Regions: Introduction and Comparison

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Notes

1 Sergei Troush, ‘China’s Changing Oil Strategy and Its Foreign Policy Implications’, The Brookings Institution, 1 September 1999, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-changing-oil-strategy-and-its-foreignpolicy-implications/.

2 ‘Kazakh Oil Reaches China Through New Pipeline’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 July 2006, https://www.rferl.org/a/1069776.html.

3 ‘West–East Gas Pipeline Project (2002–2013): Special Report on Social Responsibility’, China National Petroleum Corporation, 2013, http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/cs2012en/201407/7572081fc158451cbbf5a835f6428b2d/files/ea40888641b5423ba32206cdb15441fc.pdf.

4 Luke Harding, ‘China Signs Deal for 30 Years of Turkmen Gas’, Guardian, 25 June 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jun/25/china-turkmenistan-gas.

5 Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, United Nations, 7 June 2002, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202896/Part/volume-2896-I-50517.pdf.

6 ‘China Offers US$900 Million in Credit Loans to SCO Members’, People’s Daily, 18 June 2004, http://en.people.cn/200406/18/eng20040618_146720.html.

7 ‘Factbox – The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’, Reuters, 15 June 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-57713520110615.

8 AidData, Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, Version 2.0, 2021, https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddatas-global-chinesedevelopment-finance-dataset-version-2-0. (Data parameters are as follows. Recipient countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Recommended for aggregates: yes. Flow type: Export buyer’s credit; loan. Commitment year: 2000–13 inclusive. Amount: Nominal US$.)

9 Robin Paxton and Vladimir Soldatkin, ‘China Lends Russia $25 Billion to Get 20 Years of Oil’, Reuters, 17 February 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-china-oil-sbidUKTRE51G3S620090217.

10 Nargis Kassenova, ‘China as an Emerging Donor in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’, Russie.Nei.Visions, no. 36, January 2009, https://www.academia.edu/11723531/_China_as_an_Emerging_Donor_in_Tajikistan_and_Kyrgyzstan_.

11 IMF, ‘Direction of Trade Statistics’, https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61013712. (For each specified country, the data parameters are the sum of Exports, FOB and Imports, CIF for each trading partner for the year 2013.)

12 ‘China, Kazakhstan Sign Currency Swap Deal’, People’s Daily, 14 June 2011, http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/7409000.html.

13 People’s Bank of China, ‘Establishment of a Bilateral Local Currency Swap Supplemental Agreement between the People’s Bank of China and Bank of Mongolia’, 28 March 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20120328191533/www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2012/20120323091436517967877/20120323091436517967877_.html.

14 ‘China Signs 700 Mln Yuan Currency Swap Deal with Uzbekistan’, Reuters, 19 April 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/chinauzbekistan-swap-idUSB9E7EN02P20110419.

15 Yevgeny Shestakov, ‘China and Russia Plan Greater Eurasian Integration – Expert’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 5 June 2015, https://www.rbth.com/international/2015/06/05/china_and_russia_plan_greater_eurasian_integration_-_expert_46607.html.

16 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘O Podpisanii Plana Sotrudnichestva po Sopryazheniyu Novoy Ekonomicheskoy Politiki “Nұrly Zhol” i Stroitel’stva “Ekonomicheskogo Poyasa Shelkovogo Puti” Mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Respubliki Kazakhstan i Pravitel’stvom Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki’ ‘О подписании Плана сотрудничества по сопряжению Новой экономической политики “Нұрлы Жол” и строительства “Экономического пояса Шелкового пути” между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики’ [On the signing of the Cooperation Plan for the conjugation of the new economic policy ‘Nurly Zhol’ and the construction of the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China], 31 August 2016, https://tengrinews.kz/zakon/pravitelstvo_respubliki_kazahstan_premer_ministr_rk/mejdunapodnyie_otnosheniya_respubliki_kazahstan/id-P1600000518/.

17 Assel G. Bitabarova, ‘Unpacking Sino-Central Asian Engagement along the New Silk Road: A Case Study of Kazakhstan’, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2018, pp. 149–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1553226; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, ‘中哈举行产能与投资合作第十七 次对话’ [China and Kazakhstan hold the 17th dialogue on production capacity and investment cooperation], 28 September 2019, http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tzhzcj/xgzx/201909/20190902901344.shtml; and ‘ 中哈举行产能与投资合作第十八次对话’ [China and Kazakhstan hold the 18th dialogue on production capacity and investment cooperation], National Development and Reform Commission (国家发展和改革委员会), 12 June 2020, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzggw/wld/njz/lddt/202006/t20200612_1231215.html?code=&state=123.

18 ‘Vizit Mirziyoeva v Kitay: Podpisan 105 Soglasheniy na Summu $23 Mlrd’ ‘Визит Мирзиёева в Китай: подписано 105 соглашений на сумму $23 млрд’ [Mirziyoyev’s visit to China: 105 agreements worth $23 billion signed], Podrobno, 14 May 2017, https://podrobno.uz/cat/politic/vizit-mirziyeeva-v-kitay-podpisano-105soglasheniy-na-summu-23-mlrd/.

19 Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, ‘National Development Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan for the Period up to 2030’, 2016, https://nafaka.tj/images/zakoni/new/strategiya_2030_en.pdf.

20 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Developing Coordination and Institutional Arrangements for the Management of Intermodal Transport Corridors in the ESCAP Region’, Study Report 2019, https://www. unescap.org/sites/default/files/Finalized%20 study%20report%20on%20intermodal%20 corridors%20December%202019%20%20.pdf.

21 ‘Chinese President Returns to Beijing after Visits to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan’, Xinhua, 17 June 2019, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2019-06/17/content_74890243.htm; Xinhua, ‘China, Kyrgyzstan Agree to Enhance Ties to New Heights’, VietNam Breaking News, 13 June, 2019, https://www.vietnambreakingnews.com/2019/06/china-kyrgyzstan-agree-to-enhance-ties-to-new-heights/; and Mu Xuequan, ‘China, Tajikistan Agree to Deepen Ties for Common Prosperity’, Xinhua, 16 June 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190619072528/ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/16/c_138146465.htm.

22 Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation and Asian Development Bank, ‘CAREC Transport and Trade Facilitation’, 2009, https://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/CAREC- Transport-Trade-Facilitation.pdf.

23 COSCO, ‘COSCO Shipping, Lianyungang Port Holdings Group and Kazakhstan Termi Zholy (KTZ) Signed an Agreement on Transfer of Share in the Dry Port in Khorgos Eastern Gates’, 16 May 2017, http://en.coscoshipping.com/art/2017/5/16/art_6923_58640.html.

24 Evgeny Vinokurov et al., ‘Silk Road Transport Corridors: Assessment of Trans-EAEU Freight Traffic Growth Potential’, Report no. 49, EDB Centre for Integration Studies, 2018, https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/0a8/EDB-Centre_2018_Report-49_TransportCorridors_ENG.pdf.

25 International Union of Railways, ‘Eurasian Corridors: Development Potential’, February 2020, p. 6, https://uic.org/IMG/pdf/uic-iec2020_eurasian-corridors-developmentpotential_exec_summary.pdf.

26 Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, ‘Railway Sector Assessment for the Republic of Kazakhstan’, March 2021, https://www. carecprogram.org/uploads/CAREC-CRAKAZ_7th_4MAR2021_WEB.pdf.

27 Ibid.; and ‘Trans-Kazakhstan Railway Opens’, Railway Gazette International, 26 August 2014, https://www.railwaygazette.com/infrastructure/trans-kazakhstan-railwayopens/39895.article.

28 International Union of Railways, ‘Silk Road Middle and Southern Corridors’, presented at the International Union of Railways’‘Eurasian Rail Traffic Development: Southern and Middle Corridor’ webinar, 22 April 2021, https://uic. org/events/IMG/pdf/presentations_210422_ uic_corridor_study_2021_1.pdf.

29 Jalil Saporov and Bakyt Ibraimov, ‘China– Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway Remains Uncertain’, Third Pole, 13 January 2021, https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/regional-cooperation/china-kyrgyzstanuzbekistan-railway-remains-uncertain/.

30 International Union of Railways, ‘Presentation of the Recommendations and Gaps from the UIC Study on Eurasian Corridors’, presented at the International Union of Railways’‘Eurasian Corridors Stakeholder Group Meeting’, 22 November 2017, https://uic.org/IMG/pdf/2017-11-22_00_agenda_stakeholder_ group.pdf.

31 ‘China Unveils Vision for “Polar Silk Road” across Arctic’, Reuters, 26 January 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-arcticidUSKBN1FF0J8.

32 Albert Buixadé Farré et al., ‘Commercial Arctic Shipping through the Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources, Governance, Technology, and Infrastructure’, Polar Geography, vol. 37, no. 4, 2014, pp. 298–324, https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769.

33 Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, ‘Russia Launches Gas Pipeline to China’, Financial Times, 2 December 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/551258ca-14ed-11ea-9ee4-11f260415385.

34 Novatek, ‘Novatek Closes Sale of 20% Interest in Yamal LNG to CNPC’, Press release, 14 January 2014, https://www.novatek.ru/en/press/releases/index.php?id_4=826.

35 Novatek, ‘Novatek and China’s Silk Road Fund Sign Binding Definitive Agreements’, Press release, 17 December 2015, https://www. novatek.ru/en/press/releases/printable. php?print=1&id_4=1056&mode_20=all.

36 Vladimir Soldatkin and Olesya Astakhova, ‘Russia’s Yamal LNG Gets Round Sanctions with US$12 Bln Chinese Loan Deal’, Reuters, 29 April 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/russia- china-yamal-idUSL5N17W2G8.

37 ‘China Insurance Fund to Invest in Russia’s Yamal LNG’, Reuters, 5 January 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/china-insuranceinvestment-idUSL3N14P1JG20160105.

38 ‘Do 80% Oborudovaniya Dlya “Yamal SPG” Soberut na Kitayskikh Verfyakh’‘До 80% оборудования для “Ямал СПГ” соберут на китайских верфях’ [Up to 80% of equipment for Yamal LNG will be assembled at Chinese shipyards], Interfax, 5 May 2016, https://www. interfax.ru/business/507033.

39 Katya Golubkova and Maria Kiselyova, ‘Russia’s Novatek to Sell 20 Percent in Arctic LNG 2 to China’, Reuters, 25 April 2019, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-russia-gas-novatekcnodc-idUSKCN1S11WY.

40 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’, https://www.fdimarkets.com/. (Data parameters: Estimated capital expenditure by Chinese investors on investment projects in countries in the region falling under sector ‘Coal, oil & gas’ versus all other sectors.)

41 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’.

42 American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, ‘China Global Investment Tracker’ database, https://www.aei.org/china-globalinvestment-tracker/

43 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’.

44 American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, ‘China Global Investment Tracker’ database.

45 Elvira Kadyrova, ‘Tajikistan Builds First Tunnel for the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline Line D’, News Central Asia, 30 January 2020, http://www.newscentralasia.net/2020/01/30/tajikistan-builds-first-tunnel-for-the-centralasia-china-gas-pipeline-line-d/.

46 ‘Joining Hands for a Shared Future’, speech by President Xi Jinping at the Virtual Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between China and Central Asian Countries, 25 January 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202201/t20220125_10633542. html.

47 Farkhod Aminjonov et al., ‘BRI in Central Asia: Overview of Chinese Projects’, Central Asia Regional Data Review, vol. 20, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26578.

48 David Rogers, ‘Russian Objections Halt $1bln Mongolian Dam’, Global Construction Review, 11 July 2016, https://www. globalconstructionreview.com/news/russianobjections-ha7lt-1bn-mong7olian-da7m/.

49 Cella Chen, ‘Huawei Has Increased Investment in Russia Because of US Sanctions, Founder Ren Zhengfei Says’, South China Morning Post, 31 August 2020, https://www.scmp.com/tech/gear/article/3099528/huawei-has-increased-investment-russiabecause-us-sanctions-founder-ren.

50 Dimitri Simes, ‘Huawei Finds Allies in Russia as Kremlin Cuts Reliance on West’, Nikkei Asia, 11 March 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Huawei-finds-allies-in-Russia-asKremlin-cuts-reliance-on-West2.

51 Umida Hashimova, ‘Before and Beyond 5G: Central Asia’s Huawei Connections’, Diplomat, 19 February 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/before-and-beyond-5g-centralasias-huawei-connections/; and ‘Kazakh President Arrives in China’, Strategy 2050, 11 September 2019, https://strategy2050.kz/en/news/kazakh-president-arrives-in-china-/.

52 Yau Tsz Yan, ‘Smart Cities or Surveillance? Huawei in Central Asia’, Diplomat, 7 August 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/smart-cities-or-surveillance-huawei-in-centralasia/.

53 ‘Kazakhstan Retail E-commerce Market Analysis: Expert Survey Results’, PwC, December 2020, https://www.pwc.com/kz/en/assets/e-commerce-eng.pdf.

54 As mentioned above, several of the projects that facilitated this uptick in imports from North and Central Asia began before the BRI, but they are consistent with the general purpose and modus operandi of the BRI.

55 Steer Davies Gleave, ‘Research for TRAN Committee: The New Silk Route– Opportunities and Challenges for EU Transport’, European Parliament, Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, 2018, p. 58, http://www. europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/585907/IPOL_STU(2018)585907_ EN.pdf.

56 ‘COVID-19 Restrictions Halt Kazakh Grain, Oilseed Exports to China’, Reuters, 28 January 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/kazakhstan-china-grains-oilseedsidUSL8N2K30DB.

57 ‘China–Europe Freight Trains Reaching 12,000 in 2020, up 50%’, Global Times, 19 January 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213258.shtml.

58 ‘China’s Railway Freight Volume Up 12 Pct in Q1’, Xinhuanet, 10 April 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/10/c_139871263.htm.

59 International Union of Railways, ‘Study: Eurasian Rail Corridors: What Opportunities for Freight Stakeholders?’, October 2017, https://uic.org/IMG/pdf/corridors_exe_sum2017_web. pdf.

60 Gleave, ‘Research for TRAN Committee: The New Silk Route – Opportunities and Challenges for EU Transport’.

61 Yulia Melnikova, ‘5G i IoT: GKRCH dala start importozameshcheniyu’‘5Г и ИоТ: ГКРЧ дала старт импортозамещению [5G and IOT: GKRCH launched import substitution], ComNews, 24 November 2020, https://www.comnews.ru/content/211770/2020-11-24/2020-w48/5g-i-iot-gkrch-dala-start-importozamescheniyu; and Janis Kluge, ‘Russia’s Transition to 5G: Stuck in a Regulatory Tug of War’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 2020, https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/rpe-kluge-.pdf.

62 ‘Proizvodstvo v Rossii oborudovaniya dlya 5G mozhet nachat’sya do 2023 goda’ ‘Производство в России оборудования для 5G может начаться до 2023 года’ [Production in Russia of equipment for 5G may begin until 2023], TASS, 12 November 2020, https://tass. ru/ekonomika/9986909.

63 ‘China’s Huawei Signs Deal to Develop 5G Network in Russia’, Guardian, 6 June 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/06/chinas-huawei-signsdeal-to-develop-5g-network-in-russia.

64 Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, ‘Russia Gives Nuclear Group Control of Arctic Sea Route’, Financial Times, 13 December 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/b5dc9c38-fd56-11e8- aebf-99e208d3e521; and Paul Stronski and Nicole Ng, ‘Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 February 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/28/cooperation-and-competition-russia-andchina-in-central-asia-russian-far-east-andarctic-pub-75673.

65 ‘Russia Accuses Scientist of Treason for Passing Secrets to China’, Reuters, 15 June 2020, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-russia-china-scientist/russia-accuses-scientist-of-treason-for-passingsecrets-to-china-lawyer-idUSKBN23M0Z4.

66 Land Matrix, ‘Deals’, https://landmatrix.org/list/deals.

67 Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, ‘Geography Rules: Why Mongolia’s China Mining Strategy Is a Mistake’, Wall Street Journal, 6 September 2012, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-16438.

68 Terrence Edwards, ‘Cash-strapped Mongolia Puts Giant Coalmine Back in Play’, Reuters, 9 September 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/mongolia-tavantolgoi-idUKL3N1BK3EL.

69 Catherine Putz, ‘Bitter Cold Hits Bishkek, Chinese-repaired Power Plant Breaks Down’, Diplomat, 30 January 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/bitter-cold-hits-bishkek-chinese-repairedpower-plant-breaks-down/.

70 ‘Two Former Kyrgyz Prime Ministers Receive Prison Terms’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 December 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/two-former-kyrgyz-prime-ministers-receiveprison-terms-/30311583.html.

71 Ainur Koskina, ‘Astana LRT: A Project or a Scam?’, Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, 24 December 2019, https://cabar. asia/en/astana-lrt-a-project-or-a-scam/and Paolo Sorbello, ‘Kazakhstan’s Light Rail Corruption Case Drags On’, Diplomat, 16 October 2021, https://thediplomat. com/2021/10/kazakhstans-light-railcorruption-case-drags-on/.

72 ‘Kyrgyz Government Cancels $275 Million Chinese Project amid Protests’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 24 February 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-government-cancels-275-millionchinese-project-amid-protests/30451825.html.

73 Catherine Putz, ‘Protests in Kazakhstan Over Land Code Changes’, Diplomat, 27 April 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/protests-inkazakhstan-over-land-code-changes/.

74 ‘Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained’, BBC, 28 April 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36163103.

75 ‘Who Are the Uyghurs and Why Is China Being Accused of Genocide?’, BBC, 26 June 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037.

76 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, https://data. imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61726508. (Data parameters are as follows. Ranges are derived from figures for exports (FOB) to partner countries for the two specified countries in 2019, 2020 and 2021, with exports to China presented as a percentage of exports to all countries.)

77 World Bank, International Debt Statistics, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/international-debt-statistics. (Data parameters are as follows. Figures are for external-debt stocks, public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) (DOD, current US$), with each specified country’s debts to China in 2019 in current US$ and as a share of debts to all countries in 2019.)

78 International investment statistics from the National Bank of Kazakhstan for directinvestment liabilities as of 1 April 2021 list the largest sources of investment, in order, as the Netherlands, the United States, France, Bermuda, Japan, China and then Russia. If investments from Hong Kong are added to China’s, China remains in the same position on the list. However, the Netherlands and Bermuda are countries in which foreign companies, especially from the United States, base subsidiaries to avoid taxation, and so investment by companies that are truly based in the Netherlands and Bermuda is likely much lower and the figures for the United States much higher.

79 ‘Russia Halts Transit of Kazakh LPG and Coal to Ukraine: Document’, Reuters, 27 May 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russiaukraine-kazakhstan-lpg-idUSKCN1SX161.

80 ‘Russia, Mongolia Sign New Treaty to Bring Partnership to “Whole New Level”’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 3 September 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-mongolia-sign-new-treaty-to-bringpartnership-to-whole-new-level-/30144655. html; and ‘Russian Railways to Modernize Mongolia Rail System, Tap Transit Potential – Putin’, TASS, 2 September 2019, https://tass. com/economy/1075970.

81 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61726508. (Data parameters are as follows. Figures for exports (FOB) to China and the European Union are given as current US$. Figures for the European Union exclude the United Kingdom. Percentages figures are the difference between Russia’s exports to China in 2013 and 2019 as a percentage of Russia’s exports to China in 2013.)

82 Bank of Russia (CBR), ‘International Investment Position: Geographic Breakdown of Foreign Assets and Liabilities of the Banking Sector of the Russian Federation’, https://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/macro_itm/svs/.

83 Lidiya Parkhomchik, Hayal Ayca Simsek and Zhulduz Baizakova, ‘The Khorgos Free Economic Zone and Its Economic Potential’, Eurasia Research Institute, no. 97, 9 January 2017, http://www.ayu.edu.tr/static/aae_haftalik/aae_bulten_en_97.pdf.

84 Nargis Kassenova, ‘China’s Silk Road and Kazakhstan’s Bright Path: Linking Dreams of Prosperity’, Asia Policy, no. 24, July 2017, pp. 110–16, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26403209.

85 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Joint Statement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan’, 17 April 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20211021171406/ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t559688.shtml.

86 ‘China Lends Crisis-hit Kazakhstan $10 Bln’, Reuters, 16 April 2009, https://uk.reuters. com/article/china-kazakhstan-loans/china-lends-crisis-hit-kazakhstan-10-blnidUKLG94896920090416; and Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘O Podpisanii Memoranduma Mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Respubliki Kazakhstan i Pravitel’stvom Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki o Kompleksnom Sotrudnichestve v Sfere Energetiki i Kreditovaniya’‘О подписании Меморандума между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики о комплексном сотрудничестве в сфереэнергетики и кредитования [On the signing of a memorandum between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on comprehensive cooperation in the field of energy and lending]’, 14 April 2009, http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P090000520_.

87 Yvette Choo, ‘CITIC and Kazyna Capital Management Forms [sic] Infrastructure Fund (2)’, Infrastructure Investor, 29 May 2009, https://www.infrastructureinvestor.com/citic-and-kazyna-capital-management-formsinfrastructure-fund2/.

88 Michael Clarke and Dana Rice, ‘Kazakhstan in Sino-Russian Relations: Cooperation and Competition between the EEU and BRI’, The ASAN Forum, 2 March 2021, https://theasanforum.org/kazakhstan-in-sino-russianrelations-cooperation-and-competitionbetween-the-eeu-and-bri/.

89 Wataru Suzuku, ‘China’s Belt and Road Hits a Speed Bump in Kazakhstan’, Nikkei Asia, 24 April 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/China-s-Belt-and-Road-hits-aspeed-bump-in-Kazakhstan.

90 Chu Daye, ‘Lianyungang Port: No Longer Landlocked’, Global Times, 20 June 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20191125223738/ http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1052589.shtml; and ‘Kazakhstan Plans Reefer Container Train to Uzbekistan’, Rail Freight, 9 August 2019, https://www.railfreight.com/beltandroad/2019/08/09/kazakhstan-plans-reefer-container-train-touzbekistan/.

91 ‘China, Kazakhstan Set to Cooperate on 51 Key Projects’, Global Times, 8 June 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20191206201714/ https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1106169.shtml.

92 Zhang Xiao, ‘China, Kazakhstan to Enhance BRI Cooperation’, People’s Daily, 26 April 2019, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0426/c90000-9572701.html; and Eugene Simonov, ‘Half China’s Investment in Kazakhstan Is in Oil and Gas’, China Dialogue, 29 October 2019, https://chinadialogue.net/en/energy/11613-half-china-s-investment-inkazakhstan-is-in-oil-and-gas-2/.

93 ‘Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained’.

94 ‘Kazakhstan to Export 20 New Agricultural Products to China’, Azernews, 8 November 2018, https://www.azernews.az/region/140568.html.

95 ‘China, Kazakhstan Renew Currency Swap Deal’, Xinhua, 15 December 2014, http://english.www.gov.cn/news/international_exchanges/2014/12/15/content_281475024236560.htm.

96 Tamara Vaal, ‘Parlament ratifitsiroval soglasheniye s Kitayem o zayme v 2 mlrd yuaney’‘Парламент ратифицировал соглашение с Китаем о займе в 2 млрд юаней’ [Parliament ratifies rmb 2 billion loan agreement with China]’, Vlast, 11 April 2019, https://vlast. kz/novosti/32656-parlament-ratificirovalsoglasenie-s-kitaem-o-zajme-v-2-mlrduanej.html

97 ‘JSC Halyk Bank: Halyk Bank Completes Sale of 60% of Altyn Bank’, Bloomberg, 24 April 2018, https://www.bloomberg. com/press-releases/2018-04-24/jsc-halyk-bank-halyk-bank-completes-sale-of-60-of-altyn-bank.

98 Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), ‘The AFSA and the China Securities Regulatory Commission Agreed on Cooperation in the Field of Financial Markets’, 9 February 2018, https://aifc.kz/press-relizy/the-afsa-and-the-china-securities-regulatorycommission-agreed-on-cooperation-in-thefield-of-financial-markets/.

99 AIFC, Annual Report on the Activities of the Astana International Financial Centre, 29 August 2010, p. 24, https://web.archive.org/web/20220120161750/ https://report.aifc.kz/store/2019/08/29/15670579238.pdf.

100 Huawei, ‘Development of Huawei in the Republic of Kazakhstan’, https://www.huawei. com/kz/corporate-information.

1 The Chinese government defines Western China as including the municipality of Chongqing, the provinces of Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan, and the autonomous regions of Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang.

2 Shahbaz Rana, ‘War on Terror Aid: Pakistan Received $33.4bn from US’, Express Tribune, 6 September 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1498815/war-terror-aid-pakistanreceived-33-4bn-us.

3 Luis Andrés, Dan Biller and Matías Herrera Dappe, ‘Infrastructure Gap in South Asia: Infrastructure Needs, Prioritization, and Financing’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7032, September 2014, p. 2, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/20327/WPS7032.pdf.

4 Andrés, Biller and Herrera Dappe, ‘Infrastructure Gap in South Asia: Infrastructure Needs, Prioritization, and Financing’, p. 2.

5 Shahbaz Rana, ‘Building on Ties: New Premier Indicates Plan to Link Gwadar with China’, Express Tribune, 5 June 2013, https://tribune.com.pk/story/559370/building-on-ties-new-premier-indicates-planto-link-gwadar-with-china.

6 ‘Pakistan, China Ink Accords on Economic Corridor Plan, Maritime Cooperation’, Pakistan Today, 22 May 2013, https://archive.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/05/22/pakistan-china-ink-accords-on-economiccorridor-plan-maritime-cooperation/.

7 K. Yhome, ‘The BCIM Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges’, Observer Research Foundation, 10 February 2017, https://www. orfonline.org/research/the-bcim-economiccorridor-prospects-and-challenges/.

8 ‘China Goes All Out to Get India on Board OBOR’, Times of India, 9 May 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chinagoes-all-out-to-get-india-on-board-obor/articleshow/58585534.cms.

9 Ministry of External Affairs of India, ‘Official Spokesperson’s Response to a Query on Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum’, 13 May 2017, https://mea.gov.in/media-briefings. htm?dtl/28463/Official+Spokespersons+ response+to+a+query+on+participation+ of+India+in+OBORBRI+Forum.

10 Daniel Kostecka, ‘The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean’, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, vol. 10, no. 15, 22 July 2010, https://jamestown.org/program/the-chinese-navys-emergingsupport-network-in-the-indian-ocean/; and ‘Mapping China’s Maritime Ambition’, Stratfor Worldview, RANE, 23 November 2014, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/mappingchinas-maritime-ambition.

11 ‘Joint Communique of Leaders’ Roundtable of 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation’, 27 April 2019, as published by Xinhua News Agency on People.cn, https://web.archive.org/web/20200508183937/ http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0428/c90000-9573244.html.

12 ‘Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar Want Progress in Building Economic Corridor’, Independent (Bangladesh), 11 June 2019, https://www.theindependentbd.com/post/202888.

13 The official CPEC website lists both the plans for and updates on completed projects: http://cpec.gov.pk/. For the best summary of the original CPEC plans, see Arif Rafiq, ‘The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: Barriers and Impact’, Peaceworks No. 135, United States Institute of Peace, October 2017, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/pw135-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor.pdf.

14 ‘Pakistan Hands Management of Strategic Gwadar Port to China’, Reuters, 18 February 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-port-idUSBRE91H0IU20130218.

15 The conservative figure was typically presented by Chinese officials themselves, who excluded projects that had not yet been signed off. See, for example, Khalid Mehmood, ‘China Has Invested $19b in CPEC Projects: Yao Jing’, Express Tribune, 20 April 2019, https://tribune. com.pk/story/1954843/2-china-invested-19bcpec-projects-yao-jing.

16 On the controversies over the eastern and western alignment, see ‘China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Risks’, International Crisis Group, 29 June 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/297-china-pakistan-economiccorridor-opportunities-and-risks.

17 Cui Jia, ‘China Studying New Silk Road Rail Link to Pakistan’, China Daily, 28 June 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-06/28/content_17621525.htm.

18 For the most comprehensive assessment of the energy projects, see Erica Downs, ‘China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Power Projects: Insights into Environmental and Debt Sustainability’, Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, 3 October 2019, https://www. energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/report/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-power-projects-insights-environmental-and-debtsustainability.

19 CPEC Authority, Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives of the Government of Pakistan, ‘CPEC Projects Progress Update’, http://cpec.gov.pk/progressupdate.

20 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ‘China– Pakistan Cross-border Optical Fiber Cable Project’, 1 October 2018, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cepk//eng/zbgx/t1627111.htm.

21 M. Abbas Raza, ‘Lesson for Pakistan to Learn from Free Trade Agreement with China’, Dawn, 18 September 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1358446; and ‘China Agrees to Accommodate Pakistan’s Concerns on FTA’, Dawn, 9 February 2018, https://www.dawn. com/news/1388207.

22 On the economic relationship between China and Pakistan before CPEC, see Fazal-ur Rahman, ‘Pakistan–China Trade and Investment Relations’, Strategic Studies Journal (Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad), vol. 30, no. 3, 2011, p. 3, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploa ds/2014/06/1299822989_45060000.pdf.

23 See Jeremy Page and Saeed Shah, ‘China’s Global Building Spree Runs into Trouble in Pakistan’, Wall Street Journal, 22 July 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-global-building-spree-runs-intotrouble-in-pakistan-1532280460.

24 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Sultanate of Oman, ‘Wang Yi Talks about Ten Important Consensuses Reached by Foreign Ministers of China and Pakistan’, 8 September 2018, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceom//eng/zgyw/t1593890.htm.

25 For Dawood’s remarks, see Jamil Anderlini, Henny Sender and Farhan Bokhari, ‘Pakistan Rethinks Its Role in Xi’s Belt and Road Plan’, Financial Times, 9 September 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/d4a3e7f8-b282-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132. On the Uighur question, see Javed Hussain, ‘Religious Affairs Minister Discusses Treatment of Xinjiang Muslims with Chinese Envoy’, Dawn, 19 September 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1433886.

26 The Pakistani army’s efforts to quash public criticism of CPEC by officials began shortly after the Dawood interview (endnote 25). See ‘H.E. Mr. Yao Jing, Ambassador of China to Pakistan Called on General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) at GHQ’, Inter-Services Public Relations, 11 September 2018, https://ispr.gov. pk/press-release-detail.php?id=4920.

27 Rizwan Ghilzai, ‘Asad Umar Replaces Khusro Bakhtiar as Planning Minister’, Express Tribune, 19 November 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2102829/bakhtiar-notified-minister-foodsecurity; and Fida Hussnain, ‘China Welcomes Asad Umar’s Appointment as Minister for Planning’, Urdupoint, 20 November 2019, https://www.urdupoint.com/en/pakistan/china-welcomes-asad-umars-appointmentas-min-766613.html.

28 Andrew Small, ‘Returning to the Shadows: China, Pakistan, and the Fate of CPEC’, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS), Report no. 16, September 2020, pp. 47–48,https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Small%2520-%2520China%2520Pakistan%2520CPEC%2520-%252023%2520September.pdf.

29 ‘China Looks Forward to “Jointly Promote” CPEC with Its New Civilian Chief’, Express Tribune, 5 August 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2313910/china-looks-forward-to-jointlypromote-cpec-with-its-new-civilian-chief.

30 Tom Hussain, ‘Why Is Pakistan’s New PM Shehbaz So Keen to Accelerate the CPEC with Beijing’, South China Morning Post, 20 April 2022, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/explained/article/3174875/why-pakistans-newpm-shehbaz-sharif-so-keen-accelerate-cpec.

31 Jehanzeb Khan, ‘PM Shehbaz Sharif Affirms Resolve to Fast Track CPEC Projects’, Mashriq TV, 17 May 2022, https://mashriqtv.pk/en/2022/05/17/in-phone-call-with-chinesepremier-pm-shehbaz-affirms-resolve-to-fasttrack-cpec-projects/.

32 Shahbaz Rana, ‘Govt to Wind Up CPEC Authority’, Express Tribune, 21 April 2022, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2353506/govt-to-wind-up-cpec-authority; and Khaleeq Kiani,‘Ahsan Directs Winding Up of CPEC Authority’, Dawn, 23 April 2022, https://www.dawn.com/news/1686352.

33 ‘PM Shahbaz Sharif Directs to Ensure Security of Chinese Nationals in Pakistan’, News, 17 May 2022, https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/958479-pm-shehbaz-directs-to-ensuresecurity-of-chinese-nationals-in-pakistan.

34 Imran Ayub and Shazia Hasan, ‘Shehbaz Proposes Including Turkey in CPEC’, Dawn, 21 May 2022, https://www.dawn.com/news/1690701

35 AidData, ‘AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0’, 2021, https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddatas-global-chinese-development-financedataset-version-2-0. Data parameters are loan-financed projects (export finance or loan) funded by Chinese organisations and located in Sri Lanka from 2000 to 2013.

36 Ganeshan Wignaraja et al., ‘Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka’, Chatham House, 24 March 2020, p. 9, https://www.chathamhouse. org/2020/03/chinese-investment-and-bri-srilanka

37 ‘Sri Lanka Scraps $1.5bn Japan-funded Light Rail System’, Agence France-Presse, 24 September 2020, https://www.france24. com/en/20200924-sri-lanka-scraps-1-5bnjapan-funded-light-rail-system; ‘MCC Won’t Be Signed Even in My Dreams: President’, News 1st, 1 November 2020, https://www.newsfirst.lk/2020/11/01/mcc-wont-be-signed-even-inmy-dreams-president/; and Meera Srinivasa, ‘From East to West: Colombo’s Compromise with New Delhi in Port Project’, Hindu, 10 March 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/from-east-to-west-colomboscompromise-with-new-delhi-in-port-project/article34031375.ece.

38 Srinivasa, ‘From East to West: Colombo’s Compromise with New Delhi in Port Project’.

39 Waruna Karunatilake, ‘Sri Lanka’s Rajapaksa Draws Country Closer to China after Summit’, Reuters, 9 October 2020, https://www.reuters. com/article/sri-lanka-china-idUSL4N2H0314.

40 Simon Mundy and Kathrin Hille, ‘The Maldives Counts the Cost of Its Debts to China’, Financial Times, 11 February 2019, https://www. ft.com/content/c8da1c8a-2a19-11e9-88a4c32129756dd8.

41 Ali Asif Shawon, ‘Deep Sea Port Project in Matarbari Gains Pace, Sonadia Dropped’, Dhaka Tribune, 23 January 2020, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/government-affairs/2020/01/23/deep-sea-port-project-in-matarbari-gainspace-sonadia-dropped

42 Mir Mostafizur Rahaman, ‘BD Seeks $6.4b Chinese Fund for New Projects’, Financial Express, 29 June 2020, https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/economy/bd-seeks-64b-chinese-fund-for-newprojects-1593400758.

43 ‘2 Chinese Projects: PMO Asks Rail Ministry to Cut Costs’, Daily Star, 11 November 2020, https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/2-chinese-projects-pmo-asks-railministry-cut-costs-1992733.

44 Shohel Mamun, ‘Major Railway Expansion Projects in Limbo’, Dhaka Tribune, 31 July 2021, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2021/07/31/major-railwayexpansion-projects-in-limbo.

45 Ruma Paul, ‘China Signs Deals Worth Billions with Bangladesh as Xi Visits’, Reuters, 14 October 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-china-idUSKCN12D34M.

46 Rejaul Karim Byron and Jagaran Chakma, ‘All Hands on Deck to Get China-funded Projects Back on Track’, Daily Star, 24 August 2020, https://www.thedailystar.net/business/news/all-hands-deck-get-china-fundedprojects-back-track-1949929 (NB: this source provides conflicting figures for the amount disbursed – the chart notes US$1.8bn in amount disbursed; the body text states US$1.54bn; the former includes a more detailed breakdown and is therefore used here); Jagaran Chakma, ‘China-funded Projects Back on Track’, Daily Star, 7 October 2020, https://www.thedailystar.net/business/news/china-funded-projects-back-track-1973869; and Ibrahim Hossain Ovi, ‘China–Bangladesh Ties: Experts Urge Expansive Vision to Bolster Trade, Investment’, Dhaka Tribune, 29 October 2020, https://www.dhakatribune. com/business/economy/2020/10/29/china-bangladesh-ties-experts-urge-expansivevision-to-bolster-trade-investment.

47 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’, https://www.fdimarkets.com/.

48 Anil Giri, ‘Nepal Trims Projects Under BRI from 35 to 9 at Chinese Call’, Kathmandu Post, 18 January 2019, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2019/01/18/nepal-trims-projectsunder-bri-from-35-to-9-at-chinese-call.

49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Joint Communiqué of the Leaders’ Roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation’, Belt and Road Forum, 27 April 2019, http://www.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2019/0427/c36-1311.html; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal, ‘Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China’, 13 October 2019, https://mofa.gov. np/joint-statement-between-nepal-and-thepeoples-republic-of-china-2/.

50 Ramesh Bhushal, ‘The China–Nepal Railway: High Cost and Hidden’, China Dialogue, 28 June 2019, https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/11336-the-china-nepal-railway-highcost-and-hidden/

51 Anil Giri, ‘Nepal Scraps $1.5-billion Dam Project with China’, Hindustan Times, 19 September 2018, https://www. hindustantimes.com/world-news/nepalscraps-1-5-billion-dam-project-with-china/story-Acd7RSmSdF2BdI1kQUcc6M.html; and Yubaraj Ghimire, ‘China Eyes Exit, Nepal’s West Seti Hydropower Project in Jeopardy’, South China Morning Post, 30 August 2018, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2161968/nepals-west-seti-hydropowerproject-jeopardy-china-eyes-exit.

52 Bibek Subadi, ‘China’s Gezhouba Lands Budhi Gandaki Contract’, Kathmandu Post, 24 May 2017, https://kathmandupost.com/money/2017/05/24/chinas-gezhouba-landsbudhi-gandaki-contract.

53 Ramesh Bhushal, ‘As Nepal’s Budhi Gandaki Hydro Project Is Put on Hold, Flooding Threatens Lives of Thousands’, Firstpost, 16 February 2021, https://www.firstpost.com/world/as-nepals-budhi-gandaki-hydro-projectis-put-on-hold-flooding-threatens-lives-ofthousands-9310321.html.

54 CAPA Centre for Aviation, ‘New Pokhara International Airport’, https://centreforaviation. com/data/profiles/newairports/new-pokhara-international-airport.

55 Franz J. Marty, ‘Project to Exploit Afghanistan’s Giant Copper Deposit Languishes’, China Dialogue, 25 April 2018, https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/10577-project-to-exploit-afghanistans-giant-copper-deposit-languishes/.

56 ‘Amu Darya Basin Oil Extraction Operation Halted’, TOLOnews, 19 August 2013, https://tolonews.com/business/amu-darya-basin-oilextraction-operation-halted.

57 Raffaello Pantucci, ‘China’s Non-intervention in Afghanistan’, Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, 18 November 2020, https://oxussociety. org/chinas-non-intervention-in-afghanistan/.

58 Didi Tang, ‘China Plans to Reopen Copper Mine in Afghanistan’, The Times, 18 August 2021, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-plans-to-reopen-copper-mine-inafghanistan-8q9jxpcxn.

59 Iain Marlow and Enda Curran, ‘China Eyes Afghanistan’s $1 Trillion of Minerals with Risky Bet on Taliban’, Bloomberg, 24 August 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-24/china-s-eyes-1-trillion-ofminerals-with-risky-bet-on-taliban.

60 Edward White and Fazelminallah Qazizai, ‘Chinese Mining Groups Scour Afghanistan for Opportunities’, Financial Times, 5 December 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/4c0eb548-3c00-4702-8d43-227d80b94a4a.

61 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’.

62 Sankalp Phartiyal, ‘India Retains Ban on 59 Chinese Apps, Including TikTok’, Reuters, 25 January 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-china-apps-idUSKBN29U2GJ.

63 United Nations, ‘UN Comtrade Database’, https://comtrade.un.org/data/.

64 Syful Islam, ‘Bangladesh Hits Back After China Envoy Warns Against Joining Quad’, Nikkei Asia, 11 May 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Bangladesh-hits-backafter-China-envoy-warns-against-joining-Quad.

65 Ankit Panda, ‘Chinese Envoy in Maldives Pushes Back on “Debt Trap” Free Trade Agreement Concerns’, Diplomat, 17 December 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/chinese-envoy-in-maldives-pushes-back-ondebt-trap-free-trade-agreement-concerns/.

66 International Monetary Fund, ‘Pakistan: First Post-program Monitoring Discussions – Press Release; Staff Report; Statement by Staff; and Statement by the Executive Director for Pakistan’, IMF Country Report no. 18/78, March 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/03/14/Pakistan-First-PostProgram-Monitoring-Discussions-PressRelease-Staff-Report-and-Statement-45724.

67 ‘PM’s China Visit’, Dawn, 5 November 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1443677.

68 ‘National Assembly Passes Budget 2019–2020’, Dunya News, 29 June 2019, https://dunyanews. tv/en/Pakistan/498043-National-Assemblypasses-budget-2019-20-.

69 Amin Ahmed, ‘IMF Wants Railways to End Reliance on Govt Subsidies’, Dawn, 2 November 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1443043.

70 Shahbaz Rana, ‘IMF Deal Overshadows CPEC’s ML-1 Railway Project’, Express Tribune, 6 August 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2028965/imf-deal-overshadows-cpecs-ml-railwayproject.

71 For a summary of the first-year struggles of the Khan government, see Saeed Shah, ‘China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative Puts a Squeeze on Pakistan’, Wall Street Journal, 3 April 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-puts-a-squeezeon-pakistan-11554289201.

72 Asif Shahzad, ‘Pakistan Returns $1 Billion of Saudi Arabia’s Soft Loan, Officials Say’, Reuters, 16 December 2020, https://www.reuters. com/article/pakistan-china-saudi-arabia-intidUSKBN28Q2A5.

73 World Bank, International Debt Statistics, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/international-debt-statistics. Data parameters are as follows. For selected country, the Maldives, the database provides figures for external debt, public and publicly guaranteed to all counterparts (world) and for gross national incomes (GNI) for 2019.

74 International Monetary Fund, Historical Public Debt Database, version October 2020, https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-datasets/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/Data/_wp10245.ashx

75 International Monetary Fund, ‘Maldives: 2019 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Maldives’, IMF Country Report no. 19/156, p. 5, June 2019, https://www.imf. org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/06/07/Maldives-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statementby-the-46972.

76 Mariyam Malsa, ‘China to Suspend Debt Repayment for Four Years: President Solih’, Edition, 24 June 2020, https://edition.mv/news/17454.

77 Marwaan Macan-Markar, ‘Sri Lanka Turns to China Rather than IMF to Avoid Default’, Nikkei Asia, 12 October 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Sri-Lanka-turnsto-China-rather-than-IMF-to-avoid-default.

78 Agence France-Presse, ‘$200 Million Chinese Bridge a Debt Trap, Says Maldives Opposition’, NDTV, 1 September 2018, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/maldives-opposition-says-chinese-bridgepushing-country-deeper-in-debt-1909532; and Shihar Aneez, ‘Maldives’ Nasheed Vows to Renegotiate China Loans if Opposition Wins September Poll’, Reuters, 4 June 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-chinadebt-idUSKCN1J01J6.

79 Sidhant Sibal, ‘Maldives–China FTA Is Dead: Speaker of Maldivian Parliament Mohamed Nasheed Tells WION’, WION, 13 December 2019, https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/maldives-china-fta-is-dead-speaker-ofmaldivian-parliament-mohamed-nasheed-tellswion-268187; and Mariyam Malsa, ‘State to Review FTA with China Before Implementation: Minister Fayyaz’, Edition, 11 October 2020, https://edition.mv/news/19684.

80 Mundy and Hille, ‘The Maldives Counts the Cost of Its Debts to China’; and Anbarasan Ethirajan, ‘China Debt Dogs Maldives’“Bridge to Prosperity”’, BBC News, 17 September 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia-52743072

81 Rahul Jaybhay, ‘China’s Pipeline Dream in Pakistan’, Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 30 June 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-pipeline-dreampakistan.

82 ‘Department of Railways Seeks 200 Staffers’, Himalayan, 25 August 2019, https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/departmentof-railways-seeks-200-staffers; ‘NRC Can Hire Foreign Workers for Rail Service’, Himalayan, 24 January 2020, https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/nrc-can-hire-foreign-workers-for-railservice; and ‘Service Commencement Date Pushed Back’, Himalayan, 7 November 2019, https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/service-commencement-date-pushed-back

83 For estimated cost of the railway, see Bhushal, ‘The China–Nepal Railway: High Cost and Hidden’. For government revenues, see International Monetary Fund, ‘Government Finance Statistics’, https://data.imf.org/regular. aspx?key=60991462 (for data, select Nepal; approximate exchange rate between Nepalese rupee and US dollar is 1NPR = 0.008USD).

84 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2020’, https://www. transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/afg.

85 ‘Blame Russia and China for Sri Lanka Failure, Not UN’s Ban’, Channel 4 News, 26 April 2011, https://www.channel4.com/news/blame-russia-and-china-for-sri-lanka-failurenot-uns-ban

86 International Monetary Fund, ‘Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook’, https://data. imf.org/?sk=7A51304B-6426-40C0-83DDCA473CA1FD52; and World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators’, https://databank. worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators.

87 Saibal Dasgupta, ‘China’s Global Image Under Strain as Sri Lanka Faces Debt Trap’, VOA News, 25 April 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-global-image-under-strain-as-sri-lankafaces-debt-trap-/6544106.html.

88 Swati Bhat and Aftab Ahmed, ‘India Open to Additional $1bln Aid for Sri Lanka with Eye on China – Sources’, Reuters, 13 April 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/exclusive-india-open-additional-2-bln-aid-srilanka-with-eye-china-sources-2022-04-13/.

89 Nitin Srivastava, ‘India Seeks to Win Public Trust in Crisis-hit Sri Lanka’, BBC News, 19 May 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asiaindia-61490635.

90 Meera Srinivasan, ‘India Inks Deal with Sri Lanka to Develop Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm’, Hindu, 7 January 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-inks-deal-with-srilanka-to-develop-trincomalee-oil-tank-farm/article38162574.ece.

91 Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings, a subsidiary of CK Hutchison Holdings, has developed Karachi’s new South Asia Pakistan Terminal, the country’s first deep-water container terminal. Additionally, in September 2021, the Pakistani government announced a US$3.5bn Chinese investment in the Karachi Comprehensive Coastal Development Zone, including a new urban environment and housing, new berths, a new fishery port and a harbour bridge. See Parvaiz Ishfaq Rana, ‘South Asia Pakistan Terminal to Add Two More Berths’, Dawn, 21 November 2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/1517942; and Imran Ayub, ‘CPEC Panel Okays Ambitious Karachi Coastline Plan’, Dawn, 26 September 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1648433/.

92 International Monetary Fund, ‘International Liquidity Selected Indicators’, https://data.imf. org/regular.aspx?key=63087882. Data for 2020 used here.

93 For India’s GDP growth figures, see World Bank, ‘National Accounts Data – GDP growth (annual %) – India’, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IN.

94 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Vaccine Maitri – Vaccine Supply’, https://www.mea.gov.in/vaccine-supply.htm.

95 Krishna N. Das, ‘India Considers Resuming Vaccine Exports Soon, Focus on Africa, Says Source’, Reuters, 15 September 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-considers-resuming-vaccine-exportssoon-focus-africa-says-source-2021-09-15/; and Akriti Anand, ‘Producing 1 Billion COVID-19 Vaccine Doses in India to Boost Global Supply: Joe Biden’, India Today, 23 September 2021, https://www.indiatoday. in/coronavirus-outbreak/vaccine-updates/story/producing-billion-COVID-19-vaccinedoses-india-boost-global-supply-joe-biden-1856030-2021-09-23.

96 World Bank, ‘National Accounts Data – GDP growth (annual %) – Bangladesh’, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP. KD.ZG?locations=BD.

97 Islam, ‘Bangladesh Hits Back After China Envoy Warns Against Joining Quad’

98 Masud Bin Momen, ‘Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy Priorities and Challenges’, remarks at The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10 September 2021, https://www.iiss.org/events/2021/09/bangladesh-foreign-policychallenges; and Islam, ‘Bangladesh Hits Back After China Envoy Warns Against Joining Quad’

99 ‘Sri Lanka to Mandate 70-pct Renewable Power Target in Gazette Rule’, Economy Next, 6 August 2021, https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-to-mandate-70-pct-renewablepower-target-in-gazette-rule-84641/; and International Renewable Energy Agency, ‘Sri Lanka: Energy Profile’, https://www.irena.org/IRENADocuments/Statistical_Profiles/Asia/Sri%20Lanka_Asia_RE_SP.pdf

100 International Trade Administration of the United States of America, ‘Sri Lanka – Country Commercial Guide: Energy’, 28 September 2021, https://www.trade.gov/countrycommercial-guides/sri-lanka-energy.

101 Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘Sri Lanka Wind Power Generation Project: Audited Project Financial Statements’, 2021, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/projectdocuments/49345/49345-002-apfs-en_1.pdf; ADB, ‘Amendments to Loan Agreement’ (letter from ADB Sri Lanka Resident Mission to the General Manager of Ceylon Electricity Board), 21 January 2020, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/49345/49345-002-lna-en_0.pdf; and Jaimes Kolantharaj and Melanie Ullrich, ‘Scaling Up Wind Power in Sri Lanka’, Development Asia, 10 June 2021, https://development.asia/insight/scaling-windpower-sri-lanka.

102 Syful Islam, ‘Bangladesh Seeks EPC for 68 MW Solar Park’, pv magazine, 13 August 2021, https://www.pv-magazine.com/2021/08/13/bangladesh-seeks-epc-for-68-mw-solar-park/.

103 ‘Bangladesh Approves Chinese-led Wind Power Project’, Radio Free Asia, 9 December 2020, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/approves-12092020172023.html.

104 ADB,‘A Brighter Future for Maldives Powered by Renewables: Road Map for the Energy Sector 2020–2030’, November 2020, https://www. adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/654021/renewables-roadmap-energy-sector-maldives.pdf.

105 Rina Saeed Khan, ‘Pakistan Pushes Renewables– but Coal Expansion Continues Too’, Reuters, 7 August 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-renewables-climatechange-trfidUSKCN253311.

106 Naila Saleh, ‘Reduced Ambitions for Renewable Energy’, Dawn, 9 August 2021, https://www. dawn.com/news/1639557.

107 Kamran Yousaf, ‘Islamabad Turns to Pakistani American for Biden–Imran Call’, Express Tribune, 4 October 2021, https://tribune. com.pk/story/2323212/islamabad-turns-to-pakistani-american-for-biden-imran-call; and Mahida Afzal, ‘Under Biden, Pakistan and the US Face a Dilemma About the Breadth of Their Relationship’, Order from Chaos blog series, Brookings, 12 April 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/04/12/under-bidenpakistan-and-the-us-face-a-dilemma-aboutthe-breadth-of-their-relationship/.

1 ‘Full Text of Chinese President Xi’s Speech at APEC CEO Summit’, Xinhua, published on the website of the China International Development Cooperation Agency, 17 November 2018, http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2018-11/17/c_292039.htm.

2 Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, ‘Harbored Ambitions: How China’s Port Investments Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific’, C4ADS, 2017, p. 19, https://static1.squarespace. com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5a d5e20ef950b777a94b55c3/1523966489456/Harbored+Ambitions.pdf.

3 Bruce Vaughn and Wayne Morrison, ‘China– Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States’, CRS Report for Congress, RL32688, 4 April 2006, p. 5, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL32688.pdf.

4 ‘Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China’, ASEAN Secretariat, 4 November 2002, https://web.archive.org/web/20021107033935/ http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm; and Andrew Walker, ‘China and ASEA Free Trade Deal Begins’, BBC News, 1 January 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8436772.stm.

5 ASEAN, ‘ASEAN–China Free Trade Area: Building Strong Economic Partnerships’ (undated), https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2015/October/outreach-document/Edited%20ACFTA.pdf.

6 Richard Bluhm et al., ‘Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in Developing Countries’, AidData Working Paper no. 64, AidData, 2018, https://www.aiddata.org/publications/connective-finance-chineseinfrastructure-projects.

7 ‘Chinese Loan Agreements Revive Trans-Laos Project’, Railway Gazette International, 30 October 2012, https://www.railwaygazette. com/home/chinese-loan-agreements-revivetrans-laos-project/37448.article.

8 Asian Development Bank, ‘Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs’, February 2017, p. xi, https://www.adb.org/publications/asiainfrastructure-needs.

9 Rendi A. Witular, ‘Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World’, Jakarta Post, 13 November 2014, http://www.thejakartapost. com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launchesmaritime-doctrine-world.html; and Vibhanshu Shekhar and Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead’, Brookings, 7 November 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indonesia-as-a-maritime-power-jokowis-visionstrategies-and-obstacles-ahead.

10 ‘Why China Is Coming to Brunei’s Aid as Its Oil Slowly Runs Out’, South China Morning Post, 5 March 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2135748/why-china-coming-bruneis-aid-its-oil-slowlyruns-out

11 Aardash Baijal, Alessandro Cannarsi and Florian Hoppe, ‘e-Conomy SEA 2020’, Bain, 10 November 2020, https://www.bain.com/insights/e-conomy-sea-2020/.

12 Brian Harding, ‘China’s Digital Silk Road and Southeast Asia’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 February 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-digitalsilk-road-and-southeast-asia.

13 Sarah Repucci, ‘Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy’, Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggledemocracy.

14 ‘Xi Meets Individually with Leaders at Forum’, China Daily, 26 April 2019, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/26/WS5cc17376a3104842260b8605_5.html.

15 Li Qiaoyi, ‘BRI Creates Peaceful, Inclusive Growth’, Global Times, 26 July 2019, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1159337.shtml.

16 Xi Jinping, ‘Working Together to Deliver a Brighter Future for Belt and Road Cooperation’, keynote speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 26 April 2019, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, https://web.archive.org/web/20190526110455/ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1658424.shtml; and Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘ASEAN–China Joint Statement on Synergising the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’, 3 November 2019, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Final-ASEAN-China-Joint-StatementSynergising-the-MPAC-2025-and-the-BRI. pdf. For a discussion, see Zhao Hong, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative and ASEAN’, China: An International Journal, vol. 17, no. 2, May 2019, pp. 127–47, 131, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/726918/summary.

17 Mitsuru Obe and Marimi Kishimoto, ‘Why China Is Determined to Connect Southeast Asia by Rail’, Nikkei Asia, 9 January 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Why-China-is-determined-to-connectSoutheast-Asia-by-rail.

18 ‘The Group and the Central Bank of Laos Signed IBS Clearing and Settlement Platform Memorandum Cooperation, and to Jointly Promote the Construction of’, International Business Settlement, October 2016, https://www.ibsettlement.com/en/newsx. php?lm=20&id=49

19 Xie Yu, ‘China’s US$7 Billion Railway Link to Laos Is Almost Half Done, on Schedule to Begin Service in 2021’, South China Morning Post, 21 March 2019, https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3002518/chinas-us7billion-railway-link-laos-almost-half-done.

20 Keith Barrow, ‘Thai Cabinet Approves Highspeed Project’, International Railway Journal, 14 July 2017, https://www.railjournal.com/regions/asia/thai-cabinet-approves-highspeed-project/; Yasmin Lee Arpon, ‘Thai Govt Okays $7b High-speed Rail Despite Criticisms’, Straits Times, 13 July 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thai-govt-okays-7b-high-speed-rail-despitecriticisms; and ‘After Delays, Ground Broken for Thailand–China Railway Project’, Reuters, December 2017, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-thailand-china-railway/after-delays-ground-broken-for-thailand-chinarailway-project-idUSKBN1EF1E6.

21 Nan Lwin, ‘Gov’t Signs MoU with Beijing to Build China–Myanmar Economic Corridor’, Irrawaddy, 13 September 2018, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/govt-signs-mou-beijing-build-china-myanmareconomic-corridor.html; and Amara Thiha, ‘Myanmar Speeds Up Progress on China’s Belt and Road’, Diplomat, 8 December 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/myanmar-speedsup-progress-on-chinas-belt-and-road/.

22 Eric Watkins, ‘China, Myanmar Sign Oil Pipeline Agreement’, Oil & Gas Journal, 19 June 2009, https://www.ogj.com/pipelines-transportation/pipelines/article/17276846/china-myanmarsign-oil-pipeline-agreement.

23 Debby Chan Sze Wan, ‘China–Myanmar Highspeed Railway Quietly Back on Track’, Myanmar Times, 6 July 2018, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/china-myanmar-high-speed-railwayquietly-back-track.html.

24 ‘China, Myanmar Sign Framework Agreement on Kyauk Phyu SEZ Deep-sea Port Project’, Xinhuanet, 8 November 2018, http://english. scio.gov.cn/beltandroad/2018-11/09/content_71192973.htm.

25 John Reed, ‘China and Myanmar Sign Off on Belt and Road Projects’, Financial Times, 18 January 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/a5265114-39d1-11ea-a01a-bae547046735.

26 James Clark, ‘North–South Express Railway Vietnam’, Future Southeast Asia, 26 October 2020, https://futuresoutheastasia.com/northsouth-express-railway-vietnam/.

27 ‘COVID-19 Halts Indonesia’s Batang Toru Hydropower Project’, Star, 20 February 2020, https://www.thestar. com.my/news/regional/2020/02/20/COVID-19-halts-indonesia039s-batang-toruhydropower-project.

28 ‘Xi, Myanmar Leaders Celebrate 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Ties’, Xinhuanet, 18 January 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/18/c_138714325.htm.

29 Refinitiv, BRI Connect: An Initiative in Numbers, 2020, p. 6, https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/marketing/en_us/documents/gated/reports/belt-and-road-issue-4-impact-ofpandemtic-on-infrastructure-projects.pdf.

30 Yu Qianliang and Dames Alexander Sinaga, ‘Feature: High-speed Railway Project in Indonesia on Track Despite COVID-19 Pandemic’, Xinhuanet, 2 July 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/02/c_139184070.htm.

31 M. Taufiqurrahman, ‘Indonesia Can Be Manufacturing Hub for COVID-19 Vaccine, Says Chinese Foreign Minister’, Jakarta Post, 13 October 2020, https://www. thejakartapost.com/news/2020/10/12/indonesia-can-be-manufacturing-hub-for-covid-19-vaccine-says-chinese-foreign-minister.html.

32 Laura Zhou, ‘“Let’s Build a Digital Silk Road”’: Xi Jinping Looks to Cement China’s Ties with ASEAN’, South China Morning Post, 27 November 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3111612/lets-build-digital-silk-road-president-xipromises-ways-china

33 Jeffrey A. Bader, ‘Prospects of Political Reform in Myanmar’, Brookings, 9 November 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/prospects-of-political-reforms-in-myanmar/.

34 ‘Less Thunder Out of China’, The Economist, 6 October 2012, https://www.economist.com/china/2012/10/06/less-thunder-out-of-china.

35 Wa Lone and Simon Lewis, ‘Myanmar Plays Diplomatic Card to Avert U.N. Censure Over Rohingya’, Reuters, 6 September 2017, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/myanmar-plays-diplomatic-card-to-avert-u-ncensure-over-rohingya-idUSKCN1BH0HD.

36 Le Hong Hiep, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam: Challenges and Prospects’, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 29 March 2018, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_ [email protected].

37 ‘Vietnam Detains 100 After Anti-China Economic Zone Protests Turn Violent’, BBC News, 11 June 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-44436019.

38 Rebecca Henschke, ‘Indonesia 2019 Elections: How Many Chinese Workers Are There?’, BBC News, 13 April 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47881858.

39 Huileng Tan, ‘The Specter of Chinese Investment Looms Over Indonesia’s Election’, CNBC, 15 April 2019, https://www.cnbc. com/2019/04/16/indonesia-elections-jokowiprabowo-and-the-topic-of-china.html

40 Christine Tamir and Abby Budiman, ‘Indonesians Optimistic About Their Country’s Democracy and Economy as Elections Near’, Pew Research Center, 4 April 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/04/indonesians-optimistic-about-their-countrysdemocracy-and-economy-as-elections-near/.

41 Liz Lee, ‘Selling the Country to China? Debate Spills into Malaysia’s Election’, Reuters, 26 April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-election-china-idUSKBN1HY076.

42 Russel Hsiao, ‘A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Singapore’, China Brief, vol. 19, no. 13, 16 July 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/a-preliminary-survey-of-ccp-influence-operations-in-singapore/and Amy Qin, ‘Worries Grow in Singapore Over China’s Calls to Help “Motherland”’, New York Times, 5 August 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/08/05/world/asia/singapore-china. html.

43 ‘Asia-Pacific Nations View Chinese Investment with Suspicion’, Pew Research Center, 4 December 2019, https://www.pewresearch. org/global/2019/12/05/chinas-economicgrowth-mostly-welcomed-in-emergingmarkets-but-neighbors-wary-of-its-influence/pg_2019-12-05_balance-of-power_2-07/

44 Chap Sotharith, ‘Cambodia’s Experience and Perspective on BRI’, in Yose Rizal Damuri et al. (eds), Perceptions and Readiness of Indonesia towards the Belt and Road Initiative (Jakarta, Indonesia; Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), pp. 34–5, https://www.csis.or.id/uploads/attachments/post/2019/05/23/CSIS_BRI_Indonesia_r.pdf

45 Harding, ‘China’s Digital Silk Road and Southeast Asia’

46 ‘Indonesia to Propose Projects Worth US$91 Billion for China’s Belt and Road’, Straits Times, 20 March 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-to-propose-projectsworth-us91-bilion-for-chinas-belt-and-road

47 Wilda Asmarini and Maikel Jefriando, ‘Indonesia Asks China for Special Fund under Belt and Road: Ministers’, Reuters, 3 July 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-china-beltandroad/indonesia-asks-china-for-special-fund-underbelt-and-road-ministers-idUSKCN1TY1DU.

48 ‘PM Values Efforts to Promote International Connectivity at Belt and Road Forum’, Vietnam Investment Review, 30 April 2019, https://www.vir.com.vn/pm-values-efforts-to-promote-internationalconnectivity-at-belt-and-road-forum-67444. html.

49 Yukako Ono, ‘China’s High-speed Train Plans in Southeast Asia Stumble’, Nikkei Asia, 28 December 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/China-s-high-speed-train-plans-inSoutheast-Asia-stumble.

50 Stefania Palma, ‘Malaysia Cancels Chinabacked Pipeline Projects’, Financial Times, 9 September 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/06a71510-b24a-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132; Zuraidah Ibrahim and Bhavan Jaipragas, ‘Nothing to Fear from China, Says Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, but Lopsided Deals Must End’, South China Morning Post, 20 June 2018, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2151451/nothing-fear-china-says-malaysias-mahathirmohamad-lopsided; and Lucy Hornby,‘Mahathir Mohamad Warns Against “New Colonialism” During China Visit’, Financial Times, 20 August 2018, https://www. ft.com/content/7566599e-a443-11e8-8ecfa7ae1beff35b.

51 Anisah Shukry, ‘China, Malaysia to Resume East Coast Rail for 11 Billion’, Bloomberg, 12 April 2019, https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-12/china-agrees-to-resume-malaysian-east-coastrail-for-11-billion?sref=zJ04jZBU.

52 Lee Hsien Loong, ‘The Endangered Asian Century’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-04/lee-hsien-loong-endangeredasian-century.

53 Zhao, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative and ASEAN’.

54 James Griffiths, ‘Singapore’s Lee Looks to Patch Up China Relations on Official Visit’, CNN, 19 September 2017, https://www.cnn. com/2017/09/19/asia/china-singapore-leeasean/index.html.

55 Bhavan Jaipragas, ‘What New Silk Road Snub Means for Singapore’s Ties with China’, South China Morning Post, 18 May 2017, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2094781/what-belt-and-road-snub-means-singapores-ties-china.

56 Oceans & Law of the Sea, ‘Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submission to the Commission: Partial Submission by Malaysia in the South China Sea’, 16 February 2022, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_ mys_12_12_2019.html.

57 Jane Perlez, ‘Asian Leaders at Regional Meeting Fail to Resolve Disputes Over South China Sea’, New York Times, 12 July 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/asia/asian-leaders-fail-to-resolve-disputes-onsouth-china-sea-during-asean-summit.html.

58 Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in Los Angeles, ‘Wang Yi Talks About China’s Four-point Consensus on South China Sea Issue with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos’, 23 April 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgla/eng/topnews/t1358478.htm.

59 Thomas Parks, ‘ASEAN: Shaping the Future of Regional Development in Southeast Asia’, Asia Foundation, 24 October 2018, https://asiafoundation.org/2018/10/24/asean-shaping-the-future-of-regionaldevelopment-in-southeast-asia/.

60 Chatrudee Theparat, ‘Cabinet Approves $200m for Regional Master Plan’, Bangkok Post, 19 June 2019, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1697592/cabinet-approves-200mfor-regional-master-plan.

61 Lynn Kuok, ‘“America First” Cannot Mean “America Alone”: Engaging Southeast Asia’, Brookings, 15 December 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/america-first-cannot-mean-america-aloneengaging-southeast-asia/.

62 Shellka Arora-Cox et al., ‘Understanding the New $60 Billion US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)’, Pillsbury Law, 17 August 2020, https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/dfc-developmentfinance-corporation.html.

63 The White House, ‘FACT SHEET: In Asia, President Biden and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity’, 23 May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-biden-and-a-dozen-indo-pacific-partners-launch-the-indopacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/.

64 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2021’, https://www. aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ASYB_2021_All_Final.pdf.

65 ‘U.S. Says Malaysia Offers to Host Spy Planes that Irk China’, Reuters, 12 September 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-usa-spyplanes/u-s-says-malaysiaoffers-to-host-spy-planes-that-irk-chinaidUSKBN0H72CN20140912.

66 Christia Marie Ramos, ‘Duterte Extends Suspension of VFA Termination “by Yet Another Six Months”’, INQUIRER.net, 11 November 2020, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/192090/duterte-extends-suspension-ofvfa-termination-by-6-more-months; and Jim Gomez, ‘US, Philippines Assessing Defense Treaty, China Wary’, Associated Press, 30 September 2021, https://apnews.com/article/china-asia-united-states-philippines-manilaa9b1ca68f23d994afda55d2652393428.

67 ASEAN Studies Centre, ‘The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report’; ‘The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report’, 10 February 2021, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-State-ofSEA-2021-v2.pdf; and ‘The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report’, 16 February 2022, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/The-State-of-SEA-2022_FA_ Digital_FINAL.pdf.

68 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Free and Open Indo Pacific’, 3 March 2022, https://www. mofa.go.jp/files/000430632.pdf.

69 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2021’, https://www. aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ASYB_2021_All_Final.pdf.

70 Michelle Jamrisko, ‘China No Match for Japan in Southeast Asia Infrastructure Race’, Bloomberg, 23 June 2019, https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-23/china-no-match-for-japan-in-southeast-asiainfrastructure-race?sref=zJ04jZBU.

71 ASEAN Studies Centre, ‘The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report’, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 16 January 2020, pp. 49, 53, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2020.pdf.

72 Roland Rajah, ‘Mobilizing the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia’, Brookings, April 2020, p. 9, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200429_mobilize_compete_rajah.pdf

73 Australian Government Department of Defence, ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’, 1 July 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/docs/2020_Defence_ Strategic_Update.pdf.

74 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘AUSMIN 2020 Global Health Security Statement’, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/ausmin-2020-global-health-security-statement.

75 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, ‘Australia, US and Japan Announce Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific’, 31 July 2018, https://dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/australia-us-and-japan-announce-trilateralpartnership-for-infrastructure-investment-inthe-indo-pacific.aspx.

76 The White House, ‘Joint Statement of the Governments of the United States of America, Australia, and Japan’, 17 November 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse. archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-governments-united-statesamerica-australia-japan/.

77 ‘US, Japan, Australia Reaffirm Commitment to Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Development’, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 25 June 2019, https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/us-japan-australia-reaffirm-commitment-toindo-pacific-infrastructure-development.

78 US Department of State, ‘Blue Dot Network’, https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Zhou, ‘“Let’s Build a Digital Silk Road”: Xi Jinping Looks to Cement China’s Ties with ASEAN’.

82 Mukhtar Hussain, ‘Singapore Has Role in BRI’s Investment into South-east Asia’, Business Times, 21 August 2019, https://www.businesstimes. com.sg/opinion/singapore-has-role-in-brisinvestment-into-south-east-asia.

83 ‘Chinese Anti-COVID-19 Medical Team Arrives in Malaysia’, Straits Times, 18 April 2020, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/chinese-anti-COVID-19-medical-team-arrivesin-malaysia

84 Jude Blanchette, ‘China’s Digital Silk Road

After the Coronavirus’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 April 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-digital-silk-roadafter-coronavirus.

1 Of the Solomon Islands’ total 2018 exports of US$569m, its exports to China were US$380m, and its lumber (HS Code 4403: wood in the rough) exports to China were US$350m. Data from United Nations, ‘UN Comtrade Database’, https://comtrade.un.org/data. (Parameters for data extraction are as follows. Types of product: goods; frequency: annual; classification: HS, as reported; periods: 2021; reporters: Solomon Islands; partners: all; trade flows: export; commodity codes: all.)

2 Vijay Narayan, ‘Fiji Does Not Support China’s Proposition on South China Sea’, Fijivillage, 15 April 2016, https://fijivillage.com/news/Fiji-does-not-support-Chinas-proposition-on-South-China-Sea-5r2k9s/.

3 ‘Wen’s Speech at China–Pacific Island Countries Forum’, China Daily, 5 April 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/05/content_560573.htm.

4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Xi Jinping Meets with Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama of Fiji’, 16 May 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20170527234352/ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1463452.shtml.

5 Keoni Everington, ‘Bye-bye Fiji: Representative Office of Fiji in Taiwan Shuttered for Good’, Taiwan News, 17 May 2017, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3165855.

6 ‘Fiji, China to Defend Paris Agreement on Climate Change at COP23 Meet’, Fiji Sun, 18 May 2017, https://fijisun.com.fj/2017/05/18/fiji-china-to-defend-paris-agreement-onclimate-change-at-cop23-meet/.

7 ‘China National Fishery Corporation Opens Vanuatu Tuna Factory’, IntraFish, 25 October 2019 (updated 26 October 2019), https://www.intrafish.com/processor/china-national-fishery-corporation-opensvanuatu-tuna-factory/2-1-694796.

8 Peter Connolly, ‘The Belt and Road Comes to Papua New Guinea: Chinese Geoeconomics with Melanesian Characteristics?’, Security Challenges, vol. 16, no. 4, 2020, p. 53, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26976257?seq=2.

9 Graeme Smith, ‘China’s Guide to Investment Cooperation in Papua New Guinea’, DPA In Brief, no. 25, 2019, http://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/7391/ib-201925-chinas-guide-investmentcooperation-papua-new.

10 Naveel Krishant, ‘Total of 277 Chinese Investment Projects Successfully Implemented Worth Approximately US$2.36B’, Fijivillage, 21 May 2019, https://fijivillage.com/news/Total-of-277-Chinese-investmentprojects-successfully-implemented-worthapproximately-236B-rk2s59/.

11 Stephen Dziedzic, ‘Beijing Intensifies Lobbying of Pacific Nations to Recognize Taiwan as Part of One China’, ABC News, 13 February 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-14/beijing-lobbying-pacific-nations-to-recogniseone-china-policy/10809412.

12 Isabella Steger, ‘A Pacific Island Nation of 11,000 People Is Picking a Fight with China’, Quartz, 6 September 2018, https://qz.com/1380770/taiwans-ally-nauru-fights-with-china-at-pacificislands-forum/.

13 Sandra Tarte, ‘A New Pacific Regional Voice? The Pacific Islands Development Forum’, in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte (eds), The New Pacific Diplomacy (Canberra: ANU Press, 2015), pp. 79–88, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19w71mc.13?seq=1.

14 David Lawler, ‘The 53 Countries Supporting China’s Crackdown on Hong Kong’, Axios, 3 July 2020, https://www.axios.com/countries-supporting-china-hong-kong-law-0ec9bc6c-3aeb-4af0-8031-aa0f01a46a7c.html.

15 Denghua Zhang and Setope So’oa’emalelagi, ‘A New Trend: Pacific Island Language Teaching as Part of the Belt and Road Initiative’, DPA In Brief, no. 14, 2019, http://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2019-07/dpa_ib2019_14_zhang_sooaemalelagi.pdf.

16 Ian Kemish, ‘China’s Push into PNG Has Been Surprisingly Slow and Ineffective. Why Has Beijing Found the Going So Tough?’, Conversation, 3 July 2020, https://theconversation.com/chinas-push-into-png-hasbeen-surprisingly-slow-and-ineffective-why-hasbeijing-found-the-going-so-tough-140073.

17 Glenda Willie, ‘No Budget to Maintain Convention Centre: PM’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 11 February 2019, https://dailypost.vu/news/no-budget-to-maintain-convention-center-pm/article_51d2171a-8155-5da6-a96e-43c6775be3f5.html.

18 Nathan VanderKlippe, ‘Huawei-built Data Centre a “Failed Investment”, Papua New Guinea Says’, Globe and Mail, 14 August 2020, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-huawei-built-data-centre-a-failedinvestment-papua-new-guinea-says/.

19 Matthew Dornan and Philippa Brant, ‘Chinese Assistance in the Pacific: Agency, Effectiveness and the Role of Pacific Island Governments’, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, May 2014, pp. 349–63, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/app5.35.

20 ‘Government Splurges K4 Million “Only” on Gate’, Papua New Guinea Post Courier, 4 December 2017, https://postcourier.com.pg/govt-splurgesk4-million-gate/; and Marian Faa, ‘Plans to Revive “Dormant” Industrial Fishing Zone in Madang’, ABC Radio Australia, 18 February 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/radio-australia/programs/pacificbeat/png-finsheries-authority-to-takeback-pmiz/13166630.

21 Graeme Smith, ‘The Belt and Road to Nowhere: China’s Incoherent Aid in Papua New Guinea’, Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 23 February 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/belt-and-road-nowhere-china-s-incoherent-aidpapua-new-guinea.

22 Philip Gibbs, Lorraine Basse and Thomas Warr, ‘PMIZ – Promise and Plight’, Contemporary PNG Studies, vol. 16, May 2012, pp. 37–51, https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.062944732925075; and ‘Govt Splurges K4 Million “Only” On Gate’, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier.

23 Smith, ‘The Belt and Road to Nowhere: China’s Incoherent Aid in Papua New Guinea’.

24 Graeme Smith, ‘Are Chinese Soft Loans Always a Bad Thing?’, Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 29 March 2012, https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/are-chinese-soft-loans-alwaysbad-thing.

25 Anthony Galloway, ‘Chinese State-owned Company Behind Plane that Held Up RAAF Supplies to Vanuatu’, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 April 2020, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/chinese-state-owned-company-behindplane-that-held-up-raaf-supplies-to-vanuatu-20200417-p54krg.html.

26 ‘China, Pacific Island Countries Lift Ties to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, Xinhuanet, 17 November 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20181116215152/ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/17/c_137612239.htm.

27 Lowy Institute, ‘Lowy Institute Aid Map’, https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/.

28 Denghua Zhang and Jessica Marinaccio, ‘Chinese and Taiwanese Scholarships for Pacific Island Countries’, DPA In Brief, no. 10, 2019, http://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/6816/ib-201910-chinese-andtaiwanese-scholarships-pacific-island.

29 Brahma Chellaney, ‘China’s Debt-trap Diplomacy’, Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 24 January 2017, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/.

30 Roland Rajah, Alexandre Dayant and Jonathan Pryke, ‘Ocean of Debt? Belt and Road and Debt Diplomacy in the Pacific’, Lowy Institute, 21 October 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/ocean-debt-belt-and-road-anddebt-diplomacy-pacific.

31 Stephen Dziedzic, ‘China’s “Payday Loans” Attacked by Arthur B Culvahouse Jr, New US Diplomat to Australia’, ABC News, 13 March 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-13/china-accused-payday-loanspacific-us-ambassador-australia/10896280.

32 Zhang Lei, ‘Report on Facilities Connectivity Index – Five Connectivity Index Report (2018)’, Taihe Institute, 19 April 2019, http://taiheinstitute.org/Content/2019/04-19/0910401150.html.

33 Karl Lee Chee Leong, ‘What to Expect from Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Push in 2020?’, Diplomat, 6 March 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/what-to-expect-from-indonesiasindo-pacific-push-in-2020/.

34 Agence France-Presse, ‘Solomon Islands Drops Chinese Tech Giant Huawei for Billion-dollar Undersea Cable, Signs Australia’, South China Morning Post, 13 June 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/2150616/solomon-islands-drops-chinese-tech-gianthuawei-billion-dollar; and ‘Undersea Cable Deal with PNG Inked Amid Concerns Over Chinese Influence in the Pacific’, ABC News, 13 November 2017, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-14/png-to-get-new-australiafunded-undersea-internet-cable/9146570.

35 Winston Qiu, ‘Coral Sea Cable System Overview’, Submarine Cable Networks, 13 December 2019, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/asia-australia/coral-sea/coral-sea-cablesystem-overview; and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, https://www.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific-step.

36 Tom Westbrook, ‘PNG Upholds Deal with Huawei to Lay Internet Cable, Derides Counter-offer’, Reuters, 26 November 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-papua-huawei-tech/png-upholds-deal-with-huawei-to-lay-internetcable-derides-counter-offer-idUSKCN1NV0DR; and HMN Technologies Co. Ltd, ‘Experience’, https://www.hmntechnologies.com/enExperience.

37 Georgina Kekea, ‘Huawei in Talks with Government to Build 200 Telecommunication Towers’, Solomon Times, 22 September 2020, https://www.solomontimes.com/news/huawei-in-talks-with-government-to-build-200-telecommunication-towers/10231.

38 Rebecca Ray et al., ‘Geolocated Dataset of Chinese Overseas Development Finance’, Scientific Data, vol. 8, no. 241, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-021-01021-7.

39 Beth A. Polidoro et al., ‘Conservation Status of Marine Biodiversity in Oceania: An Analysis of Marine Species on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species’, Journal of Marine Sciences, vol. 2011, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1155/2011/247030.

40 Denghua Zhang, ‘China’s Military Engagement with Pacific Island Countries’, Policy Forum, 17 August 2020, https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-military-engagement-with-pacific-islandcountries/.

41 ‘China Makes Inroads in the Solomon Islands’, The Economist, 2 April 2022, https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/04/02/china-makesinroads-in-the-solomon-islands.

42 Euan Graham, ‘Assessing the Solomon Islands’ New Security Agreement with China’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Analysis, 5 May 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/05/china-solomon-islands.

43 Joseph D. Foukona and Graeme Smith, ‘Rumblings Along the Federal Fault Line in Solomon Islands’, Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 21 October 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rumblings-along-federalfault-line-solomon-islands; and Wilson Saeni, ‘Malaita Launches 2019 Communique’, Solomon Star, 18 October 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20210405052121/ https://www.solomonstarnews.com/index.php/news/national/item/22182-malaita-launches-2019-communique.

44 Joseph D. Foukona, ‘Solomon Islands Gets a Lesson in Chinese Diplomacy’, Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 29 June 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/solomonislands-gets-lesson-chinese-diplomacy.

45 Foukona and Smith, ‘Rumblings Along the Federal Fault Line in Solomon Islands’.

46 Ben Blanchard, ‘China Downplays Solomon Island Lease Debacle, Tells U.S. to Stay Out’, Reuters, 29 October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-solomonislands/china-downplays-solomon-island-leasedebacle-tells-u-s-to-stay-out-idUSKBN1X80YR.

47 Jonathan Barrett, ‘Chuuk Independence Vote Postponed as China–U.S. Pacific Contest Builds’, Reuters, 27 February 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pacific-micronesia/chuuk-independence-vote-postponed-as-chinau-s-pacific-contest-builds-idUSKCN20L09G.

48 US Department of State, ‘Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Federated States of Micronesia President David W. Panuelo, Republic of the Marshall Islands President Hilda C. Heine, and Republic of Palau Vice President and Minister of Justice Raynold B. Oilouch at a Press Availability’, 5 August 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190813101908/ https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeofederated-states-of-micronesia-president-davidw-panuelo-republic-of-the-marshall-islandspresident-hilda-c-heine-and-republic-of-palauvice-president-and-min/.

49 Richard K. Pruett, ‘A United States–Kiribati Compact of Free Association Would Yield Mutual Dividends’, Asia-Pacific Bulletin, no. 501, East-West Center, 5 March 2020, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/united-states-kiribati-compact-free-associationwould-yield-mutual-dividends.

50 ’ Papua New Guinea orders China-owned Ramu nickel plant to shut’, Reuters, 24 October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/papua-mining-spill-idUSL3N2790AW; ‘Expert Says Lab Results from PNG Ramu Nickel Spill “Alarming”: Report’, Reuters, 11 October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-papuamining-spill-idUSKBN1WQ0HA; and Ian Morse, ‘Locals Stage Latest Fight Against PNG Mine Dumping Waste into Sea’, Mongabay, 22 May 2020, https://news.mongabay.com/2020/05/locals-stage-latest-fight-against-png-minedumping-waste-into-sea/.

51 Jonathan Pryke and Shane McLeod, ‘Politics and Porgera: Why Papua New Guinea Cancelled the Lease on One of Its Biggest Mines’, Guardian, 12 May 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/12/politics-and-porgera-whypapua-new-guinea-cancelled-the-lease-on-oneof-its-biggest-mines.

52 ‘Porgera Mine Set to Restart as PNG and Barrick Niugini Limited Agree New Partnership’, Barrick Gold, 9 April 2021, https://www.barrick.com/English/news/news-details/2021/Porgera-Mine-Set-to-Restart-as-PNG-and-Barrick-Niugini-Limited-Agree-New-Partnership/default.aspx; and ‘Mineral Resources Enga Yet to Sign Off on Agreement: MRA’, National (Papua New Guinea), 4 May 2022, https://www.thenational.com.pg/mineral-resources-engayet-to-sign-off-on-agreement-mra-2/.

53 Bruce Hill, ‘Dozens of Chinese Fraud Suspects Deported from Fiji Arrive Handcuffed, in Hoods’, ABC News, 8 August 2017, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-08/chinese-suspects-deported-from-fiji-arrivehooded-and-handcuffed/8786080.

54 Grant Wyeth, ‘The Long Arm of Chinese Law Reaches Vanuatu, Again’, Diplomat, 11 July 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-longarm-of-chinese-law-reaches-vanuatu-again/.

55 ‘Papua New Guinea Bars Chinese Workers in Vaccine Trial Over Virus Risk: Paper’, Reuters, 21 August 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-papua/papua-newguinea-bars-chinese-workers-in-vaccine-trialover-virus-risk-paper-idUSKBN25H0R8.

1 Figures for goods exports from mainland China only to all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in current US$. Data are ‘Exports to counterpart countries’ for China from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics database, https://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85.

2 Boston University Global Development Center, ‘China–Latin America Economic Bulletin, 2020’, 18 March 2020, https://www.bu.edu//gdp/files/2020/03/GCI-Bulletin_2020.pdf.

3 Juan Forero, ‘China’s Oil Diplomacy in Latin America’, New York Times, 1 March 2005, https://web.archive.org/web/20151029040904/ https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/01/business/worldbusiness/chinas-oil-diplomacy-in-latin-america.html.

4 Li Xue, ‘中国不应高估拉美的战略意义’ [China should not overestimate Latin America’s strategic significance], Financial Times in Chinese, 21 January 2015, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001060237?full=y&archive.

5 ‘China’s Transport Infrastructure Investment in LAC: Five Things to Know’, Dialogue, 13 November 2018, https://www.thedialogue.org/blogs/2018/11/chinas-transport-infrastructure-investment-in-lac-five-things-to-know/.

6 Gregory Poindexter, ‘Honduran Authorities Define Details of Planned Hydroelectric Plants’, Hydro Review, 6 November 2017, https://www.hydroreview.com/business-finance/honduran-authorities-define-details-of-planned-hydroelectric-plants/.

7 Hugh Bronstein, ‘Exclusive: China Set to Deepen Argentine Trade Ties with Bid for Grains “Superhighway”’, Reuters, 16 August 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-china-grains-cccc-exclusive-idUSKCN1V60AW.

8 ‘Cosco Shipping y Volcan Invertiran US$ 3,000 Millones para Construir Puerto en Chancay’ [Cosco Shipping and Volcan will invest $3 billion US dollars to build a port in Chancay], Gestíon, 23 January 2019, https://gestion.pe/economia/empresas/cosco-shipping-volcaninvertiran-us-3-000-millones-construir-puertochancay-256532-noticia/.

9 ‘Colombia cerca de firmar un multimillonario acuerdo con China’ [Colombia near to signing a multimillion deal with China], Espectador, 4 March 2020, https://www.elespectador.com/economia/colombia-cerca-de-firmar-un-multimillonario-acuerdo-con-china-articulo-907671/.

10 Fermin Coop, ‘Explainer: Latin America and the AIIB’, Dialogo Chino, 8 January 2021, https://dialogochino.net/en/trade-investment/39049-explainer-latin-america-aiib-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/; and New Development Bank, ‘List of All Projects’, https://www.ndb.int/projects/list-of-all-projects/.

11 Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR), ‘Hidrovia Amazonica: Buen Negocio para el Peru?’ [Amazon Waterway: Good Business for Peru?], August 2018, http://dar.org.pe/archivos/Cartilla_hidrovia.pdf.

12 Interview with former Argentine government official, January 2019.

13 Xinhua, ‘China Opens First Renminbi Clearing Bank in South America’, China Daily, 22 June 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-06/22/content_25806563.htm.

14 Margaret Myers and Guillermo Garcia Montenegro, ‘Latin America and 5G: Five Things to Know’, Dialogue, 14 December 2019, https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/latin-americaand-5g-five-things-to-know/.

15 Huawei, ‘Visualized Public Safety Lays a Solid Foundation for Building a Smart Cochabamba’, https://e.huawei.com/topic/leading-new-ict-ru/visualized-public-safety-smart-bolivia-case.html.

16 ‘PDI y Huawei Chile Firman Acuerdo de Cooperacion Tecnologica’ [PDI and Huawei Chile sign technological cooperation agreement], trendTIC, 24 April 2017, https://www.trendtic.cl/2017/04/pdi-y-huawei-chilefirman-acuerdo-de-cooperacion-tecnologica/.

17 Huawei, ‘Solucion de ciudad segura salvaguarda el Puerto de Colon en Panama Parte’ [Safe city solution safeguards the Port of Colon in Panama], 7 February 2020, https://forum.huawei.com/enterprise/es/soluci%C3%B3n-deciudad-segura-salvaguarda-el-puerto-decol%C3%B3n-en-panam%C3%A1-parte-i/thread/600246-100323.

18 ‘Inauguran primera parte del Centro de Comando Unificado’ [First part of the Unified Command Centre inaugurated], El Observador, 11 April 2011, https://www.elobservador.com.uy/nota/inauguran-primera-parte-del-centro-de-comandounificado-20114111930.

19 Angus Berwick, ‘How ZTE Helps Venezuela Create China-style Social Control’, Reuters, 14 November 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-zte-specialreport/special-report-how-zte-helps-venezuela-createchina-style-social-control-idUSKCN1NJ1TT.

20 Ferney Arias Jimenez, ‘El 90% de los Municipios Debe Cambiar Alumbrado’ [90% of Municipalities Must Change Lighting], El Colombiano, 12 August 2020, https://www.elcolombiano.com/negocios/findeter-sugiere-cambio-de-alumbradopublico-en-colombia-CC13444798.

21 Boston University Global Development Center, ‘China–Latin America Economic Bulletin, 2020’, p. 8.

22 Ibid., p. 2.

23 Margaret Myers and Kevin Gallagher, ‘Scaling Back: Chinese Development Finance in Latin America, 2019’, Dialogue, March 2020, https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/scaling-backchinese-development-finance-in-lac-2019/.

24 Boston University Global Development Center, ‘China–Latin America Economic Bulletin, 2020’, p. 1.

25 Boston University Global Development Center, ‘China–Latin America Economic Bulletin, 2018’, 2018, http://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/04/CLAC-Bulletin-2018.pdf.

26 Jonathan Watts, ‘China’s Exploitation of Latin American Natural Resources Raises Concern’, Guardian, 26 March 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/26/china-latin-america-resources-concern.

27 Simon Romero, ‘Tensions over Chinese Mining Venture in Peru’, New York Times, 14 August 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/world/americas/15chinaperu.html; ‘Strike by Peru’s Miners Against China’s Shougang Group Hardens’, IndustriALL, 5 October 2009, http://www.industriall-union.org/archive/icem/strike-by-perus-miners-against-chinasshougang-group-hardens; and Cynthia Sanborn and Victoria Chonn, ‘Chinese Investment in Peru’s Mining Sector: Blessing or Curse?’, Boston University Global Economic Governance Initiative, 2015, https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/12/Peru2.pdf.

28 Josue Hinojosa, ‘ENDE Suspende Proyecto Rositas por el Rechazo de las Comunidades’ [ENDE Suspends the Rositas Project due to Communities’ Opposition], Los Tiempos, 4 October 2018, https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/economia/20181004/ende-suspende-proyecto-rositas-rechazo-comunidades#:~:text=ENDE%20suspende%20proyecto%20Rositas%20por%20el%20rechazo%20de%20las%20comunidades,-Un-a%20imagen%20de&text=La%20Empresa%20Nacional%20de%20Electricidad,el%20presidente%20ejecutivo%2C%20Joaqu%C3%ADn%20Rodr%C3%ADguez.

29 Joe Leahy, ‘Brazil Looks to China for Industrial Policy’, Financial Times, 11 April 2011, https://www.ft.com/content/1f82a382-646a-11e0-a69a-00144feab49a.

30 Karla Mendes, ‘Brazilian Government Split on Land Ownership Law’, Dialogo Chino, 22 January 2019, https://dialogochino.net/en/trade-investment/21043-brazilian-government-split-on-land-ownership-law/.

31 InfoLEG, ‘Ley de Proteccion al Dominio Nacional sobre Propiedad, Posesion o Tenencia de Tierras Rurales’ [Regime of protection to the national domain over the property, possession or tenure of rural lands], 27 December 2011, http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/190000-194999/192150/norma.htm.

32 National Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property, ‘El INDECOPI autoriza adquisicion de Luz Del Sur pero con condiciones’ [INDECOPI authorises acquisition of Luz Del Sur but with conditions], Press release, 10 April 2020, https://www.indecopi.gob.pe/-/el-indecopi-autoriza-la-adquisicion-de-luzdel-sur-siempre-y-cuando-la-empresa-seabastezca-de-energia-mediante-licitaciones-o-concursos-competitivos-.

33 Pepe Zhang, ‘Belt and Road in Latin America: A Regional Game Changer?’, Atlantic Council, 8 October 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/belt-and-road-in-latin-america-a-regionalgame-changer/.

34 Juan Enrique Serrano Moreno, Diego Telias and Francisco Urdinez, ‘Deconstructing the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America’, Asian Education and Development Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, 2020, https://www.academia.edu/45451168/Deconstructing_the_Belt_and_Road_Initiative_in_Latin_America.

35 Eleanor Albert, ‘Which Countries Support the New Hong Kong National Security Law?’, Diplomat, 6 July 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/which-countries-support-thenew-hong-kong-national-security-law/.

36 George Lauriat, ‘Latin America Faces Challenges with Fall in Commodity Prices’, American Journal of Transportation, 30 March 2015, https://ajot.com/premium/ajot-latin-america-faces-challenges-with-fall-in-commodity-prices.

37 Boston University Global Development Center, ‘China–Latin America Economic Bulletin, 2020’.

38 Paloma Ochoa, Margaret Myers and Pablo Elverdin, ‘Upgrading China–Southern Cone Agro-industrial Relations’, Dialogue, December 2019, https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/REPORT-Upgrading-China-Southern-Cone-Agro-Industrial-Relations-3.pdf.

39 Yohei Hirose and Naoyuki Toyama, ‘Chile Picks Japan’s Trans-Pacific Cable Route in Snub to China’, Nikkei Asia, 29 July 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Telecommunication/Chile-picks-Japan-s-trans-Pacific-cable-route-in-snub-to-China.

40 Margaret Vice, ‘In Global Popularity Contest, U.S. and China – not Russia – Vie for First’, Pew Research Center, 23 August 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/23/in-global-popularity-contest-u-s-and-chinanot-russia-vie-for-first.

41 Richard Wike et al., ‘America’s Image Abroad Rebounds with Transition from Trump to Biden’, Pew Research Center, 10 June 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/06/10/americas-image-abroad-rebounds-withtransition-from-trump-to-biden/.

42 Enrique Dussel Peters, ‘Monitor de la OFDI china en America Latina y el Caribe 2022’ [Monitor of Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 2022], Red ALC-China, 31 May 2022, https://dusselpeters.com/371.pdf.

43 Total trade between Brazil and mainland China (exports and imports) is US$162.6bn (current US$) out of the total trade between Latin America and China of US$426.9bn. The next-largest trade partner is Mexico, with total trade with China of $86.5bn in 2022. Data are ‘Exports to counterpart countries’ and ‘Imports from counterpart countries’ for China from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics database, https://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85.

44 Gustavo de L.T. Oliveira and Margaret Myers, ‘The Tenuous Co-Production of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Brazil and Latin America’, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 30, no. 129, 2021, pp. 481–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1827358.

45 ‘Sao Paulo State in Brazil Asks Approval to Use Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine’, Reuters, 3 October 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-brazil-vaccine/sao-paulo-state-in-brazil-asks-approval-to-use-sinovac-COVID-19-vaccine-idUSKBN26O068.

46 ‘Sinovac: Brazil Results Show Chinese Vaccine 50.4% Effective’, BBC, 13 January 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latinamerica-55642648.

47 ‘Brazilian President Thanks China for Fasttrack COVID-19 Vaccine Supplies’, CGTN, 27 January 2021, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-01-27/Brazil-thanks-China-for-fasttrack-COVID-19-vaccine-supplies-XnNykj2f8Q/index.html.

48 ‘Chinese Embassy Delivers Donation of Medical Supplies to Brazil’, Xinhuanet, 3 July 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/04/c_139187100.htm.

49 Banco Central Do Brasil, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil Report 2018’, 2018, pp. 19–20, https://www.bcb.gov.br/Rex/CensoCE/ingl/FDIReport2016.pdf.

50 Mike Billington, ‘China Goes Global with Ultra High Voltage Power Transmission’, Executive Intelligence Review, 26 August 2018, https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2018/eirv45n35-20180831/14-16_4535.pdf.

51 Gustavo de L.T. Oliveira, The South–South Question: Transforming Brazil–China Agroindustrial Partnerships, PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2017, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1v44x1qs.

52 Oliveira and Myers, ‘The Tenuous Co-Production of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Brazil and Latin America’.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’, https://www.fdimarkets.com.

1 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, ‘The First Ministerial Conference of FOCAC’, 15 September 2004, http://www.focac.org/eng/ljhy_1/dyjbzjhy_1/CI12009/200409/t20040915_7976632.htm.

2 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’, https://www.fdimarkets.com/.

3 Ibid.

4 Deborah Brautigam et al., ‘Chinese Loans to Africa Database’, China Africa Research Initiative, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, http://www.sais-cari.org/data.

5 African Development Bank, ‘Infrastructure Deficit and Opportunities in Africa’, Economic Brief, vol. 1, September 2010, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/ECON%20Brief_Infrastructure%20Deficit%20and%20Opportunities%20in%20Africa_Vol%201%20Issue%202.pdf.

6 Ibid.

7 IISS regional calculations based on Sebastian Horn, Carmen Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch, ‘China’s Overseas Lending’, Working Paper no. 26050, National Bureau of Economic Reform, April 2020, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199621001197.

8 Two countries participate in FOCAC but have not formally joined the BRI: Malawi and Mauritius. The only sub-Saharan African country not to participate in FOCAC is Eswatini; it maintains diplomatic relations instead with Taiwan.

9 Ethiopia received humanitarian, agricultural and governance assistance from the West, but less by way of loans and investment.

10 Axel Dreher et al., ‘Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 1, March 2018, pp. 182–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx052; and David Dollar, ‘China as a Global Investor’, Asia Working Group Paper 4, May 2016, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/China-as-a-Global-Investor_Asia-Working-Paper-4-2.pdf.

11 Xi Jinping, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit’ [translated transcript], Xinhuanet, 9 September 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20180907084831/ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_129946189.htm.

12 African Development Bank, ‘Trade and Trade Costs in Africa: An Overview’, in Africa Development Report 2010, 2010, pp. 1–30, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/african-development-report-2010-27559.

13 Brautigam et al., ‘Chinese Loans to Africa Database’.

14 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2018, 2018, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2018_en.pdf; see also EY, Turning Tides: EY Attractiveness Program, Africa, October 2018, p. 27, http://enterprise.press/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/EY-Attractiveness-Africa-Oct-2018.pdf, figures include North Africa.

15 Fesseha Mulu Gebremariam and Bizuayehu Daba Feyisa, ‘Assessing the Performance of Industrial Parks (IPS) in Ethiopia: The Case of Bole Lemi 1, Eastern Industry Zone and Hawassa Industrial Parks’, Social Sciences and Education Research Review, vol. 6, no. 1, 2019, pp. 72–111, https://sserr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/SSERR_2019_6_1_72_111.pdf.

16 Brautigam et al., ‘Chinese Loans to Africa Database’.

17 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2018, https://data.imf.org/api/document/download?key=60964573.

18 Mordor Intelligence, ‘Africa Construction Market – Growth, Trends, COVID-19 Impact, and Forecasts (2022–2027)’, 2020, https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/africa-construction-market.

19 Costas Paris, ‘China Tightens Grip on East African Port’, Wall Street Journal, 21 February 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tightens-grip-on-east-african-port-11550746800.

20 Richard Bluhm et al., ‘Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in Developing Countries’, AidData Working Paper no. 64, 11 September 2018, AidData at William & Mary, https://www.aiddata.org/publications/connective-finance-chinese-infrastructureprojects.

21 International Energy Agency, ‘Partner Country Series – Boosting the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Country Report, July 2016, https://www.iea.org/reports/partner-country-series-boosting-the-powersector-in-sub-saharan-africa.

22 Wei Shen, ‘China Role for Africa Energy Transition: A Critical Review’, Energy and Economic Growth Applied Research Programme, State of Knowledge Paper, January 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338913949.

23 Yunnan Chen, ‘Ethiopia and Kenya Are Struggling to Manage Debt for Their Chinese-built Railways’, Quartz Africa, 4 June 2019, https://qz.com/africa/1634659/ethiopia-kenyastruggle-with-chinese-debt-over-sgr-railways/.

24 Duncan Miriri, ‘Kenya Forcing Importers to Use Costly New Chinese Railway, Businessmen Say’, Reuters, 3 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-railways/kenya-forcing-importers-to-use-costly-new-chinese-railway-businessmen-say-idUSKBN1Y70LT; Dominic Omondi, ‘KPA Orders All Imported Goods to Be Ferried Via SGR’, Standard, 19 March 2019, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001317263/kpa-orders-all-imported-goods-to-be-ferried-via-sgr; and Philip Muyanga, ‘Transporters Want Mandatory Use of Railway Rule Quashed’, Daily Nation, 20 June 2020, https://www.nation.co.ke/kenya/business/transporters-want-mandatory-use-of-railway-rule-quashed-733484.

25 Istvan Tarrosy and Zoltan Voros, ‘Revisiting Chinese Transportation Projects in Ethiopia’, Diplomat, 26 January 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/revisiting-chinese-transportation-projects-in-ethiopia/.

26 ‘Greedy Train Station Officials Hoard Tickets, Triple Prices as Abuja–Kaduna Kidnappers Scare Passengers Away from Road’, Sahara Reporters, 8 April 2019, http://saharareporters.com/2019/04/08/greedy-train-station-officials-hoard-tickets-triple-prices-abuja-kaduna-kidnappers-scare; and Ian Timberlake, ‘Sudan’s New Sharp-nosed Train a Rarity’, Middle East Eye, 12 February 2015, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudans-new-sharp-nosed-train-rarity.

27 Adedayo Akinwale, ‘House Seeks Review, Cancellation of Chinese Loans’, This Day, 13 May 2020, https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/05/13/house-seeks-review-cancellation-of-chinese-loans/.

28 Garang A. Malak, ‘South Sudan Suspends Construction of Major Highway Over Quality’, East African, 10 June 2020, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/South-Sudan suspends-construction-of-major-highway-over-quality/4552908-5574208-10lqnrez/index.html.

29 ‘I Personally Took Chinese PPEs to KEBS and They Failed the Test–Health CS, Mutahi Kagwe Confirms’, Pulse Live Kenya, 9 August 2020, https://www.pulselive.co.ke/news/i-personallytook-chinese-ppes-to-kebs-and-they-failed-the-test-health-cs-mutahi/5vd4ltx.

30 Charles Mghenyi, ‘Scuffle as Chinese Builder Blocks Transport CAS at Likoni Bridge Site’, Star (Kenya), 13 August 2020, https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-08-13-scuffle-as-chinese-builderblocks-transport-cas-at-likoni-bridge-site/; and Chun Han Wong, Joe Parkinson and Nicholas Bariyo, ‘African Countries Complain of Racism in Chinese City’s Pandemic Controls’, Wall Street Journal, 14 April 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/african-countries-complain-of-racism-in-chinese-citys-pandemic-controls-11586808397.

31 See, for example, Nyasha Chingono, ‘Shooting of Zimbabwe Workers by Chinese Mine Owner Shows “Systemic” Abuse, Watchdog Says’, CNN, 28 June 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/27/africa/zimbabwe-mine-shooting-intl/index.html.

32 Eric Olander, ‘The Chinese “Western Media Conspiracy”’, China Africa Project, 12 August 2020, https://chinaafricaproject.com/analysis/the-chinese-western-media-conspiracy/.

33 See, for example, Editorial Board, ‘Chinese Loan and Nigeria’s Sovereignty’, Guardian (Nigeria), 11 August 2020, https://guardian.ng/opinion/chinese-loan-and-nigerias-sovereignty/; and Editorial, ‘It’s Time to Review SGR Deal and Get Value for Money from It’, Standard (Kenya), 24 May 2020, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/editorial/article/2001372404/it-s-time-to-review-sgr-deal-get-value-for-money-from-it.

34 Ulande Nkomesha, ‘There Is Tension in Zambia Because Govt Favours Chinese – Hichilema’, News Diggers!, 12 June 2020, https://diggers.news/local/2020/06/12/there-is-tension-in-zambia-because-govt-favours-chinese-hichilema/; see also Agence France-Presse, ‘Zambian Opposition Leader Hichilema Questioned Over “Anti-China” Remarks’, Africanews, 21 November 2018, https://www.africanews.com/2018/11/21/zambia-opposition-leader-hichilema-questioned-over-anti-china-remarks/.

35 Mpho Tebele, ‘Beijing Caught Up in Botswana Elections Debacle’, Southern Times, 28 April 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190501030240/ https://southerntimesafrica.com/site/news/beijing-caught-up-in-botswana-elections-debacle.

36 Kamau Muthoni, ‘Government Illegally Hired a Chinese Firm to Build SGR, Court Declares’, Standard (Kenya), 20 June 2020, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001375723/court-declares-sh500b-sgr-deal-with-china-illegal.

37 ‘Nigerian National Assembly to Review, Cancel Chinese Loans’, Belt and Road News, 15 May 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20200530211312/ https://www.beltandroad.news/2020/05/15/nigerian-national-assembly-to-review-cancel-chinese-loans/.

38 Kunle Olasanmi, ‘Nigeria: $3.1bn Rail Projects – Transport Ministry, BPP Appear in Court’, AllAfrica, 23 December 2020, https://allafrica.com/stories/202012230329.html.

39 IISS calculations based on loan data from the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and from World Bank Annual Financial Reports. See Brautigam et al., ‘Chinese Loans to Africa Database’; and World Bank, ‘Fiscal Year Data’, in Annual Reports, from 2014 to 2020, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2127.

40 Export–Import Bank of the United States, ‘Report to the U.S. Congress on Global Export Credit Competition’, June 2020, https://www.exim.gov/sites/default/files/reports/competitiveness_reports/2019/EXIM_2019_CompetitivenessReport_FINAL.pdf.

41 Paul Burkhardt, ‘U.S. Exim Bank Out to Displace China After Record Loan in Africa’, Bloomberg, 23 July 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-23/u-s-exim-bank-outto-displace-china-after-record-loan-in-africa.

42 Eric Olander, ‘Finally Some Straight Talk on Chinese Loans to Africa’, China Africa Project, 5 August 2020, https://chinaafricaproject.com/analysis/finally-some-straight-talk-on-chinese-loans-to-africa/.

43 Ibid.

44 John Mutua, ‘Kenya Drops Chinese Contractor for Naivasha–Malaba Rail Upgrade’, Business Daily Africa, 3 June 2020, https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Kenya-drops-Chinese-contractor-for-Naivasha-Malabarail-upgrade/539546-5569818-br7gidz/index.html; and Jacob Ng’etich, ‘Kisumu’s Hope for a Rail Dimmed Over Change of Route’, Standard (Kenya), 5 June 2020, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001374024/kisumus-hope-for-a-rail-dimmed-over-change-of-route.

45 Julius Barigaba, ‘Exim Bank Again Rejects Uganda’s Loan Request to Build Railway’, Daily Monitor, 9 March 2020, https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Exim-Bank-rejects-Uganda-loan-request-build--railway-SGR/688334-5484852-gx42iu/index.html.

46 Elias Biryabarema, ‘Uganda Revamps Century-old Rail Network After China Delays Funding’, Reuters, 6 November 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-railways/uganda-revamps-century-old-rail-network-after-china-delays-funding-idUSKBN1XG1T3.

47 Andrew Stegmann, ‘Huawei Looks to Africa to Cut Network Deals’, This Is Africa, 24 March 2016, reposted at https://www.relocationafrica.com/huawei-looks-to-africa-to-cut-network-deals/ (original source unavailable).

48 IISS calculation based on data from Julien Clemencot, ‘Chinese Tech Giant Huawei Wins Support in Africa’, Africa Report, 11 June 2019, https://www.theafricareport.com/13764/chinese-tech-giant-huawei-wins-support-inafrica/; Huawei, ‘2018 Annual Report’, https://www.huawei.com/-/media/corporate/pdf/annual-report/annual_report2018_en_v2.pdf; ZTE, ‘Annual Report 2019’, p. 246, https://res-www.zte.com.cn/mediares/zte/Investor/20200417/E1.pdf; and Brautigam et al., ‘Chinese Loans to Africa Database’.

49 For both CCCC and CRCC, figures include North Africa. See China Communications Construction Company, ‘Annual Report 2019’, p. 15, http://chinaeast.cdn.euroland.com/arinhtml/CN-CYY/2019/AR_ENG_2019/index.htm; and China Railway Construction Corporation, ‘Financial Report 2019’, p. 45, http://english.crcc.cn/module/download/downfile.jsp?classid=0&filename=9dbf24f30d2840fdaa930c5e1af249f4.pdf. For both companies, the figures are similar to 2018; see China Communications Construction Company, ‘Annual Report 2018’, https://web.archive.org/web/20210807231102/ http://en.ccccltd.cn/investorrelations/announcement/201904/P020190430666124841547.pdf; and China Railway Construction Corporation, ‘Financial Report 2018’, p. 48, http://english.crcc.cn/module/download/downfile.jsp?classid=0&filename=1f87f6a2b3d340dcbc8c964068dafe99.pdf.

50 Mordor Intelligence, ‘Africa Construction Market – Growth, Trends and Forecast (2019–2024)’.

51 Deloitte, ‘Africa Construction Trends Report 2019: Capital Projects in a Digital Age’, p. 7, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/energy-resources/za-Africa-Construction-Trends-2019.pdf.

52 International Monetary Fund, ‘Direction of Trade Statistics Database’, https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61013712.

53 Figures from 2014–2020; see Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’.

54 United Nations, ‘UN Comtrade Database’, https://comtrade.un.org/data/.

55 South Africa Reserve Bank, ‘Full Quarterly Bulletin’, no. 275, March 2015, https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/quarterly-bulletins/quarterly-bulletin-publications/2015/6649; and South Africa Reserve Bank, ‘Full Quarterly Bulletin’, no. 299, March 2021, https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/quarterly-bulletins/quarterly-bulletin-publications/2021/full-quarterly-bulletin---no-299---march-2021.

56 Tom Daly, ‘China Moly Shrugs Off South Africa Port Disruption as DRC Cobalt Sales Rise’, Reuters, 30 April 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cmoc-cobalt-drc-idUSKBN22C1KG.

57 Earl Carr, ‘The US versus Chinese Investment in Africa’, Forbes, 4 September 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/earlcarr/2020/09/04/the-us-versus-chinese-investment-in-africa/?sh=4047db65d4c0; and Cobus Van Staden, ‘How the U.S. Can Eclipse China in the Battle over Africa’, POLITICO China Watcher, POLITICO, 22 April 2021, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2021/04/22/how-biden-can-win-over-africa-in-battle-with-china-492553.

58 Francois Soudan and Nicholas Norbrook, ‘Kagame: On Judgement Day, I Will Get Better Marks Than Those Who Criticise Us Over Human Rights’, Africa Report, 11 July 2020, https://www.theafricareport.com/33192/kagame-on-judgement-day-i-will-get-better-marks-than-those-who-criticise-us-over-human-rights/.

59 Agence France-Presse, ‘Kenyatta Warns Against US–China Rivalry in Africa’, East African, 6 February 2020, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/kenyatta-warns-against-us-china-rivalry-in-africa-1436330.

60 Simon Marks, ‘How an African State Learned to Play the West Off China for Billions’, POLITICO, 7 February 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/07/ethiopia-china-west-power-competition-110766; and ‘Ethiopia Signs Up for IMF Deal: What’s in Store?’, Fortune (Addis Ababa), 21 December 2019, https://addisfortune.news/ethiopia-signs-up-for-imf-deal-whats-in-store/.

61 Joseph Sany and Thomas P. Sheehy, ‘Despite High Stakes in Ethiopia, China Sits on the Sidelines of Peace Efforts’, United States Institute of Peace, Commentary, 19 January 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/01/despite-high-stakes-ethiopia-china-sits-sidelines-peace-efforts.

62 Eric Olander, ‘Wang Yi Gives Boost to Abiy with Official Visit to Ethiopia’, China Africa Project, 2 December 2021, https://chinaafricaproject.com/analysis/wang-yi-gives-boost-to-abiy-with-official-visit-to-ethiopia/.

63 Lucas Niewenhuis, ‘China Opposes U.S. Sanctions on Ethiopia and Afghanistan as Humanitarian Crises Worsen’, SupChina, 23 September 2021, https://supchina.com/2021/09/23/china-opposes-u-s-sanctions-on-ethiopia-and-afghanistan-as-humanitarian-crises-worsen/.

64 Geoffrey Mosoku, ‘Kenya to Sign Deal for Sh51 Billion JKIA–Westlands Expressway’, Standard, 24 April 2019, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/nairobi/article/2001322387/kenya-to-sign-deal-for-sh65b-jkia-westlands-expressway; and Angeline Mbogo, ‘Chinese Private Investors Commit to Support JKIA–Westlands Expressway’, Kenyan Wall Street, 5 September 2018, https://kenyanwallstreet.com/chinese-private-investors-commit-to-support-jkia-westlands-expressway/.

65 ‘New Port in Lagos Will Be Chinese-financed, Chinese-built’, Maritime Executive, 24 October 2019, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/china-finances-new-chinese-built-portin-lagos-nigeria.

66 See, for example, US firm Bechtel Corporation’s public–private partnership (PPP) for the construction of the Nairobi–Mombasa Expressway, and South African firm Ai SkyTrain Consortium’s PPP for the construction of a US$2.6bn highspeed railway in Accra: ‘Presentation by Bechtel Corporation on the Nairobi–Mombasa Expressway’, Kenya Private Sector Alliance, https://kepsa.or.ke/presentation-by-bechtel-corporation-on-the-nairobi-mombasa-expressway/; and African Development Bank, ‘2019 Africa Investment Forum: Historic Signing of High-speed Railway Construction Concession Agreement for Ghana, with the Support of the African Development Bank’, 12 November 2019, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/2019-africa-investment-forum-historic-signing-high-speed-railway-construction-concession-agreement-ghana-support-african-development-bank-32609.

1 BP, ‘Statistical Review of World Energy 2021’, 70th edition, 2021, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statisticalreview/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf; and ‘Statistical Review of World Energy 2002’, 51st edition, 2002, https://www.griequity.com/resources/industryandissues/Energy/bp2002statisticalreview.pdf.

2 Christian Le Miere, ‘Increasing Mutual Dependence in Sino-Gulf Relations Is Changing the Strategic Landscape’, Atlantic Council, 11 May 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/increasing-mutual-dependence-in-sino-gulf-relations-is-changing-the-strategic-landscape/#:~:text=In%202019%2C%20oil%20exports%20from,barrels%20per%20day%20(mbpd).&text=Overall%2C%20the%20Gulf%20supplied%20more,plurality%20of%20China%27s%20oil%20imports.

3 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East (London: IISS, 2019), https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier.

4 Belt and Road Portal, ‘List of Countries That Signed Cooperation Documents with China to Jointly Build the “Belt and Road”’, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?tm_id=126&cat_id=10122&info_id=77298.

5 ‘China’s Xi Pledges US$20 Billion in Loans to Revive Middle East’, Reuters, 10 July 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinaarabstates-idUSKBN1K0072.

6 Xuming Qian and Jonathan Fulton, ‘China–Gulf Economic Relationship Under the “Belt and Road” Initiative’, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, 2017, p. 17.

7 Rebecca Ray et al., ‘Geolocated Dataset of Chinese Overseas Development Finance’, Boston University Global Development Policy Center, http://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/7WUXV.

8 ‘ACWA Power, Silk Road Fund Complete Partnership’, Arab News, 11 May 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1672921/corporate-news.

9 Angus McNeice, ‘UAE Renewable Energy Developer Masdar Eyes China, BRI Green Projects Expansion’, China Daily, 16 January 2020, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202001/16/WS5e1fc1aba310128217271576.html.

10 ‘Agricultural Bank of China Starts RMB Settlement in UAE’, Xinhua, 10 May 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-05/10/c_136272388.htm.

11 Muhammad Ishtiaq, ‘Seven Nations Including Saudi Arabia, UAE Pledge Support for Development of Pakistani Port City’, Arab News Pakistan, 6 July 2021, https://www.arabnews.pk/node/1889266/pakistan.

12 Adnan Aamir, ‘Pakistan’s Gwadar Loses Luster as Saudis Shift $10bn Deal to Karachi’, Nikkei Asia, 13 June 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Pakistan-s-Gwadar-loses-luster-as-Saudis-shift-10bn-deal-to-Karachi.

13 McNeice, ‘UAE Renewable Energy Developer Masdar Eyes China, BRI Green Projects Expansion’.

14 ‘Iran and China Sign 25-year Cooperation Agreement’, Reuters, 27 March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-chinaidUSKBN2BJ0AD.

15 ‘Iran’s Oil Export Claims Not Without Foundation Says Tankertrackers.com’, bne IntelliNews, 2 December 2019, https://www.intellinews.com/iran-s-oil-export-claims-not-without-foundation-says-tankertrackers-com-172638/?source=iran.

16 ‘Third Bridge on Bosphorus in Turkey Assigned to Chinese Group’, Xinhua Silk Road Information Service, 3 February 2020, https://en.imsilkroad.com/p/310765.html.

17 ‘Chinese Consortium Acquires 65 Pct Stake in Turkish Port Terminal’, Hürriyet Daily News, 17 September 2015, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chinese-consortium-acquires-65-pct-stake-in-turkish-port-terminal-88636.

18 AidData, ‘AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0’, 2021, https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddatas-global-chinese-development-finance-dataset-version-2-0.

19 ‘Egypt Prepares to Open Its Grand New Capital’, The Economist, 26 January 2019, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/01/26/egyp-tprepares-to-open-its-grand-new-capital.

20 Ray et al., ‘Geolocated Dataset of Chinese Overseas Development Finance’.

21 ‘UPDATE 1–Oman Signs $3.55 Billion Loan with Chinese Banks’, Reuters, 3 August 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/oman-loanidUSL5N1KP2XX; ‘Chinese Loans to Middle East Projects Grew 10-fold in Two Years’, Reuters, 2 September 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20180905132621/ https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/Chinese_loans_to_Middle_East_projects_grew_10fold_in_two_years-ZAWYA20180902104205/; ‘Bank Muscat Completes US$150m Loan Facility from China’, Arabian Business, 11 June 2020, https://www.arabianbusiness.com/banking-finance/448064-bank-muscatcompletes-150-loan-facility-from-china; ‘China Says Cancels Debt Owed by Iraq’, Reuters, 21 June 2007, https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-iraq/china-says-cancels-debt-owed-by-iraq-idUSPEK28432020070621; and Nayla Razzouk, ‘China Agrees to Write Off Most of Iraq’s Debt, Ministry Says’, Bloomberg, 2 April 2010, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-04-02/china-agrees-to-write-off-80-of-iraq-s-8-5-billion-saddam-era-debts.

22 ‘UPDATE 1–Oman Signs $3.55 Billion Loan with Chinese Banks’; and ‘Bank Muscat Completes $150m Loan Facility from China’.

23 Data on China’s outward FDI in MENA countries compiled from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Ministry of Commerce of China. Data on China’s outward FDI stock in the world obtained from UNCTAD. Data on MENA countries’ share of global GDP (current US$) obtained from the World Bank. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2018, 2018, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2018_en.pdf; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201612/20161202082006.shtml; and World Bank, ‘National Accounts Data’, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=DZ-MA-TN-BH-EG-IR-IQ-IL-JOKW-LB-LY-OM-QA-SA-SY-AE-PS-YE-1W.

24 American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, ‘China Global Investment Tracker’, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investmenttracker/.

25 Peter Nilson, ’ The ten most expensive port projects in the last year’, Ship Technology, 17 February 2022, https://www.ship-technology.com/analysis/the-ten-most-expensive-port-projects-in-the-last-year/

26 ‘Construction to Commence on $3.3 Billion Deep-Water Port in Algeria, Backed by Chinese Financing and Chinese State-Owned Contractors’, RWR Advisory, 26 March 2021, https://www.rwradvisory.com/construction-to-commence-on-3-3-billion-deep-water-portin-algeria-backed-by-chinese-financing-and-chinese-state-owned-contractors/.

27 PowerTechnology, ‘Hassyan Clean Coal Project, Dubai’, 15 June 2017, https://www.power-technology.com/projects/hassyan-clean-coal-project-dubai/#:~:text=Credit%3A%20Alstom.-,The%202%2C400MW%20Hassyan%20clean%20coal%20power%20station%20is%20an,plant%20commenced%20in%20November%202016.

28 Robert Mogielnicki, ‘China Strengthens Its Presence in Gulf Renewable Energy’, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 10 June 2020, https://agsiw.org/china-strengthens-its-presence-in-gulf-renewable-energy/.

29 Shira Efron, Karen Schwindt and Emily Haskel, ‘Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure’, RAND Corporation, 2020, https://doi.org/10.7249/RR3176.

30 Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch, ‘China’s Overseas Lending’, Working Paper no. 26050, National Bureau of Economic Reform, July 2019 (revised May 2020), p. 15, http://www.nber.org/papers/w26050.

31 Ahmed Eljechtimi and Ulf Laessing, ‘Morocco Hopes to Attract US$10 Billion in Investment to New Tech City’, Reuters, 2 July 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-china-idUSKCN1TW3UF.

32 Hamid Ould Ahmed, ‘Algeria Jails Ex-officials, Fines Foreign Firms in Highway Graft Case’, Reuters, 7 May 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/algeria-corruption-trial-idUSL5N0XY56320150507.

33 Alanoud Alsabah and Mohammed Alsudairi, ‘“Chinese” Developmental Zones in the Gulf: The Case of Kuwait’s North Economic Zone (Silk City)’, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, May 2020, https://www.kfcris.com/en/view/post/281.

34 Tehran Correspondent, ‘Iran Government Squeezed Over “Secretive” Deal with China’, Al-Monitor, 10 July 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/07/iran-government-rouhani-secretive-deal-china.html; and Omar Sattar, ‘Iraq’s Outgoing Government Keeps Mum on China Pact’, Al-Monitor, 7 February 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/iraq-economy-abdul-mahdi-china.html.

35 Asim Kashgarian and Ezel Sahinkaya, ‘Turkey Cracks Down on Uighur Protesters After China Complains’, Voice of America, 5 March 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_turkey-cracks-down-uighur-protesters-after-china-complains/6202920.html.

36 ‘Joint Letter to the President of the Human Rights Council’, 12 July 2019, made available on the website of Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190712_joint_counterstatement_xinjiang.pdf.

37 Michael Knights, ‘A Credibility Test for U.S.–Saudi Defense Relations and Iran Deterrence’, PolicyWatch, no. 3180, September 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/credibility-test-us-saudi-defensesaudidefense-relations-and-iran-deterrence.

38 Samir Bennis, ‘What Impact of Morocco–China Strategic Partnership on Western Sahara?’, Morocco World News, 21 May 2016, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/05/187088/what-impact-of-morocco-china-strategic-partnership-on-western-sahara/.

39 ‘The Mediterranean Region Looks at China’, China MEDiterranean, June 2020, https://www.chinamed.it/observer/june-2020-2021; ‘The Mediterranean Region Looks at China’, China MEDiterranean, May 2020, https://www.chinamed.it/observer/may-2020-2021.

40 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, ‘India, Oman Renew Defence Pacts as New Delhi Seeks to Play Wider Role in Region’, Economic Times, 24 May 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-oman-renew-key-defence-pacts-asnew-delhi-seeks-to-play-wider-role-in-region/articleshow/82912235.cms?from=mdr.

41 Manoj Kumar and Nidhi Verma, ‘India Likely to Start Full Operations at Iran’s Chabahar Port by May End’, Reuters, 5 March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/india-iran-ports-int-idUSKBN2AX1DK.

42 Thomas P. Narins and John Agnew, ‘Missing from the Map: Chinese Exceptionalism, Sovereignty Regimes and the Belt Road Initiative’, Geopolitics, vol. 25, no. 4, 2020, pp. 809–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1601082.

1 David Stanway, ‘China Overcapacity Problems Worsen Over 2008–2015: EU Chamber’, Reuters, 22 February 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-overcapacity-idUSKCN0VV05R; Ian Greenwood and Ray Hudson, ‘Fact Check: Is China Dumping Steel?’, Conversation, 14 June 2017, https://theconversation.com/fact-check-is-china-dumping-steel-76916; Stephen Castle, ‘European Steel Makers Urge Tariffs on Chinese Imports’, New York Times, 30 October 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/business/worldbusiness/30steel.html; data on exports of iron and steel (two-digit HS code 72), and capital goods (BES classification 4), for 2013, United Nations, UN Comtrade Database’, https://comtrade.un.org/data.

2 AidData, ‘AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0’, 2021, https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddatas-global-chinese-development-finance-dataset-version-2-0.

3 In the period 2003–11, cumulative, estimated Chinese greenfield investment per capita in Central and Eastern Europe was $38.2, in Northern Europe was US$45.2, in Southern Europe was US$49.1 and in Western Europe was US$37.6, based on estimated capital expenditure in greenfield projects from the Financial Times’ fDi Markets Database (https://www.fdimarkets.com/), population figures for 2011 from the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2011&start=2011) and regions based on the European Union’s Eurovoc thesaurus (https://op.europa.eu/en/web/eu-vocabularies/concept-scheme/-/resource?uri=http://eurovoc.europa.eu/100277). In absolute terms, the largest recipients of Chinese greenfield investment during this period were, in descending order, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Bulgaria and Poland.

4 Axel Bugge, ‘China Three Gorges Buys EDP Stake for 2.7 Billion Euros’, Reuters, 23 December 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-edpthreegorges-idUSTRE7BM04V20111223.

5 ‘Greece’s Piraeus Port Seals Deal with COSCO’, Reuters, 10 October 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/piraeusport-cosco-idUSLA27344320081010.

6 ‘Greece Completes Transfer of 16% Stake in Piraeus Port to COSCO’, Reuters, 7 October 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/greece-port-cosco-idUSKBN2GX1OV.

7 Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries’, 26 April 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20171108041129/ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/wjbispg_665714/t928567.shtml.

8 Austria refuses to confirm or deny it has signed an MOU.

9 Rebecca Ray et al., ‘Geolocated Dataset of Chinese Overseas Development Finance’, Boston University Global Development Policy Center, http://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/7WUXV.

10 Ibid.

11 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Veselina Petrova, ‘PowerChina, WindFarm Unveil 800-MW Wind Project in Ukraine’, RenewablesNow, 4 November 2020, https://renewablesnow.com/news/powerchina-windfarm-unveil-800-mw-wind-project-in-ukraine-719573/.

16 Frans-Paul van der Putten, ‘European Seaports and Chinese Strategic Influence: The Relevance of the Maritime Silk Road for the Netherlands’, Clingendael, December 2019, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/Report_European_ports_and_Chinese_influence_December_2019.pdf.

17 Francesca Ghiretti, ‘Demystifying China’s Role in Italy’s Port of Trieste’, Diplomat, 15 October 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/demystifying-chinas-role-in-italys-port-of-trieste/.

18 Madalin Necsutu, ‘Romania Cancels Deal with China to Build Nuclear Reactors’, Balkan Insight, 27 May 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/27/romania-cancels-deal-with-china-to-build-nuclear-reactors/.

19 Tanjug News Agency, ‘China Proposes USD 10bn Investment Fund to CEEC’, B92, 24 November 2015, https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2015&mm=11&dd=24&nav_id=96149.

20 Non-BRI members’ exports to China (including Hong Kong and Macau) grew at an annualised rate of 6%, based on a comparison of three-year averages for 2009–11 and 2017–19. BRI members’ exports to China grew at an annualised rate of 4%. United Nations, ‘UN Comtrade Database’.

21 Ibid.

22 David Glass, ‘Piraeus Largest European Med Port in 2020’, Seatrade Maritime News, 15 March 2021, https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/ports-logistics/piraeus-largest-european-me-dport-2020.

23 David Gordon, Haoyu Tong and Tabatha Anderson, ‘Beyond the Myths – Towards a Realistic Assessment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: The Development-finance Dimension’, IISS Research Report, IISS, March 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/03/beyond-the-myths-of-the-bri.

24 Tamas Szekely, ‘152 for €1.7 Billion – New Details on China-funded Budapest–Belgrade Rail Line Upgrade’, Hungary Today, 28 November 2017, https://hungarytoday.hu/152-km-e1-7-billion-new-details-china-funded-budapest-belgrade-rail-line-upgrade-79885/.

25 Yan Qiong, ‘EU Investigates China-funded Rail Project in Hungary and Serbia’, CGTN, 21 February 2017, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d676a4d35556a4d/share_p.html.

26 ‘Hungary Signed $1.9bn Loan Deal with China for Railway’, Global Construction Review, 27 April 2020, https://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/hungary-signs-19bn-loan-deal-china-railway-belgrad/.

27 Parliament of Serbia, ‘Law on Confirmation of the Loan Agreement for the Loan for Eligible Buyer for Modernization Project I Reconstructions of the Hungarian–Serbian Railway Connection on the Territory of the Republic of Serbia, for the Section Belgrade Center – Stara Pazova Represented by the Minister of Finance as Borrower and Chinese Export–Import Bank as, Lender’, 2017, http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/lat/pdf/zakoni/2017/2320-17%20-%20lat.pdf.; Parliament of Serbia, ‘Law on Confirmation of the Loan Agreement for Eligible Customer Loan for Modernization Project I Hungarian–Serbian Reconstructions Railway Connections on the Territory of the Republic of Serbia, for the Novi Sad Section – Subotica – State Border (Kelebija) Represented by the Minister of Finance as Borrower and Chinese Export–Import Bank as, Lender’, 2019, http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/cir/pdf/zakoni/2019/1635-19.pdf; and Andreea Brinza, ‘China and the Budapest–Belgrade Railway Saga’, Diplomat, 28 April 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-and-the-budapest-belgrade-railway-saga/.

28 World Bank, ‘Worldwide Development Indicators’, https://datatopics.worldbank.org/worlddevelopment-indicators/.

29 Ministry of Finance of North Macedonia (MOF-NM), ‘Law on Guarantee for the Miladinovci–Stip Highway’, https://web.archive.org/web/20170210024148/ https://www.finance.gov.mk/files/u5/Law_on_guarantee_MS.pdf; MOF-NM, ‘Law on Guarantee for the Kichevo–Ohrid Highway’, https://web.archive.org/web/20170210024349/ https://www.finance.gov.mk/files/u5/Law_on_guarantee_KO.pdf; and Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia, ‘Предлог – закон за гаранција на Република Северна Македонија на обврските по Договорот за заем за дополнително финансирање за Проектот за изградба на Автопат – делница Кичево – Охрид кој ќе се склучи меѓу Експорт - импорт банката на Кина и Јавното претпријатие за државни патишта, по скратена постапка’ [Draft law on Guarantee of the Republic of Northern Macedonia on the Obligations under the Loan Agreement for Additional Financing for the Highway Project – Section Kicevo – Ohrid to be concluded between the Export–Import Bank of China and the Public Enterprise for State Roads, by summary procedure], November 2019, https://www.sobranie.mk/materialdetails.nspx?materialId=66bfbd6d-b9af-48ac-b2d8-7c908b3c19fd.

30 Interview with a senior official in the Ministry of Transport of North Macedonia.

31 Ibid.

32 ‘Athens to Thessaloniki High-speed Train Line Is Now Open’, Greek City Times, 30 January 2019, https://greekcitytimes.com/2019/01/30/athens-to-thessaloniki-high-speed-train-line-is-now-open/.

33 For example, of the 15 European countries not participating in the BRI (for which data is available), 14 ranked in the top quintile for control of corruption in the 2013 and 2015 World Governance Indicators; only three of the 23 European countries participating in the BRI ranked in the top quintile. The figures were 13 out of 15 and four out of 23, respectively, in 2017 and 2019.

34 Agence France-Presse, ‘Hungary’s Viktor Orban Will Support Referendum on Plan to Host Chinese University Campus’, South China Morning Post, 11 June 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3136849/hungarys-viktor-orban-will-support-referendum-plan-host.

35 ‘China’s Investments in the Western Balkans’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 26, no. 38, December 2020, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2020/chinas-investments-in-the-western-balkans.

36 Ray et al., ‘Geolocated Dataset of Chinese Overseas Development Finance’.

37 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’.

38 Srinivas Mazumdaru, ‘EU Fears Divisions as China Woos Eastern European Nations’, Deutsche Welle, 5 July 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/eu-fears-divisions-as-china-woos-easterneuropean-nations/a-44542971.

39 Helena Smith, ‘Greece Blocks EU’s Criticism at UN of China’s Human Rights Record’, 18 June 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/18/greece-eu-criticism-un-china-humanrights-record.

40 Dana Heide et al., ‘EU Ambassadors Band Together Against Silk Road’, Handelsblatt, 17 April 2018, https://www.handelsblatt.com/english/politics/china-first-eu-ambassadorsband-together-against-silk-road/23581860.html?ticket=ST-3962605-jAMyD3d7ZxT3VZVsAMrn-ap4#:~:text=EU%20ambassadors%20to%20Beijing%20warn,strategy%20to%20divide%20the%20bloc.&text=No%20compromises.

41 Giovanna De Maio, ‘The Broken Compass of Italian Foreign Policy’, Brookings, 29 March 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/29/the-broken-compass-of-italian-foreign-policy/.

42 Max J. Zenglein, ‘Mapping and Recalibrating Europe’s Economic Interdependence with China’, MERICS, 17 November 2020, https://merics.org/en/report/mapping-and-recalibrating-europes-economic-interdependence-china.

43 Alicia Garcia-Herrero et al., ‘EU–China Trade and Investment Relations in Challenging Times’, Bruegel, 4 June 2020, https://www.bruegel.org/2020/06/eu-china-trade-and-investment-relations-in-challenging-times/.

44 Frank Bickenback et al., ‘Megatrends im Welthandel: Die neue Seidenstrase’ [Megatrends in global trade: The New Silk Road], Ifo-Institut, May 2019, https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/ifo-Studie_Megatrends_im_Welthandel_IHK_Impulse.pdf.

45 ‘Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 Establishing a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union’, Official Journal of the European Union, L 79/I, 21 March 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0452.

46 European Commission, ‘Coronavirus: Commission Issues Guidelines to Protect Critical European Assets and Technology in Current Crisis’, 25 March 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_528.

47 European Commission, ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’, COM(2020) 641 Final, 6 October 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0641.

48 Alicja Bachulska and Richard Q. Turcsanyi, ‘Behind the Huawei Backlash in Poland and the Czech Republic’, Diplomat, 6 February 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/behind-the-huaweibacklash-in-poland-and-the-czech-republic/; and Patrick Wintour, ‘Europe Divided on Huawei as US Pressure to Drop Company Grows’, Guardian, 13 July 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jul/13/europe-divided-onhuawei-as-us-pressure-to-drop-company-grows.

49 Albanian Prime Minister’s Office, ‘“Historic Day in the Relations of Friendship and Partnership with the United States of America”: Remarks by Prime Minister Edi Rama at the Signing Ceremony of the Memorandum of Economic Cooperation between Albania and the USA’, Press release, 3 October 2020, https://kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/nje-dite-e-shenuar-nemarredheniet-e-miqesise-dhe-partneritetitme-shtetet-e-bashkuara-te-amerikes/; and US Department of State, ‘United States – Republic of North Macedonia Joint Declaration on 5G Security’, Media note, 23 October 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20201031234038/ https://www.state.gov/united-states-republic-of-north-macedonia-joint-declaration-on-5g-security/.

50 ‘China’s Investments in the Western Balkans’.

51 Ericsson, ‘Ericsson and Magyar Telekom Launch Commercial 5G in Hungary’, 9 April 2020, https://www.ericsson.com/en/press-releases/2020/4/ericsson-and-magyar-telekom-launch-commercial-5g-in-hungary.

52 Helen Davidson, ‘China Recalls Lithuania Ambassador in Taiwan Diplomatic Office Row’, Guardian, 10 August 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/10/china-recalls-lithuania-ambassador-taiwan-diplomatic-office-row-beijing-tension-taipei; Helen Davidson, ‘Taiwan: Angry China Vows “Corresponding Measures” Over Czech Visit’, Guardian, 1 September 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/01/taiwan-angry-china-vows-corresponding-measures-over-czech-visit; and ‘China Warns Slovaks, Czechs of Retaliation for Taiwan Minister Visit’, Reuters, 22 October 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/china-warns-slovaks-czechs-retaliation-taiwan-minister-visit-2021-10-22/.

53 Sun Yu, ‘China Bans Pork Imports from Germany’, Financial Times, 13 September 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/056d3e13-e19b-41f9-ad70-d44a79915715.

54 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Joint Statement of the High-level Video Conference on Belt and Road International Cooperation: Combating COVID-19 with Solidarity’, Xinhua, 22 June 2020, http://english.scio.gov.cn/beltandroad/2020-06/22/content_76188774.htm.

55 Stuart Lau, ‘Lithuania Pulls Out of China’s “17+1” Bloc in Eastern Europe’, POLITICO, 21 May 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/lithuania-pulls-out-china-17-1-bloc-eastern-central-europe-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis/.

56 Finbarr Bermingham and Robert Delaney, ‘Estonia and Latvia leave China’s 16+1 trade group for central and eastern European nations’, South China Morning Post, 12 August 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3188599/estonia-and-latvia-leave-chinas-161-trade-group-central-and.