Role of Justice Perception in Relationship Duration, Brand Equity, and Strategic Integration

Figures & data

Figure 1. Conceptual framework.

Note: Arrow in gray represents the initiating role of justice perception in the causality from attitude to behavior; Arrow in blue represents the direct effect of justice perception on relationship duration; Arrow in green represents the moderating effect on the relationship between justice perception and attitude

Table 1. Summary of extant research on justice perception.

			Variables in research model
Study	Study context	Sub-dimension	Dependent	Key mediators	Moderators	Key findings
Brown, Cobb, and Lusch (2006)	Survey of 433 merchant wholesaler–agent/broker relationships in the US	Distributive; Procedural	Manifest conflict	Economic satisfaction	N/T	• Distributive justice increases economic satisfaction and decreases manifest conflict. • Procedural justice decreases manifest conflict.
Griffith, Harvey, and Lusch (2006)	Survey of 290 merchant wholesale distributor–primary supplier relationships in the US	Distributive; Procedural	Performance	Long-term orientation; Relational behavior; Conflict; Satisfaction	N/T	• Distributive and procedural justice enhance long-term relationship and relational behavior.
Luo (2008)	Survey of 224 dyadic relationships in foreign-invested enterprises in China (adding company archival data)	Procedural	Financial outcome	Interpersonal trust	Interpersonal culture distance; Equity-based strategic alliance	• Procedural justice increases financial outcome, operational outcome, interpersonal trust, and interorganizational trust.
Ling-Yee (2010)	Survey of 353 exporting firms participating in the electronic fair in Hong Kong	Procedural (Decision-making justice)	Channel relationship performance	Voluntary cooperation over strategy execution; Knowledge sharing over strategy formulation	N/T	• Procedural justice increases knowledge-sharing and voluntary cooperation.
Zhang, Jia, and Schalk (2010)	Survey of 96 managers from nonprofits in the medical and health fields in China	Procedural	Corporation effects	Formal contract; Informal contract	N/T	• Procedural justice increases both formal and informal contracts.
Gu and Wang (2011)	Face-to-face interviews of 131 distributors and manufacturers in Hong Kong	Overall justice (focus on the program)	Relationship quality	Satisfaction withthe collaboration; Compliance	Distributor dependence	• Program fairness increases compliance, satisfaction with the collaboration, and relationship quality.
Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant (2011)	Survey of 1,060 large Fortune 500 firms (sellers) and their resellers (channel members) relationships in the US	Overall justice (focus on unfairness)	Channel member performance	Channel member cooperation; Channel member; Flexibility	Contract utilization	• Perceived unfairness decreases both channel member cooperation and flexibility.
Hofer, Knemeyer, and Murphy (2012)	Web-based survey of 223 3PL relationships in Brazil	Distributive; Procedural	Proactive improvement	Long-term orientation; Trust	N/T	• Distributive justice increases long-term orientation. • Procedural justice increases both long-term orientation and trust.
Liu et al. (2012)	Survey of 269 dyadic data from home appliances companies and major distributors in China	Distributive; Procedural; Interpersonal; Informational	Relationship performance	Mutual coupling behaviors	N/T	• Distributive justice and informational justice increase knowledge-sharing, continuous commitment, and relationship investment. • Procedural justice and interpersonal justice increase mutual coupling behaviors partially.
Yang et al. (2012)	Survey of 360 distributors from the dairy industry in Korea	Overall justice (focus on unfairness)	Dissolution intention	N/T	Trust	• Unfairness increases dissolution intention. • Interaction term of unfairness and trust has a negative impact on task conflict.
Duffy et al. (2013)	Survey of 73 supermarket A’s suppliers in UK	Distributive; Procedural; Interpersonal; Informational	Supplier engagement with Customer Relationship Management	N/T	N/T	• Distributive justice increases supplier engagement with CRM. • Procedural justice decreases supplier engagement with CRM. • No significant coefficients between informational/interpersonal justice and supplier engagement with CRM.
Poujol et al. (2013)	Survey of 130 buyers from the bio-diagnostic sector in France	Distributive; Procedural	Loyalty toward the firm	Overall satisfaction	N/T	• Distributive fairness and procedural fairness increase overall satisfaction.
Praxmarer-Carus, Sucky, and Durst (2013)	Phone interviews of 38 buyer–supplier relationships in automotive, engineering, and pharmaceutical industries in Switzerland, Germany, and Austria	Distributive	Satisfaction with supplier development program	N/T	N/T	• Perceived distributive fairness increases satisfaction with supplier development program.
Hoppner, Griffith, and Yeo (2014)	Survey of 283 sellers and primary Japanese buyers in the US	Distributive; Procedural	Relationship performance	N/T	Relative dependence	• No significant coefficient between distributive justice and relationship performance. • Procedural justice increases relationship performance.
Poppo and Zhou (2014)	Survey of 283 matched buyer–supplier dyad relationships in various industries in China	Distributive; Procedural	Exchange performance	N/T	N/T	• Distributive fairness and procedural fairness increase exchange performance.
Wang, Craighead, and Li (2014)	Face-to-face interview of 302 buyer–supplier relationships in manufacturing firms in China.	Distributive; Procedural; Interactional	Mitigation of damaged buyers’ trust	N/T	N/T	• Distributive and procedural justice mitigate damaged trust (i.e., ability, benevolence, and integrity). • International justice mitigates damaged trust (i.e., benevolence).
Kang and Jindal (2015)	Survey of 270 franchisees and a single franchisor in Korea	Overall justice (focusing on unfairness)	Opportunism	Conflict	N/T	• Unfairness increases conflict.
Kaynak et al. (2015)	Survey of 307 Turkey pharmaceutical distributors	Distributive; Procedural;	Continuity of relationship	N/T	N/T	• Perceived distributive justice and procedural justice increase continuity of the relationship.
Luo et al. (2015)	Survey of 225 dyadic data from manufacturer–distributor relationships in China	Distributive; Procedural; Interactional	Governance costs; Relational performance	Strong form opportunism; Weak form opportunism	N/T	• Distributive justice decreases strong form opportunism. • Second-order term (square) of procedural justice decreases weak form opportunism.
Zaefarian et al. (2016)	Survey of 326 automotive parts suppliers in Iran	Distributive; Procedural; Interactional	Sales growth	Trust; Commitment	Dependence	• Distributive and interactional fairness increase both trust and commitment. • Procedural fairness has no effect on both trust and commitment.
Trada and Goyal (2017)	Survey of 247 supplier–distributor dyad relationships in the pharmaceutical industry in India	Distributive; Procedural; Interactional; (focusing on unfairness)	Relationship performance; Governance cost	Distributor opportunism	N/T	• Distributive, procedural, and interactional unfairness increases distributor opportunism.
Qiu (2018)	Survey of 92 suppliers from the agricultural industry in the US	Distributive; Procedural	Market performance	Relationship effectiveness; Relationship commitment	N/T	• Distributive fairness has no relationship with relationship commitment or relationship effectiveness. • Procedural fairness increases both relationship commitment and relationship effectiveness.
Srinivasan, Narayanan, and Narasimhan (2018)	Survey of 218 buyer–supplier relationships among managers in International Association of Outsourcing Professionals (IAOP) and Project Management Institute (PMI).	Distributive; Procedural; Interactional	Relationship conflict	Task conflict	Supplier autonomy; Cultural distance	• Distributive justice has no significant impact on both task and relationship conflict. • Procedural justice and interactional justice decrease both task and relationship conflicts.
Dong et al. (2019)	Survey of 124 mid-level or higher managers of International Joint Ventures in Beijing	Distributive; Procedural	International joint ventures instability	Joint learning	Distributive justice; Procedural justice	• Distributive justice increases joint learning. • Procedural justice interaction term positively correlated with joint learning.
Liu et al. (2020)	Survey of 182 top 1000 manufacturing companies in Taiwan	Procedural	Alliance performance	Relational governance effectiveness	N/T	• Procedural justice increases relational governance effectiveness.
Pan et al. (2020)	Survey of 342 dyadic relationships between distributors and cell phone manufacturers/communication solution providers in China	Distributive	Contract enforcement; Compliance; Satisfaction (relationship quality)	Supplier non-coercive power	N/T	• Buyers’ distributive fairness and supplier’s distributive fairness increase supplier’s non-coercive power. • The square of buyer’s distributive fairness increases supplier’s non-coercive power.
Jia et al. (2021)	Survey of 348 manufacturer–reseller relationships in the mobile phone industry in China	Distributive; Procedural	Reseller’s opportunism	N/T	Distributive Fairness Perception; Procedural Fairness Perception	• No significant coefficient between reseller’s perception of manufacturer’s distributive fairness and reseller’s opportunistic behavior. • Reseller perception of manufacturer’s procedural fairness decreases reseller’s opportunistic behavior.
Zhang, Zhang, and Du (2021)	Survey of 232 dyadic buyer–supplier relationships among B2B companies in China	Overall justice (applying general justice)	Seller’s value appropriation	Buyer’sopportunism	N/T	• Buyer’s perceived justice decreases buyer’s opportunism.
The present study	Survey of 241 independent retailers with a membership of Japanese retail buying groups	Distributive; Procedural	Relationship duration	Buying group’s brand equity (BGBE)	Strategic integration	•While distributive justice directly increases relationship duration, procedural justice only indirectly increases relationship duration via enhanced BGBE. •While strategic integration positively moderates the link of distributive justice to BGBE, the relationship between procedural justice and BGBE is negatively moderated by strategic integration.

Note: N/T = Not tested.

Table 2. Constructs and measurement assessment.

Constructs and scale items	Estimate^a	AVE	CR
Distributive justice		0.66	0.85
My firm’s outcomes and earnings are fair considering my roles and responsibilities in the buying group.	0.72
My firm’s outcomes and earnings are fair compared to other member-firms in the buying group.	0.81
My firm’s outcomes and earnings are fair compared to the contributions I make to member-firms’ marketing effort.	0.79
Procedural justice		0.62	0.83
The buying group considers my views and feelings when making decisions.	0.76
The buying group’s procedures are based on accurate information.	0.74
I am able to appeal the outcome of the buying group’s decision-making procedures.	0.80
Buying group’s brand equity		0.57	0.86
More retailers have come to know the existence of my buying group.	0.70
Image of my buying group has increased.	0.86
The good quality of the buying group is perceived.	0.93
The buying group provides the stores with a personality.	0.64
Member-retailers’ loyalty to the buying group has increased.	0.44
Strategic integration		0.50	0.79
Long-term business strategy depends on maintaining a good, healthy relationship with the buying group.	0.84
A strong cooperative relationship must be maintained between my firm and the buying group for me to remain competitive.	0.74
If the buying group went out of business, my firm would immediately have to change its competitive strategy.	0.53
When developing our firm’s strategy, I consider the buying group a large part of the picture.	0.65
Relationship duration		n/a	n/a
For how many years have you been a member of your retail buying group? () years	n/a

Note: ^astandardized factor loading; AVE = average variance extracted; CR = composite reliability; n/a = not applicable.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Distributive justice	0.81
2. Procedural justice	0.54*	0.79
3. Buying group’s brand equity	0.42*	0.55*	0.75
4. Strategic integration	0.51*	0.47*	0.45*	0.71
5. Relationship duration	0.28*	0.22*	0.27*	0.13*	n/a
6. Affiliation^a	−0.05	−0.05	−0.21*	−0.03	−0.04	n/a
7. Purchase ratio	−0.05	0.08	0.08	0.21*	0.08	0.11	n/a
8. Number of stores	−0.01	0.03	0.11	−0.14*	0.07	−0.33*	−0.24*	n/a
9. Geographical area	−0.08	0.07	−0.04	0.04	−0.10	0.03	0.07	−0.13*	n/a
10. Sales performance	0.16*	0.15*	0.24**	0.03	−0.01	−0.05	−0.04	0.24*	−0.02	n/a
Mean	3.41	3.35	3.39	3.96	14.86	0.67	47.80	3.86	3.81	2.95
SD	0.77	0.80	0.72	0.78	0.99	0.47	21.14	8.51	1.18	1.10

Note: ^aDummy variable; SD = standard deviation; n/a = not applicable; Numbers in italics in the diagonal row show square roots of each construct’s AVE value; *p < 0.05.

Table 4. Results of path analysis for main effects.

Hypothesized paths	Estimate^a	Results
Direct effects
H1a: Distributive justice → Relationship duration	0.28**	Accepted
H1b: Procedural justice → Relationship duration	−0.05	Failed to Accept
H2a: Distributive justice → Buying group’s brand equity	0.05	Failed to Accept
H2b: Procedural justice → Buying group’s brand equity	0.61***	Accepted
H3: Buying group’s brand equity → Relationship duration	0.20*	Accepted
Indirect effects
Distributive justice → Relationship duration	0.01
Procedural justice → Relationship duration	0.12*
Control variables
Affiliation → Relationship duration	0.02
Purchase ratio → Relationship duration	0.11
Number of stores → Relationship duration	0.12
Geographical distance → Relationship duration	−0.06
Sale performance → Relationship duration	−0.12

Note: ^aStandardized coefficient; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001.

Table 5. Results for moderating effects of strategic integration.

Hypothesized paths	Estimate^a		χ^2 difference test^b	Results
	High	Low
H4: Distributive justice → Buying group’s brand equity	0.17	−0.36*	df(1) = 7.00**	Accepted
H5: Procedural justice → Buying group’s brand equity	0.45***	0.93***	df(1) = 6.45*	Failed to Accept

Note: ^aStandardized coefficient; ^bValues greater than 3.84 are significant at a 5% level.

(△χ²(1) = 3.84, p < 0.05); *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001.

Table 6. Results of a two-stage least-squares (2SLS).

Independent variables	BGBE	RD	Residual^b
Candid communication (as instrumental variable)	0.33***		0.00
Predicted value^a		7.32**

Note: BGBE = Buying group’s brand equity; RD = relationship duration; ^apredicted value is the unstandardized value calculated in the first regression estimation (i.e., the regression of BGBE on candid communication); ^bResidual is the unstandardized value calculated in the process of the second regression estimation (i.e., the regression of RD on predicted value); The estimated regression results show unstandardized coefficient; The model of BGBE shows R² = 0.21, F-statistic [1, 239] = 65.12, p < 0.001; The model of RD shows R² = 0.05, F-statistic [1, 239] = 12.27, p < 0.01; The model of Residual shows R² = 0.00, F-statistic [1, 239] = 0.00, p > 0.05; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001.

Brown, J. R., A. Cobb, and R. F. Lusch. 2006. The roles played by interorganizational contracts and justice in marketing channel relationships. Journal of Business Research 59 (2):166–75. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2005.04.004.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Griffith, D. A., M. G. Harvey, and R. F. Lusch. 2006. Social exchange in supply chain relationships: The resulting benefits of procedural and distributive justice. Journal of Operations Management 24 (2):85–98. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2005.03.003.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Luo, Y. 2008. Procedural fairness and interfirm cooperation in strategic alliances. Strategic Management Journal 29 (1):27–46. doi:10.1002/smj.646.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Ling-Yee, L. 2010. Encouraging extra-role behavior in a channel context: The role of economic-, social-, and justice-based sharedness mechanisms. Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2):195–201. doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2008.12.011.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Zhang, Z., M. Jia, and R. Schalk. 2010. Procedural fairness and cooperation in public‐private partnerships in China. Journal of Managerial Psychology 25 (5):513–38. doi:10.1108/02683941011048409.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Gu, F. F., and D. T. Wang. 2011. The role of program fairness in asymmetrical channel relationships. Industrial Marketing Management 40 (8):1368–76. doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2011.07.005.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Samaha, S. A., R. W. Palmatier, and R. P. Dant. 2011. Poisoning relationships: Perceived unfairness in channels of distribution. Journal of Marketing 75 (3):99–117. doi:10.1509/jmkg.75.3.99.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Hofer, A. R., A. M. Knemeyer, and P. R. Murphy. 2012. The roles of procedural and distributive justice in logistics outsourcing relationships. Journal of Business Logistics 33 (3):196–209. doi:10.1111/j.2158-1592.2012.01052.x.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Liu, Y., Y. Huang, Y. Luo, and Y. Zhao. 2012. How does justice matter in achieving buyer–supplier relationship performance? Journal of Operations Management 30 (5):355–67. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2012.03.003.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Yang, D., E. Sivadas, B. Kang, and S. Oh. 2012. Dissolution intention in channel relationships: An examination of contributing factors. Industrial Marketing Management 41 (7):1106–13. doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2012.04.010.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Duffy, R., A. Fearne, S. Hornibrook, K. Hutchinson, and A. Reid. 2013. Engaging suppliers in CRM: The role of justice in buyer–supplier relationships. International Journal of Information Management 33 (1):20–27. doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2012.04.005.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Poujol, J. F., B. Siadou-Martin, D. Vidal, and G. Pellat. 2013. The impact of salespeople’s relational behaviors and organizational fairness on customer loyalty: An empirical study in B-to-B relationships. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 20 (5):429–38. doi:10.1016/j.jretconser.2013.03.005.

 Google Scholar

Praxmarer-Carus, S., E. Sucky, and S. Durst. 2013. The relationship between the perceived shares of costs and earnings in supplier development programs and supplier satisfaction. Industrial Marketing Management 42 (2):202–10. doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2012.12.008.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Hoppner, J. J., D. A. Griffith, and C. Yeo. 2014. The intertwined relationships of power, justice and dependence. European Journal of Marketing 48 (9/10):1690–708. doi:10.1108/EJM-03-2013-0147.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Poppo, L., and K. Z. Zhou. 2014. Managing contracts for fairness in buyer–supplier exchanges. Strategic Management Journal 35 (10):1508–27. doi:10.1002/smj.2175.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Wang, Q., C. W. Craighead, and J. J. Li. 2014. Justice served: Mitigating damaged trust stemming from supply chain disruptions. Journal of Operations Management 32 (6):374–86. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2014.07.001.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Kang, B., and R. P. Jindal. 2015. Opportunism in buyer–seller relationships: Some unexplored antecedents. Journal of Business Research 68 (3):735–42. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.07.009.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Kaynak, R., T. Sert, G. Sert, and B. Akyuz. 2015. Supply chain unethical behaviors and continuity of relationship: Using the PLS approach for testing moderation effects of inter-organizational justice. International Journal of Production Economics 162:83–91. doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.01.010.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Luo, Y., Y. Liu, Q. Yang, V. Maksimov, and J. Hou. 2015. Improving performance and reducing cost in buyer–supplier relationships: The role of justice in curtailing opportunism. Journal of Business Research 68 (3):607–15. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.08.011.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Zaefarian, G., Z. Najafi-Tavani, S. C. Henneberg, and P. Naudé. 2016. Do supplier perceptions of buyer fairness lead to supplier sales growth? Industrial Marketing Management 53:160–71. doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2015.07.003.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Trada, S., and V. Goyal. 2017. The dual effects of perceived unfairness on opportunism in channel relationships. Industrial Marketing Management 64:135–46. doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2017.01.008.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Qiu, T. 2018. Dependence concentration and fairness perceptions in asymmetric supplier–buyer relationships. Journal of Marketing Management 34 (3/4):395–419. doi:10.1080/0267257X.2018.1450281.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Srinivasan, R., S. Narayanan, and R. Narasimhan. 2018. An investigation of justice, conflict, and moderating effects of supplier autonomy and cultural distance in buyer–supplier relationships. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 65 (1):6–20. doi:10.1109/TEM.2017.2751039.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Dong, X., S. Zou, G. Sun, and Z. Zhang. 2019. Conditional effects of justice on instability in international joint ventures. Journal of Business Research 101:171–82. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.04.027.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Liu, C. L. E., N. Sinkovics, R. R, and R. R. Sinkovics. 2020. Achieving relational governance effectiveness: An examination of B2B management practices in Taiwan. Industrial Marketing Management 90:453–65. doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2020.08.004.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Pan, X., S. Zang, Y. Hu, and J. Liu. 2020. Identifying the positive sides of power use between (in)congruence in distributive fairness perception and supplier-buyer relationship quality. Industrial Marketing Management 91:362–72. doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2020.09.013.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Jia, F., L. Wei, L. Jiang, Z. Hu, and Z. Yang. 2021. Curbing opportunism in marketing channels: The roles of influence strategy and perceived fairness. Journal of Business Research 131:69–80. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.03.039.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Zhang, J., Y. Zhang, and M. Du. 2021. The impact of relative governance on B2B firms’ value appropriation from industrial buyer–seller relationships: Empirical evidence from China. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 36 (2):230–43. doi:10.1108/JBIM-01-2019-0049.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar