Impact of uncertainty ascribed to defective products on supply chains

Figures & data

Figure 1. The relationship of Equations (8(8) $\mathit{u}\ge \mathit{w}+\frac{{\mathrm{\Pi }}_0^R(q_0^{\ast })-{\Pi }_p^R(\mathit{q})}{\mathit{pq}}.$(8) ) and (eq 10(10) $\mathit{u}\le \frac{\mathit{w}-\mathit{c}}{p}\left(1-\frac{q_0^{\ast }}{\mathit{q}}\right).$(10) ) when $\mathit{p}=\mathrm{0.010.}$

Figure 2. The relationship of Equations (8(8) $\mathit{u}\ge \mathit{w}+\frac{{\mathrm{\Pi }}_0^R(q_0^{\ast })-{\Pi }_p^R(\mathit{q})}{\mathit{pq}}.$(8) ) and (10) when $\mathit{p}=\mathrm{0.025.}$

Figure 3. The incentive compatible condition when $\mathit{p}=0.010$ and discrete symmetrical triangle distribution with the range (300, 700).

Figure 4. The expected profits and compensation fee when $q_p^C=530$.

Figure 5. The solutions based on coordination, bargaining, and Stackelberg approaches when $\mathit{p}=0.010$.

Table 1. The respective characteristics in case of $\mathit{p}=\mathrm{0.010.}$

Approach	$\mathit{q}$	$\mathit{u}$	${\Pi }_p^R(\mathit{q},\mathit{u})$	${\Pi }_p^M(\mathit{q},\mathit{u})$
No defective product	494	-	18514.3	12350.0
coordination	530	133.8	18514.3	12540.6
Nash bargaining	530	151.8	18609.6	12445.3
Stackelbelg	499	60.0	18512.2	12175.6