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ABSTRACT
Are extremists (incels, neo-nazis, and the like) characteristically answerable for their moral and political convictions? Is it necessary to offer them reasoned arguments against their views, or is it instead appropriate to bypass that kind of engagement? Discussion of these questions has centered around the putative epistemic autonomy of extremists. The parties to this discussion have assumed that epistemic autonomy is solely (or at least primarily) a matter of epistemic independence, of believing based on epistemic reasons one has assessed for oneself. Here, though, I make the case for shifting the terms of the debate. Epistemic independence is not sufficient to make one answerable for one’s beliefs. Epistemic autonomy, in the sense that matters for answerability, is also a matter of what I call epistemic receptivity. Extremists may be fiercely epistemic independent, but that commitment is characteristically paired with severe deficiencies in empathic orientation. Severe deficiencies in empathic orientation undermine extremists’ ability to adequately engage with competing evaluative perspectives, and thus compromise extremists’ epistemic autonomy. I consider how this conclusion should inform our thinking about what we owe to extremists.
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Notes
1 Cassam also recognizes the distinct categories of ideological extremism and methods extremism, into which individuals may fall simply in virtue of the aberrant content of their convictions or the extreme nature of their preferred tactics, but he does hold that the extremist mindset disposes individuals to both of these latter forms of extremism (Citation2021, 11–114).
2 For the deliberative democrats Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson, for example, respect for others’ autonomy dictates that we should not write off their judgments as ‘products of unfavorable conditions, such as impaired judgment, misguided motives, or cultural influences’, unless we cannot realistically interpret them in any other light, in which case respect might instead require that we draw attention to the judgment’s epistemically faulty etiology (Citation1999, 270).
3 A form of address could be inappropriate in virtue of being impotent, and/or in virtue of being disrespectful or otherwise immoral. Cassam himself seems primarily but not exclusively concerned with the former possibility (see Citation2021, 197).
4 Henceforth, I will mostly skip over that parenthetical qualification. ‘Epistemic autonomy’ could sensibly be used to pick out a number of different traits or conditions, some of which may have little to do with the regard suite. But since I am ultimately concerned with how we should treat or address extremists, I will focus just on the kind of autonomy that matters to the regard suite.
5 Fricker (Citation2006) and Zagzebski (Citation2007) offer characterizations of epistemic autonomy strikingly similar to Goldberg’s and Battaly’s.
6 This formulation draws inspiration from Neta (Citation2019) and Lord and Sylvan (Citation2019).
7 For discussion of challenges to such an assumption, see e.g. Reisner (Citation2012), Gardiner (Citation2018), and Moss (Citation2018).
8 On the significance of persuasion as a mechanism of radicalization, see e.g. Nuraniyah (Citation2018), Dalgaard-Nielsen (Citation2010), and Heath-Kelly (Citation2013).
9 Note, though, that the influence of the aforementioned pressures need not interfere with the epistemic independence of one’s belief, on my characterization of epistemic independence. The pressures might, for instance, influence which epistemic reasons one attends to, without making it any less true that one’s eventual belief is formed on the basis of epistemic reasons one has oneself appreciated as such.
10 The ubiquity of wishful believing, for instance, is well-evidenced: see e.g. Borkenau and Liebler (Citation1993), and Brown and Dutton (Citation1995).
11 I adopt the notion of attributability as a form of responsibility from Shoemaker (Citation2015).
12 For a defense of the view that belief can be based on non-epistemic reasons, see McCormick (Citation2019).
13 This is true even if the inability to weigh evidence is, as it were, a self-inflicted wound. If I deliberately epistemically hobble myself, the consequent flaws in my belief are still not liable to be the subject of Watsonian ‘demands’ and ‘censure’, unless it is now within my power to restore my own evidence-assessing powers (see section IV below). For other landmark analyses of holding responsible, see e.g. Wallace (Citation1996) and Smith (Citation2007).
14 The provision or illumination of epistemic reasons can, of course, take many forms. It is by no means limited to the dry recitation of arguments.
15 See e.g. Gutmann and Thompson (Citation1999, 270), Larmore (Citation2008, 148), and Hill (Citation1980, 96).
16 One might argue that they instead militate in favor of revising our assumption that epistemic autonomy necessarily makes the whole regard suite apt. I have opted to treat that assumption as a fixed point, but even if one were to abandon that assumption, the broader point stands: epistemic independence alone is not sufficient to render the whole regard suite apt.
17 I prescind here from worries about the nature or possibility of objective epistemic reasons; see e.g. Sylvan (Citation2016) and Schroeder (Citation2008) for discussion.
18 Lorenz (Citation2021) summarizes the fascinating history of the Birds Aren’t Real ‘conspiracy theory’.
19 See e.g. O’Hara and Stevens (Citation2015), Nguyen (Citation2020), and Cassam (Citation2021) for important contributions to this debate.
20 Tanesini draws from Shoemaker (Citation2015) in developing her notion of epistemic responsibility as answerability, according to which ‘agents are answerable for those views and behaviors that they are capable of justifying by supplying reasons in their support and by considering whether their conduct and beliefs are better than some relevant alternatives’ (Citation2022, 233).
21 On the epistemology of Q-anon, see e.g. Marwick and Partin (Citation2022).
22 ‘Empathy’ has many meanings apart from the one I invoke here. For an overview see Wispé (Citation1987). Shoemaker (Citation2015) also points out that empathy deficits may bar consideration of counterevidence and thus preclude epistemic responsibility. My account is thus significantly indebted to his, although Shoemaker confines his analysis to empathy deficits secondary to psychopathy or congenital neuro-atypicality and does not consider the role of what I call exclusionary judgments in compromising epistemic responsibility.
23 See Baele, Brace, and Ging (Citation2023) for a survey of dehumanizing language in incel communities, and Betus, Jablonski, and Lemieux (Citation2017) for a more general survey of dehumanization in extremist rhetoric.
24 See Hoffman, Ware, and Shapiro (Citation2020) for a sobering review.
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Notes on contributors
Olivia Bailey
Olivia Bailey is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. She writes about empathy, imagination and understanding.