; McCrae-Hokenson, 2014) are identified as the main barriers. Contrarily, other studies refer to low productivity, market challenges, education, and research, as well as economic and financial aspects (Yangzom & Singh, 2019), absence of a strong body at the national level, lack of awareness and understanding amongst various stakeholders, lack of legal foundation, scarcity of knowledge, quality control without any standards and control system (Duba et al., 2007) as the contributing setbacks.

In Sri Lanka, studies suggest that the Chronic Kidney Disease of unknown etiology (CKDu) epidemic is associated with herbicide use such as glyphosate (Gunarathna et al., 2018; Jayasumana et al., 2015). This motivated farmers, policymakers, and the broader society to find ways to reduce or even entirely avoid agrochemicals (Malkanthi et al., 2019). Ranasinghe (2016) suggests a gradual transition towards OA as a solution to CKDu. He also reports a lack of coordination between various government interventions as a barrier and introduced a coordinated bottom-up approach.

As shown above, various studies have investigated each of the three large-scale conversion programmes in isolation. However, to the authors’ best knowledge, no study has conducted a comparative analysis of these large-scale conversion programmes, focusing on the drivers and challenges and synthesizing the findings. This study addresses this research gap. The study scope is limited to the three South Asian large-scale programmes, i.e. Sikkim Organic Mission, Bhutan’s National Organic Program, and Sri Lanka’s Toxin Free Nation Program. Using an explorative approach, these three programmes are comparatively investigated to identify implementation similarities, key policy drivers, and challenges of such initiatives. Such a synthesis is particularly valuable for regions considering a large-scale transition to more sustainable agriculture. With this approach, we aim to answer the following research questions:

• How are government-led large-scale organic conversion programmes implemented, and what policies, institutional arrangements, and policy tools were used?

• What common key drivers and main challenges did all three cases face to convert the whole region/country to organic agriculture?

The underlying hypothesis is that the large-scale conversion programmes are neither based on a careful and holistic policy nor are they grounded in a sufficiently enabling environment. Instead, we hypothesize that the programmes were driven by top-down policy processes that neglected the necessary enabling conditions for a successful and sustainable conversion.

Answering these questions, the study shall provide new insights into why local or central government bodies decide to change their agriculture towards OA. Moreover, possibilities and limitations of upscaling organic farming in this way for similar future projects are identified and discussed.

2. Agronomic and socio-economic context

A comparison of the agronomic and socio-economic environments and the specifics of the large-scale conversion policies are presented to set the framework for this study. Table 1 shows the study regions are quite diverse regarding their land area, cover and use.

Table 1. Bio-physical, socio-economic, and agricultural information of Sikkim, Bhutan and Sri Lanka.

Characteristics	Sikkim	Bhutan	Sri Lanka
Land area	7,069 km²	38,394 km²	65,610 km²
Climate	Tropical, subtropical, temperate, alpine	Tropical, temperate, alpine	Tropical
Land cover	37% forest 30% snow & glaciers 16% cultivated 14% pastures	71% forest 16% scrubland 7% snow & glaciers 4% pastures 3% cultivated	43% cultivated 29% forest 22% sparsely used crop land 5% water bodies
Population	610,000 (2011)	777,486 (2021)	22,156,000 (2021)
Rural population share	75.0% (2011)	57.0% (2021)	81.0% (2021)
GDP/GSDP in billion USD^a	3.6 (2015)	2.54 (2021)	88.9 (2021)
GDP/per capita in current USD	5,901 (2015)	3,266 (2021)	4,013 (2021)
Agricultural share in GDP	10.1% (2014)	19.2% (2021)	8.7% (2021)
Share of labour force employed by agriculture	46.5% (2011)	56% (2021)	25.0% (2021)
Top 5 agricultural products by production value	No data	In million USD for 2021:Rice (25.9), Oranges (18.3), Cardamom (18.2), Maize (14.7) and Potato (13.4)	In million USD for 2021: Rice (1,480), Coconuts (897.7), Tea (618.4), Chillies and peppers, green (377.7) and Pepper (354.7)
National self-sufficiency	All food: 30%^b	Rice 48%; Cereals 63%, Fruit & potato 100%, Livestock products 70%	All food: 80%
Number of agricultural households	66,222 (2019)	73,000 (2020)	2,080,000 (2020)
Arable land in ha	97,000 (2019)	94,000 (2020)	1,372,000 (2020)
Average farm size in ha	1.5 (2019)	1.3 ha (2020)	0.7 ha (2020)
Certified organic share of total agricultural land	100%	1.3% (2018)	2.8% (2018)

^a GDP = Gross Domestic Product; GSDP = Gross State Domestic Product.

^b Estimate obtained from expert interview (interviewee 2).

Source: Data on Sikkim based on ENVIS Centre on Himalayan Ecology (2014) except for a) based on Estimate obtained from expert interview (interviewee 2); Data on Bhutan and Sri Lanka are based on World Bank Group (2023) (World Bank Group, 2023); and also taken from Ministry of Environment Sri Lanka (2012) on Sri-Lanka, as well as from National Statistics Bureau Bhutan (2019); Gross National Happiness Commission Bhutan (2019); and Neuhoff et al. (2014) on Bhutan. Food self-sufficiency estimate for Bhutan derived from Feuerbacher et al. (2018). For Sri Lanka it is derived from Weerakoon (2015). Production value data is taken from FAO (2023).

However, looking atsocio-economic factors there are similarities regarding the rural-urban distribution of population, the share of agriculture in GDP, size of farms, and s dependence on food imports (measured by food self-sufficiency rates). Sikkim and Bhutan have a substantial share of the population engaged in agriculture. In Sri Lanka, the number is about twenty to thirty percentage points smaller, reflecting the more advanced development state of the economy. Regarding the share of certified organic land cultivated in total agricultural land, Sikkim already has a situation where all land is cultivated organically. In contrast, this share is still negligible in Bhutan and Sri Lanka.

Further region-specific information is now elaborated in the next sub-sections.

2.1. Sikkim

Sikkim is a small mountainous state in India with a land area of 7,096 km² in the Eastern Himalayans. It supports a diverse range of plant species and is rich in biodiversity, listed as one of 34 global biodiversity hotspots (Government of Sikkim, 2015). As a heavily mountainous region with little cultivated area and a poor population with little access to chemical inputs, it was comparatively easy to convert to an organic state (IFOAM Asia, 2018). The Sikkim Organic Mission, a political commitment and roadmap to support organic farming, was started in 2003 and consolidated in 2010, with the target to become the first completely organic state worldwide in 2015 (IFOAM Asia, 2019).

The Indian government started supporting organic production as a niche sector in 2001 by launching a programme. It supports organic production for export through third-party certification. In 2003 Sikkim’s former Chief Minister announced his vision to become the first Indian organic state. The state government started the political movement to support OA in Sikkim through a declaration in the legislative assembly (Government of Sikkim, 2016). In 2015, under the National Mission on Sustainable Agriculture, a programme was launched to support local small-scale farmers to get certification via the participatory guarantee system. It included a subsidy scheme covering costs such as input purchases, harvesting, transportation, and marketing, which the central government largely covers, with only 10% co-financed by the states (Willer et al., 2020). Another programme² was launched in 2015 by the Ministry of Development of the northeastern region, which aims to create producers’ organizations, on-farm, and off-farm organic input production, support for certification, post-harvest processing, and marketing. According to our findings, Sikkim met its objective of converting around 75,000 hectares of farming land and crops, comprising 66,000 farmers, to OA and providing them with third-party certification by December 2015. The state was declared India's first entirely organic state in 2016.

2.2. Bhutan

The Kingdom of Bhutan, with a total area of 38,394 km², is landlocked in South Asia in the mountainous Eastern Himalayas (National Statistics Bureau Bhutan, 2019). The mountainous kingdom reaches 160 m up to more than 7,000 m above sea level (National Statistics Bureau, 2019; National Statistics Bureau Bhutan, 2019). Agriculture, forestry, and tourism are important income sources for the population. The country is self-sufficient in fruits and potatoes, while insufficiency is recorded in cereals and vegetables (Gross National Happiness Commission Bhutan, 2019). Arable land comprises only 3% of Bhutan's total land area. In 2012, about 88% of arable land was cultivated without agrochemicals, i.e. organic by default, while less than 1% of cropland was certified organic (Feuerbacher et al., 2018). The dependency on agrochemicals is higher when considering crop output value, with conventional agriculture contributing 26% of the total output value. The relative share of conventional agriculture in crop-specific output value is highest for potatoes (77%), followed by rice (30%), maize (22%), and vegetables (19%) (Feuerbacher et al., 2018). The share is lowest for spices (0%), other cereals (4%), and fruits (15%). Due to the low agrochemical use, it was anticipated that a change to OA could enhance farming practices and increase farmers’ income through higher yield and better market access.

The low external input-based traditional practices could not cover the increasing food demand in Bhutan. A big challenge is to increase national self-sufficiency while keeping the system without or with minimal chemical input (ICIMOD and Ministry of Agriculture and Forests of Bhutan, 2018). Moreover, the country is already facing labour shortages in agriculture, which would be further exacerbated if the labour-saving potential of agrochemicals becomes unavailable (Feuerbacher & Luckmann, 2023). In June 2012, Bhutan’s Prime Minister declared that the country, as the world’s first nation, would strive to become 100% organic (Willer et al., 2013). The task was not in conversion but in registration and supervision according to organic requirements and general productivity improvements (Willer & Lernoud, 2014, 2015).

In 2003, formal political support and institutionalized processes for organic farming were started in Bhutan, and ‘organic’ was promoted as a way of life (ICIMOD and Ministry of Agriculture and Forests of Bhutan, 2018; IFOAM Asia, 2019). A National Framework for Organic Farming (NFOFB) was developed to create some guidelines and support for OA in 2006, and in 2008 the NOP (National Organic Program) was recognized as the government programme to take up the national organic agenda. However, the 11th ‘Five Year Plan’ from 2013 to 2018 did not have enough resources to meet its goals because of supporting primary objectives like self-sufficiency and food security (ICIMOD and Ministry of Agriculture and Forests of Bhutan, 2018; IFOAM Asia, 2019).

2.3. Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is an island country in the Indian Ocean close to the Southern tip of India. Its land area is 65,610 km² (Ministry of Environment Sri Lanka, 2012). 43% of the land is used for agricultural production, and another 22% is sparsely used cropland (Ministry of Environment and Renewable Energy, 2014). Today there are diverse farming systems, such as smallholder production, which includes most paddy production, monoculture plantations, and home gardens (Ministry of Agriculture Sri Lanka, 2016). The production of tea is particularly relevant for Sri Lanka, for which phasing out agrochemicals may bring commercial opportunities but also requires bridging knowledge gaps and adapting best practices (Arhin et al., 2022). To date, no chemicals are used in the fruit and home garden sector). Prior to 2015, many farmers were using subsidized herbicides to reduce work and cost and increase yield (The Presidents Office – Government of Sri Lanka, 2015). In 2015, as a response to the epidemic situation of CKDu³ (Malkanthi et al., 2019), the support for toxin-free agriculture from the highest levels of the government started, and the president proclaimed to become a chemical-free nation. The government’s policy to ban glyphosate was an intermediate step in this development (IFOAM Asia, 2017; Willer & Lernoud, 2016). Sri Lanka’s former president was pushing to eliminate synthetic pesticides and fertilizers and thus launched the Toxin-Free Nation Program in March 2016, a ten-area action plan to ban toxic chemicals from agriculture in Sri Lanka, partly via the subsidization of organic fertilizer with cash payments (IFOAM Asia, 2017; Willer & Lernoud, 2016).

However, the strategy has never been named a transition to ‘organic’, although de facto, it contains all the attributes of OA in its call for a toxin-free nation. Export products mainly drove the organic movement in Sri Lanka, and in 2014 the Export Development of Organic Products Regulation was released (Ministry of Industry and Commerce Sri Lanka, 2014). In 2020, OA was well-established in Sri Lanka even though the share of organic land was still low with, 2.8%, though the second highest in Asia (Willer et al., 2020). However, in 2021, the former president of Sri Lanka boldly decided to abruptly stop all pesticide and chemical fertilizer imports into Sri Lanka. Consequently, the country’s economy, which was still suffering from the bomb attacks in 2019 and the corona crisis and related loss of tourism revenue, was fully stumbling into crisis. Since then, the export cash crop yield has dropped considerably, small-scale farmers need assistance, and the country’s food security has deteriorated (Torella, 2022).

3. Policy context

Table 2 summarizes the different implementation strategies by outlining timelines, action plans, policies, institutional transformations, and other government measures concerning government programmes in each case.

Table 2. Overview of timelines, action plans, institutions, and other government measures in relation with the government programmes Sikkim Organic Mission, Bhutan National Organic Program and Toxin Free Nation Program in Sri Lanka (until December 2020).

Government programme	Sikkim organic mission	Bhutan national organic programme	Sri Lanka toxin free nation programme
Timeline	- 2003 Vision to go organic by chief minister - 2009 Resolution passed State Assembly - 2010 Fast-tracking movement to achieve full organic - state by 2015 with Sikkim Organic Mission	- 2003 Formal political support for OA - 2008 National Organic Program - 2012 Official goal to go organic by prime minister - 2019 National Organic Flagship Program	- 2015 Election manifesto and support through president candidate - 2016 Implementation of government programme: Toxin Free Nations
Action plan	- Going for Organic Farming in Sikkim – A Concept - Paper and Action Plan (2003) - Sikkim Organic Mission – Policy Vision and Mission (2010)	- National Framework for Organic Farming (2006) - 10th, 11th & 12th National Five Year Plans - Strategic Action Plan for Organic Agriculture - Development in Bhutan	- Election manifesto (Sirisena) - A Toxin Free Nation: Three Year Plan
Lead institutions	- Sikkim State Organic Board (2003) - Sikkim Organic Mission (2010)	- National Organic Program (2008-2019) - National Organic Flagship Program Coordination Unit (2019)	- Strategic Enterprise Management Agency
Institutions directly & indirectly involved in movement	- Sikkim Organic Certification Agency - National Organic Farming Research Institute - Department of Food Security and Agriculture Development - Indian Council of Agricultural Research - Agricultural extension centres (Krishi Vigyan Kendra)	- Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (MoAF) - Technical Working Group within MoAF - Department of Agriculture (DoA) - Bhutan Agriculture and Food Regulatory Authority - Department of Agriculture Marketing Cooperatives - Agriculture Research and Development Center - Department of Livestock (DoF) - Department of Forests (DoF) - National Organic Programme Coordination Unit - District Governments	- National Organic Control Unit - President’s Office - Sri Lanka Export Development Board - Sri Lanka Standard Institute - Sri Lanka Accreditation Board - Ministry of Agriculture
Policy Instruments	- Fund allocations for capacity building - Decrease of using allotted agrochemical allowances through central government - Imposing high fines on the possession of agrochemicals - Fund allocations for third-party certification - Supply of organic input material - Research funding	- Fund allocations for capacity building - Supply of organic inputs - Machineries subsidized - Certification System Bhutan Organic Certification - System - Implementation of Local Organic Assurance System - Research funding	- Fund allocations for capacity building - Cash payment subsidy for (organic) inputs
Policies supporting programme and OA	- Ban on import and distribution of agrochemicals	- Including OA in the Economic Development Policy - Pesticide Rules and Regulations of Bhutan allows only the Department of Agriculture (within the MoAF) to import and distribute agrochemicals	- Export development of organic products Regulation - National Food Production Program - Pesticide Control Act - Ban on import of glyphosate - Ban on class 1 and parts of class 2 pesticides
Other measures to Support programme by government	- Pilot project with bio-villages - OA implemented in school curricula - Joint venture of government with IFFCO: Sikkim IFFCO Organics Ltd.	- Piloting districts - Organic studies at national universities - National Organic Flagship Program is Agency Key Result Area of the MoAF and was classified as a high priority national issue	- Piloting zones - Organic Agricultural Research Base National Food - Outlets for organic produce

Source: Authors’ compilation.

4. Methods

This study employs qualitative analysis methods to investigate the large-scale conversion policy decisions and execution in terms of processes.

4.1. Data collection

This study identifies key drivers and challenges using a combination of two qualitative approaches: expert interviews as primary data collection and qualitative content analysis as secondary data collection. Between October 2019 and February 2020, data was collected. Expert interviews were conducted in each region with researchers and agricultural advisors working in OA (Table 3). The interviews were transcribed, coded, and analyzed in MAXQDA 2018 software using three coding systems: open, axial, and selective coding. Participants were selected according to their position and publications or by reference through umbrella organizations or other experts. More information about the interviewees is listed in Appendix 2.

Each interview lasted between 35 to 55 min. The interviews were conducted via Skype or telephone, and interviewee 8 was not available for a personal talk and answered the questions in written form. All interviews were conducted in English, focused on the content of interviews, and included translated conversations during transcription.

The most recent and relevant newspaper stories, government announcements, and other non-scientific publications about the subject were studied with the content analysis method in the same way as interviews were analyzed to gain further insight into the subject matter. Google and Press reader were used to conduct the web search, which included pertinent key terms. The papers were only included if they contributed value to the analysis and contained data related to the research topic. Most came from local newspaper websites and government announcements on their respective English-language websites. Papers published until February 2020 are included in this study, and the sample size of analyzed papers ranges between 18 and 20 per region (see Appendix 2) (Table 3).

Table 3. The number of interviews and papers of content analysis, applied in the study.

Cases of the study	Number of interviews	Number of papers
Sikkim	3	18
Bhutan	2	20
Sri Lanka	3	20

4.2. Data analysis

The qualitative content analysis of the papers and the analysis of the interview transcripts are based on a coding scheme that allows one to answer the research questions. To systematically describe the meaning of qualitative data (Pohontsch, 2019), the coding (Williams & Moser, 2019) was done in three levels in MAXQDA 2018 software:

1. Open coding to distinct concepts and themes is identified for categorization.

2. Axial coding to develop core codes. This study used axial coding twice to define subcategories and categories for each item.

3. Third level of coding (selective coding), which continued the axial coding to integrate categorized data from axial coding in cohesive expressions.

On this base, the collected coded data was reorganized and clustered into different categories according to selective coding, and the results are presented in the following.

5. Results

This section discusses the three large-scale conversion policies in further detail by presenting the findings of the expert interviews and papers.

5.1. Key drivers

To categorize the contents and components, the open coding method was used first to find the primary driving variables and challenges that were revealed in acquired documents and interviews. Then the axial coding approach was used to determine the subcategories and, as a result, main categories, and finally, the selective coding approach was used to determine the main factors.

In all, 49 driving variables were collected through interviews and publications in all three research cases, but only those variables that were found in at least two cases, for instance, in both Sikkim and Bhutan, were accepted, and in total, 23 driving variables incorporated into Table 4, which summarizes significant driving variables, in six categories and 12 subcategories, as well as the frequency with which they are mentioned in different contexts.

Table 4. Frequencies of repeated key drivers and their categories in all three cases of the study.

Categories (Axial codes)	Subcategories (Axial coded)	Driving variables (Open coded)	Frequencies and relative frequencies of reporting in documents/ interviews
			Sikkim		Bhutan		Sri Lanka
			Frequency	Relative Frequency	Frequency	Relative Frequency	Frequency	Relative Frequency
Agronomic Drivers	Traditional low input farming systems	Preconditions were favourable OA	9	0.43	1	0.04	–	–
		(2) Traditional agricultural practices similar to organic (Low usage of agrochemicals)	9	0.43	3	0.14	–	–
		(3) Land conditions do not allow high intensive systems	9	0.43	1	0.04	–	–
	Enhancing sustainability in agriculture	(4) More sustainable agriculture	5	0.24	4	0.18	1	0.04
Ecological drivers	Preservation of natural resources	(5) Conservation and preservation of the natural environment	5	0.24	6	0.27	–	–
		(6) Water sources for the whole country	5	0.24	–	–	1	0.04
		(7) Soil health and fertility	5	0.24	–	–	1	0.04
	Clean and untouched nature	(8) Clean and untouched nature	6	0.29	6	0.27
Economic drivers	Enhancing farmers income and rural livelihood	(9) Increase income for farmers with premium prices	4	0.19	–	–	2	0.09
		(10) Differentiate and emphasize value-added of products with organic certification	4	0.19	7	0.32	–	–
		(11) Sustainable livelihood for farmers	4	0.19	–	–	7	0.30
		(12) Poverty reduction	4	0.19	1	0.04	–	–
	Boost ecotourism	(13) Boost ecotourism	2	0.09	1	0.04	–	–
	Market development of farming products through organic brands	(14) Promote with Sikkim/Bhutan organic Brand	1	0.05	1	0.04	–	–
		(15) Export opportunities	–	–	1	0.04	2	0.09
Political drivers	Willingness of central government	(16) Vision from central government to convert entire region/country to organic for economic development	2	0.09	3	0.14	2	0.09
	SDGs	(17) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	1	0.05	1	0.04	–	–
	Good governance	(18) Good governance	–	–	3	0.14	4	0.17
		(19) Responsibility of the government to protect and better nation	–	–	3	0.14	2	0.09
Social drivers	Safe food availability and health improvement	(20) Health improvement	2	0.09	6	0.27	3	0.13
		(21) Avoid negative effects of agrochemicals on population health and save health costs	–	–	6	0.27	2	0.09
		(22) Safe food for population /Nutrition benefits/ at affordable prices for all people	3	0.14	1	0.04	3	0.13
Others	Cultural Values	(23) Religion values of Buddhism	1	0.05	2	0.09	–	–
Total papers and interviews (used as a base to calculate relative frequency)			21	100	22	100	23	100

As evident in Table 4, in Sikkim, the movement towards organic agriculture was driven by many factors that play well together. In Bhutan, the key drivers to convert the whole country’s agriculture to organic are mainly political and initiated by the government. The key drivers for introducing the Toxic Free Nation Program in Sri Lanka were mainly of political and social nature.

The governments initiated different large-scale conversion programmes for various reasons. Generally, the factors that led to the conversion projects are similar in Sikkim and Bhutan. This makes sense, as the States of Sikkim and Bhutan are neighbouring and have similar preconditions. The perceived advantages of OA, such as keeping the soil healthy and productive in the long term, were also key aspects of the governments.

In this regard, the minimal use of chemicals in Bhutan is recognized as a precondition for an easier transition to a full OA. For instance, the former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry of Bhutan, Dr. Pema Gyamtsho, called the decision to go organic both practical and philosophical.

Ours is a mountainous terrain. When we use chemicals, they don't stay where we use them, they impact the water and plants. We say that we need to consider all the environment. Most of our farm practices are traditional farming, so we are largely organic anyway. (Paper 38)

In Bhutan, political drivers were among the major reasons for initiating the programme to follow the principles of Gross National Happiness (GNH). Wangmo and Iwai (2018) confirm the proximity of OA and GNH. In Sri Lanka, political aspects were among the most important drivers, such as winning votes in the election campaign. In Sikkim, domestic political aspects were not in focus; instead, the government seemed primarily motivated by becoming the first state of being fully converted and an inspiration for other regions.

Health problems, especially the fast spread of CKDu, were Sri Lanka’s main driver in reducing the inputs of agrochemicals, as they have been made responsible as a cause of the pandemic spread of diseases. According to Malkanthi et al. (2019), the farmers in the highly affected northeast region welcomed the government’s initiative to move away from agrochemicals in fear of the epidemic situation of CKDu. The ban on agrochemicals was in line with the research by Ranasinghe (2016). Although there is still debate on the precise causes of CKDu, recent studies have also suggested that pesticide exposure may be a risk factor (Redmon et al., 2021). The evidence for a relationship between pesticides and CKDu, however, is inconclusive because numerous studies had limitations such as cross-sectional designs, confounding, and bias in selection (Valcke et al., 2017). The population’s health was also considered in Bhutan but was not one of the major drivers. In India, in other states with extensive use of agrochemicals, a higher number of farmer health issues were reported. Sikkim also intended to avoid the negative effects by banning all chemical inputs (Yangzom & Singh, 2019).

In Bhutan and Sikkim, the favourable preconditions of the low chemical input use were an incentive to go for full conversion and support the low-input systems by upscaling them to organic systems. The overall situation in both regions has a high potential for a successful conversion from traditional to organic farming systems. According to ICIMOD and Ministry of Agriculture and Forests of Bhutan (2018), the conversion gives ground for increased and sustainable food production to ensure food security and enhance farmers’ income.

As all three research regions are naturally rich in biodiversity, the ecological factors were also important consideration factors. The preservation of clean nature, rich wildlife, and biodiversity was especially important to the governments of Sikkim and Bhutan. In Bhutan, nature conservation is an aspect of the GNH philosophy of living in harmony with nature and conserving the natural environment. In contrast, Sikkim also wants to promote ecotourism as a source of income.

Organic agriculture policy could be more realistically formulated if more data were available on the costs and benefits of converting to organic farming in various agroecosystems (Templer et al., 2018). In all regions, the livelihood of the rural population is highly dependent on agriculture, and subsistence farming is predominant in all three focus areas. Hence, the government is also aiming to enhance the livelihood of the farmers to achieve higher income through premium prices. Sikkim and Bhutan are creating an organic brand to promote the regions and their produce. Neuhoff et al. (2014) report that farmer income in Bhutan will only rise if premium prices can be realized or the outcome surpasses traditional and conventional agriculture yields. Feuerbacher et al. (2018) also warn that a full transition to OA in Bhutan will significantly reduce GDP, welfare loss, and food security. Also, Tashi and Wangchuk (2016a) report a significantly higher benefit-cost return in conventional rice than in organically grown paddy.

5.2. Challenges

Ninety-six challenges were identified through interviews and publications in all three research cases. However, only those found in at least two cases, for example, in both Sikkim and Sri Lanka, were accepted, resulting in 22 challenges, organized into five categories and ten subcategories and incorporated into Table 5.

Table 5. Frequencies of repeated challenges and their categories in all three cases of the study.

Categories (Axial Codes)	Subcategories (Axial Coded)	Challenges (Open Coded)	Frequencies of reporting in documents/ interviews
			Sikkim		Bhutan		Sri Lanka
			Frequency	Relative frequency	Frequency	Relative frequency	Frequency	Relative frequency
Market access & marketing	Market inaccessibility & deficient infrastructure	(1) Poor transportation & lack of market access	7	0.33	1		1
		(2) Lack of organic value addition industry and post-harvest facilities	4	0.19	1	0.04	–	–
	Purchasing & high prices of products	(3) Low consumers’ awareness, trust & affordability	1	0.05	5	0.23	1	0.04
		(4) Competition with cheaper products	5	0.24	2	0.09	2	0.09
		(5) Higher prices of organic products, which would not be accepted and could not be afforded by many consumers	1	0.05	5	0.23	–	–
Input management	Availability of agrochemicals instead of organic inputs	(6) Unavailability of suitable organic pesticides & seeds and other inputs	11	0.52	1	0.04	3	0.13
		(7) Availability of agrochemicals	–	–	2	0.09	3	0.13
	The labour cost in organic farming	(8) High labour cost in organic farming compared with conventional system	–	–	4	0.18	1	0.04
Farming output	Farming output & food security issue	(9) Initial decline in production productivity during switching to organic farming	2	0.09	–	–	2	0.09
		(10) Food security and providing enough food	6	0.29	–	–	1	0.04
Certification matters	Bureaucracy & high costs of organic conversion	(11) Bureaucracy of organic conversion & illiteracy of farmers	1	0.05	1	0.04	–	–
		(12) High costs of the certification of whole the country or region and for farmers is not affordable	3	0.14	1	0.04	2	0.09
Governmental matters	Political & social convergence towards organic farming	(13) It was a political move & the farmers were not in the centre of the programme	1	0.05	–	–	2	0.09
		(14) Different opinions about OA in the government	–	–	2	0.09	3	0.13
		(15) Convincing farmers and other people	–	–	1	0.04	1	0.04
		(16) Ad hoc plans, quick changes & complexity of taking people into the direction	–	–	2	0.09	4	0.17
	Funding & financial support shortages	(17) Unavailability of direct subsidies from the government for farmers to implement the changes	3	0.14	1	0.04	–	–
		(18) Lack of funding & insufficient government support	–	–	5	0.23	2	0.09
	Lack of data & information	(19) Record keeping (the documentation and data about the programme are not published or easily accessible)	–	–	1	0.04	1	0.04
	Knowledge & education	(20) Insufficient scientific knowledge about organic farming practices and inputs	8	0.38	1	0.04	3	0.13
		(21) Most farmers neither had the tools nor knowledge about the alternatives of agrochemicals	1	0.05	–	–	3	0.13
Total papers and interviews (used as a base to calculate relative frequency)			21	100	22	100	23	100

In Bhutan and Sikkim, the access to markets and infrastructure were similar to marketing and market availability, major identified challenges in the regions. Road density is criticized as a limiting factor for the Sikkim Organic Mission (Kumar et al., 2018; Phukan et al., 2018). Other research confirms a lack of markets in Bhutan and Sikkim, especially as consumers do not differentiate between organic and traditionally grown produce in the local markets (Chettri, 2015; Kumar et al., 2018; Mahat & Charoenratana, 2018; McCrae-Hokenson, 2014). This circumstance, combined with the competition for cheap imported produce, was reported as a constraint by Tashi and Wangchuk (2016b) as it did not allow farmers to receive premium prices. In Sikkim, the lack of a value-addition industry was also an identified challenge that must be faced in the future, confirmed by the study of Yadav et al. (2018).

In all regions, the lack of organic input supplies and the unavailability of effective chemical alternatives made conversion difficult. If farmers do not have the chance to adapt to new practices and other forms of input, as in Sri Lanka, pest and disease management become substantial hurdles (McCrae-Hokenson, 2014; Tashi & Wangchuk, 2016b). The legal (Bhutan) and illegal (Sri Lanka) distribution of chemical inputs is also perceived as contra-productive to reaching the programmes’ visions.

Most of the detected challenges in the form of the lack of government support identified in this paper in Bhutan’s organic movement were in line with other researchers’ findings, such as the lack of coordination between government agencies (Tashi & Wangchuk, 2016b), the absence of a strong body at national level responsible for the implementation (Duba et al., 2007) and deficiency of guidance, clarity, and policies from government’s side (Duba et al., 2007; IFOAM Asia, 2019; McCrae-Hokenson, 2014; Tashi & Wangchuk, 2016b).

The rural-urban migration and labour shortage in agriculture were also reported in various other research as a threat to organic conversion, as it is more labour intensive and hiring workforce is expensive (Duba et al., 2007; McCrae-Hokenson, 2014; Tashi & Wangchuk, 2016b). Farmer’s low awareness of organic practices and produce in Bhutan was also identified as a main challenge to the programme in this research (Duba et al., 2007; Kobayashi et al., 2015). Farmers may practice chemical-free farming but are seldom using improved organic farming practices.

The resistance of other stakeholders was the biggest challenge to the Toxin-Free Nation Program, which probably also caused it to fail a nationwide conversion. Cordell et al. (2017) and Ranasinghe (2016) also report on the great opposition towards the programme, especially the ban on glyphosate by scientists and agrochemical companies. The resistance in Sri Lanka was mainly against the ad-hoc implementation of the programme because of sociopolitical pressure, without considering basic agricultural knowledge and neglecting mainstream scientific opinion, which was also criticized by Marambe and Herath (2020). They concluded that the major consequences of the ban were increased crop production cost, low crop yield, loss of foreign exchange, and enhanced use of illegally imported glyphosate products. Weerahewa et al. (2017) also warn of a yield reduction, especially in cereal crops, because of the programme.

6. Discussion

In Bhutan, the movement was developing productively, but lacked sufficient policy support and concrete measures e.g. to resolve trade-offs with other policy objectives like food self-sufficiency. In Sikkim, the programme was implemented with a strict focus and timeline. The ambitious timeline raised concerns about the implementation and whether market expectations and output targets were exuberant (Willer & Lernoud, 2016). Likewise, in Sri Lanka, the toxin-free nation programme soon lacked implementation. Besides the ban on glyphosate and the switch from agrochemicals supply to direct cash subsidies, the Toxin-Free Nation project only reached small parts of the country (Appendix 2, Paper 57). The ban on agrochemical import and use in April 2021 was followed by a drop in agricultural production and export of key crops, like tea (Nordhaus & Shah, 2022). This resulted in a strong increase of imports, most notably rice, and a decline in foreign exchange earnings. Already in November 2021, the import ban was lifted to reverse the negative implications on Sri Lanka’s food security and economy (Nordhaus & Shah, 2022). In Sikkim, the issue of self-sufficiency was irrelevant as food from other states could be imported easily. Sikkim, being a state and not a country, had many advantages. India’s central government supports the mission with government funding, advice, and institutions.

In Sikkim and Sri Lanka, the government formed a new institution responsible for implementing the whole government programme. In contrast, in Bhutan, the number of departments and agencies responsible for part of the implementation was high. In contrast, in Sikkim and Sri Lanka, the spearheading institutions had more manpower and could act independently.

In Sikkim, the ban on importing and distributing agrochemicals came slowly, and there was a continuous phasing out time from 2003 until 2014. In Sri Lanka, the sudden ban in 2015 on glyphosate, which was used highly in the country, gave the farmers no opportunity to prepare for it with alternative inputs or farming practices. Marambe and Herath (2020) identified this as a major challenge and threat to the programme.

Certification was handled effectively in Sikkim, where the central government paid for all the certifications through third-party agencies. To reduce the cost of certification in the future, the government has set up a government agency that is taking over parts of the certification from third-party agencies. The high cost of third-party certification will remain a major challenge, especially if the cost-benefit ratio is unfavourable. A participatory guarantee system might be worth consideration for products not used for the export market, but implementing such a system is also associated with various hurdles (Chaparro-Africano & Páramo, 2022; Hruschka et al., 2022). Also, as McCrae-Hokenson (2014) reports, the certification process in Bhutan is a big handicap for a successful transition. Despite the government developing a farmer-friendly concept of certification, which is at no cost to the farmer and is supposed to be simpler in terms of record-keeping for the farms, the system is not internationally recognized yet, which makes it unsuitable for exports. So far, only very few farms have been certified. No third-party certification agency operates in the country, and certifiers must travel from abroad for inspections if the product is intended to be exported as organic. This bears extremely high costs for the farmers or exporters and limits the industry from growing. In Sri Lanka, certification was never a goal of the Toxin-Free Nation programme, but third-party agencies are operating on the island for farmers seeking certification. There is no financial support for certification through the government. In many cases, the exporters finance the certification and hold the exclusive right to sell the farmer’s produce as certified organic.

Except for Sikkim, a certification level of 100% is difficult to achieve. In Sri Lanka, the total certified organic share of agricultural land was reported at 6%, and in 2018 the share dropped to 2.8%, nonetheless still being the land with the second-highest certified organic land share after Timor-Leste in Asia (Willer et al., 2020; Willer & Lernoud, 2019). The timing of the drop from 2017 to 2018 could indicate that more farmers registered for conversion during the programme’s implementation in 2016 but did not pursue it later. In Bhutan, the share of certified organic land is 1.3% low for a country pursuing a full organic conversion, but this is related to the non-existence of recognized certification bodies in the country.

The government supported organic inputs in Sikkim and Bhutan; occasionally, inputs were distributed for free to the farmers. In Sri Lanka, the free supply of agrochemicals by the government was stopped in 2016. With this step, the Sri Lankan government stopped supporting conventional farming and allowed farmers to get organic inputs with government support. Pilot projects were established in all regions as a first step of implementation. In Bhutan, the piloting districts decided independently to become organic. Also, all programmes included funding for capacity building of training staff and farmers themselves. Governmental research institutes got mandated to research organic farming and chemical-free inputs to back up the programmes.

Figure 1 summarizes the study’s main findings and provides a visual overview of implementation policies and strategies, key drivers, and major challenges of government-initiated large-scale conversion programmes. They are recoded by selective coding method in the second level of variables (sub-categories) of each part of the study.

Figure 1. Summary of findings by selective coding method: successful implementation policies, key drivers, and major challenges of the government initiated large scale conversion programmes.

7. Conclusion

The policymakers of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Sri Lanka took the global trend of OA further, developed strategies, and implemented government programmes aiming for agrochemical-free or even organic large-scale conversion. The present study investigates the policy context (up to 2020), key drivers, and challenges accompanying such an ambitious goal and its realization.

This study identifies five major strategies that foster a transition to sustainable farming, which include: putting a strong, independent institution in charge of implementation; developing a market for organic produce and enabling cost-effective third-party certification; gradually (not ad-hoc) phasing out agrochemicals through clear policies; build a strong extension network and invest in capacity building; and ensure the supply of organic inputs.

The key drivers for ongoing organic or chemical-free policies were the central government’s willingness to support organic farming, enhancing rural livelihood, upscaling traditional farming practices, health concerns towards agrochemicals, and preserving land, water, and soil for future production.

The shortage of organic inputs, lack of market availability and price premiums, the challenge of self-sufficiency and food security, lack of farmers’ knowledge about organic practices, and the high cost and effort of certification were recognized as the main obstacles to large-scale conversion programmes.

The political drivers such as providing long-term benefits and welfare to farmers, avoiding harmful effects of agrochemicals on the health of farmer families and the population of the countries, moving towards the protection of the environment, and avoiding soil and water pollution are the main drivers for a large-scale conversion programme among the three studied regions.

Because there is limited information published about such initiatives, any other region or country considering an attempt for a successful transition toward more sustainable agriculture can learn from the present study to know which policy arrangements have worked and which have not. Hence, the study’s findings can inform concrete policy recommendations in country contexts where similar large-scale conversions are planned. For instance, policymakers should ensure that any large-scale conversion programmes must be initiated and fully supported by governments at all levels, with participation from all sectors.

At any rate, like in the case of Bhutan, food security challenges or self-sufficiency promotion policies may impede or halt the progress of such initiatives, as organic farming though beneficial for human health and ecosystems, still faces the challenge of providing sufficient calories for food insecure countries. Developing ecotourism and national branding for export products can be seen as an appropriate alternative to prevent decreasing GDP, achieving additional economic advantages, and adding some other revenues to fully transformed regions or countries. Institutional adjustments and improvements in inspection and certification systems at the international and national levels are highly suggested to prepare for the demand for organic products in local and international markets. Furthermore, activities such as raising consumer awareness through public education, the media, and farmer training and education are necessary for such large-scale conversions. However, the recent events in Sri Lanka showed that apart from the drivers mentioned above and challenges, a long-term political strategy, and a gradual transition towards OA are necessary where built-in monitoring and evaluation loops offer adjustment opportunities in case internal or external factors challenge the transition strategy.

Acknowledgements

The authors extend their appreciation to the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable insights and recommendations that significantly enhanced the quality of this paper. We would like to sincerely thank every interviewee who participated in this study, offering their time and comprehensive responses to our inquiries. Special recognition goes to Hannah Levine for her meticulous proofreading of the manuscript, to Jonathan Gerlach for his editing assistance and to Dr. Zeynab Jouzi for her insightful feedback on earlier versions of this work.

Data availability statement

The authors confirm that the data, including the papers and documents supporting the findings of this study, are available within the paper's supplementary materials, and the interviews that support the study's findings are available from the corresponding author upon request. The authors report that there are no competing interests to declare.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 According to the IFOAM General Assembly (2008) in Italy, organic agriculture is defined as following:

Organic Agriculture is a production system that sustains the health of soils, ecosystems, and people. It relies on ecological processes, biodiversity and cycles adapted to local conditions, rather than the use of inputs with adverse effects. Organic Agriculture combines tradition, innovation, and science to benefit the shared environment and promote fair relationships and good quality of life for all involved.

2 The Mission Organic Value Chain Development for the Northeast Region.

3 Chronic Kidney Disease of unknown etiology.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Information on the interviewed experts of the study

Table

Name	Position
Interviewee 1 (Sikkim)	Advisor to the government of Sikkim and Bhutan on policies and practices to promote organic agriculture; former secretary of Biodynamic Association of India; IFOAM Asia board member;
Interviewee 2 (Sikkim)	Principal Scientist (Soil Science) and Head of Division of HRD and Social Sciences at ICAR Research Complex for NEH Region;
Interviewee 3 (Sikkim)	Assistant to the Chief Operating Officer, Sikkim IFFCO Organics, joint venture between the State of Sikkim and Indian Farmer Fertilizer Cooperative Limited; her colleague Sanjana Bhardwaj joined the interview;
Interviewee 4 (Bhutan)	Associate Professor at the Agriculture Department, College of Natural Resources, Royal University of Bhutan; former Deputy Chief Horticulture Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and General Manager of Druk Seed Corporation;
Interviewee 5 (Bhutan)	Director of the Entrepreneurialism Clinic (EC) at Jingme Singye Wangchuck School of Law, where organic farming and associated values chains are a focus; since 2013 active as a consultant of an agricultural cooperative and managing director of an agricultural business living in Bhutan;
Interviewee 6 (Sri Lanka)	Professor at the University of Peradeniya, Faculty of Agriculture, Department of Crop Science; Editor in Chief of the Sri Lanka Journal of Food and Agriculture;
Interviewee 7 (Sri Lanka)	Head of Manufacturing, Bio Foods Pvt. Ltd, organic & fair-trade company, winner at German Sustainability Awards for Best Global Corporate Partnerships 2020;
Interviewee 8 (Sri Lanka)	President of LOAM; former coordinator of the Sri Lanka Nature Forum; board member of National Organic Control Authority in Sri Lanka; Managing Director of SriCert.

Appendix 2: paper selection

Sikkim

Table

Paper no.	Paper name	Publication date	Publication	Accessed on	Source
Sikkim
1	Sikkim becomes India’s first organic state	14.01.16	The Hindu	09.02.20	https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Sikkim-becomes-India%E2%80%99s-firstorganic-
2	Sikkim Organic Mission: why we need to dig deeper	29.01.16	Huffington Post	09.02.20	https://www.huffpost.com/archive/in/entry/sikkim-organic-mission-why-we-need-to-dig-deeper_b_9058356
3	How Sikkim beat Himalayan odds to become India’s first organic state	12.02.16	The Better India	09.02.20	https://www.thebetterindia.com/45137/sikkim-first-organic-state-of-india-farmers/
4	Sikkim, the Indian state becomes the first to farm 100% organic	28.04.16	Lifegate	09.02.20	https://www.lifegate.com/people/lifestyle/sikkim-first-organic-state-india
5	India’s first fully-organic state faces many challenges to maintaining its status	08.08.16	Earth Island Journal	09.02.20	https://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/articles/entry/indias_first_fullyorganic_state_faces_many_challenges/
6	Sikkim's organic revolution at risk as local consumers fail to buy into project	31.01.17	The Guardian	09.02.20	https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jan/31/sikkim-india-organicrevolution-at-risk-as-local-consumers-fail-to-buy-into-project
7	Sikkim’s switch to organic farming yielded none of the promised fruits for its orange growers	13.04.17	Scroll in	09.02.20	https://scroll.in/magazine/830504/sikkims-switch-to-organic-farming-yielded-none-of-thepromised-fruits-for-its-orange-growers
8	Sikkim is 100% organic! Take a second look	19.04.17	Down to Earth	09.02.20	https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/agriculture/organic-trial-57517
9	Sikkim: An organic vision becomes reality	05.12.17	organic.market.info	09.02.20	https://organic-market.info/news-in-brief-and-reports-article/sikkim-an-organic-visionbecomes-reality.html
10	An Indian state banned pesticides. Tourism and wildlife flourished. Will others follow?	31.05.18	The Washington Post	09.02.20	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pesticides-helped-bring-modern-farming-to-india-one-tiny-state-is-leading-the-charge-to-ban-them/2018/05/29/95c7e594-3da6-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story.html
11	Sikkim: leading in organic	20.07.18	krishijagran	09.02.20	https://krishijagran.com/agripedia/sikkim-leader-in-organic/
12	Sikkim, India's first ‘fully organic’ state wins FAO'S Future Policy Gold Award	15.10.18	FAO	09.02.20	http://www.fao.org/india/news/detail-events/en/c/1157760/
13	Sikkim – the first 100% organic state in the world!	17.10.18	Organic without Boundaries	09.02.20	https://www.organicwithoutboundaries.bio/2018/10/17/sikkim/
14	A 100% organic world is possible. The Indian state of Sikkim shows us how	14.11.18	Lifegate	09.02.20	https://www.lifegate.com/people/lifestyle/sikkim-organic-agriculture-model
15	Sikkim, the first organic Indian State – behind the stage	08.03.19	OpenTeam	09.02.20	https://www.openteam.co/2019/03/08/sikkims-the-first-indian-organic-state/
16	Sikkim’s much-hyped organic farming mission faces uncertainty, new CM won’t impose it	25.06.19	Hindustan Times	09.02.20	https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/sikkim-s-much-hyped-organic-farmingmission-faces-uncertainty-new-cm-won-t-impose-it/story-JZk1qv4H4qApJ2bya8G3kK.html
17	Sikkim becomes world's first organic state, wins ‘Oscar for best policies’ by UN	22.07.19	India Today	09.02.20	https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/sikkim-becomesworld-s-first-organic-state-wins-oscar-for-best-policies-by-un-1369158-2018-10-16
18	Sikkim will not deviate from organic farming policy	23.02.20	The Hindu	09.02.20	https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/agri-business/sikkim-will-not-deviatefrom-organic-farming-policy/article30895484.ece

Bhutan

Table

Paper no.	Paper name	Publication date	Publication	Accessed on	Source
Bhutan
19	AM with PM: National Organic Flagship Programme	12.02.20	MoAF	04.02.20	http://www.moaf.gov.bt/am-with-pm-national-organic-flagship-programme/
20	PM discusses way forward of organic flagship programme	12.02.20	Kuensel	04.02.20	https://kuenselonline.com/pm-discusses-way-forward-of-organic-flagship-programme/
21	100% organic target by 2020 pushed to 2035	04.01.20	Kuensel	04.02.20	https://kuenselonline.com/100-organic-target-by-2020-pushed-to-2035/
22	Agriculture Ministry confident about Bhutan’s organic dream	28.11.19	Business Bhutan	04.02.20	https://www.businessbhutan.bt/2019/11/28/agriculture-ministry-confident-aboutbhutans-organic-dream/
23	Nu 1 billion flagship programme for organic farming with Sikkim in mind	16.11.19	The Bhutanese	04.02.20	https://thebhutanese.bt/nu-1-billion-flagship-program-for-organic-farming-with-sikkim-inmind/
24	Organic farming receives boost	07.11.19	The Executive	04.02.20	https://www.cabinet.gov.bt/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/LayoutFinal_compressed_compressed_compressed.pdf
25	Bhutan moves closer to becoming 100% organic with National Organic Flagship Programme	24.08.19	Daily Bhutan	04.02.20	https://www.dailybhutan.com/article/bhutan-moves-closer-to-becoming-100-organicwith-national-organic-flagship-programme
26	MoAF signs National Organic Flagship Programme APA with the Hon’ble Prime Minister	23.08.19	MoAF	04.02.20	http://www.moaf.gov.bt/moaf-signs-national-organic-flagship-programme-apa-with-thehonble-prime-minister/
27	National Organig Flagship Program	22.08.19	Official Facebook Account	04.02.20	https://www.facebook.com/109632460403923/posts/the-royal-government-hasapproved-the-national-organic-flagship-program-nofp-for/109669480400221/
28	Government of Bhutan injects Nu 1 Billion to kick-start Organic Flagship Programme	12.07.19	Daily Bhutan	04.02.20	https://www.dailybhutan.com/article/government-of-bhutan-injects-nu-1-billion-to-kickstart-organic-flagship-programme
29	Bhutan Organic Guarantee System (BOGS) documents launched	07.06.19	MoAF	04.02.20	http://www.moaf.gov.bt/bhutan-organic-guarantee-system-bogs-documents-launched/
30	An economy for food sovereignty and organic farming	18.02.19	arc2020	04.02.20	https://www.arc2020.eu/bhutan-food-sovereignty-and-organic-farming/
31	Experts meet for National Organic Flagship Program	17.08.18	MoAF	04.02.20	http://www.moaf.gov.bt/experts-meet-for-national-organic-flagship-program/
32	Local organic certified products launched	26.06.18	BBS	04.02.20	http://www.bbs.bt/news/?p=98578
33	Bhutan frist organic state by 2020?	17.07.17	Selerant	04.02.20	https://resources.selerant.com/food-regulatory-news/bhutan-first-organic-state-by-2020
34	Agricultural sustainability in Bhutan: a perspective	01.07.17	Druk Journal	04.02.20	http://drukjournal.bt/agricultural-sustainability-in-bhutan-a-perspective/
35	Going organic by 2020 questionable	23.05.17	Kuensel	04.02.20	https://kuenselonline.com/going-organic-by-2020-questionable/
36	The first of organic certification	12.10.16	MoAF	04.02.20	http://www.moaf.gov.bt/the-first-of-organic-certification/
37	Bhutan's plan to go 100 percent organic make progress	26.02.13	oneco	04.02.20	https://orgprints.org/24671/7/24671.pdf
38	Bhutan set to plough lone furrow as world's first wholly organic country	11.02.13	the guardian	04.02.20	https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/povertymatters/2013/feb/11/bhutan-first-wholly-organic-country

Sri Lanka

Table

Paper no.	Paper name	Publication date	Publication	Accessed on	Source
Sri Lanka
39	Nameless killer	19.01.15	The Times-Tribune	25.02.20	https://pressreader.com/article/281509339577654
40	Mystery kidney disease takes ist toll	31.01.15	Vancouver Sun	26.02.20	https://pressreader.com/article/282205124299567
41	Immediate ban on Glyphosate herbicides	25.05.15	Sustainable Pulse	27.02.20	https://sustainablepulse.com/2015/05/25/sri-lankas-new-president-puts-immediate-banon-glyphosate-herbicides/#.XrkxzhMzau5
42	‘Wasa Visa Nethi Ratak’ programme will launch on March 06	17.02.16	News.lk	28.02.20	https://www.news.lk/news/politics/item/12261-wasa-visa-nethi-ratak-program-willlaunch-on-march-06
43	The poisoning of Sri Lanka must stop	04.03.16	Daily Mirror	29.02.20	http://www.dailymirror.lk/106370/EDITORIAL-The-poisoning-of-Sri-Lanka-must-stop
44	Major drive to detoxify Lanka begins today	06.03.16	Sunday Times Sri Lanka	01.03.20	https://www.pressreader.com/sri-lanka/sunday-times-srilanka/20160306/281874412498145
45	I would take any decision in proper time for betterment of country – President	08.03.16	Asian Tribune	02.03.20	http://asiantribune.com/node/88639
46	President vows to stop use of agrochemicals	08.03.16	Daily Mirror	03.03.20	https://pressreader.com/article/282372628707492
47	No toxic chemicals for Green Sri Lanka	02.07.16	Daily Mirror	04.03.20	https://pressreader.com/article/281771333505999
48	Network to protext consumer rights launched	09.08.16	Daily Mirror	05.03.20	https://pressreader.com/article/282621737103387
49	Toxin free food programme to fulfil a national responsibility – President	09.09.16	Sri Lanka Consulate General	06.03.20	http://slcgdxb.com/toxin-free-food-program-to-fulfill-a-national-responsibility-president/
50	The ‘Toxin Free Nation’ & its black-market in Glyphosate	31.01.17	Colombo Telegraph	07.03.20	https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/the-toxin-free-nation-its-black-market-inglyphosate/
51	Amateurish policy making destroying agriculture sector: experts	01.02.17	Daily Mirror	08.03.20	https://pressreader.com/article/281973197380892
52	Glyphosate debate: who's killing Ceylon Tea?	06.08.17	Sunday Times Sri Lanka	09.03.20	https://pressreader.com/article/282681867346906
53	1/3 of the Sri Lanka army be deployed for nation-building projects	06.01.18	Sri Lanka Brief	10.03.20	https://srilankabrief.org/2018/01/13-of-the-sri-lanka-army-be-deployed-for-nationbuilding-projects/
54	The struggle for ‘toxin-free’ Sri Lankan farming	30.01.18	Responsible Business	11.03.20	https://www.responsiblebusiness.com/news/asia-pacific-news/struggle-toxin-free-srilankan-farming/
55	Toxin free nation’ to come to a halt?	22.03.18	Sri Lanka Mirror	25.02.20	https://srilankamirror.com/news/7770-toxin-free-nation-to-come-to-a-halt
56	The ill-fated road towards a Toxin-Free Nation	01.05.18	The Abacus	26.02.20	https://www.casrilanka.com/casl/images/abacus_may_2018.pdf
57	At the two-year mark towards a Toxin Free Nation	04.05.18	Daily Mirror	27.02.20	http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/At-The-Two-Year-Mark-Towards-A-Toxin-Free-Nation–149460.html
58	Organic agriculture farming in Sri Lanka	10.07.18	Grogreen Lanka	28.02.20	https://grogreenlanka.wordpress.com/2018/07/10/the-journey-begins/