Politics of a Just Transition: lessons from the UK coal mines

ABSTRACT

The concept of a Just Transition [JT] gained considerable international interest as exemplified by a dedicated pavilion set up for the JT by the European Commission and the ILO at the COP27. Although the concept now encompasses a wide range of justices such as the social, legal, and environmental justices, the original concept itself can be traced back to trade union movements in the 1980s. Drawing lessons from the socio-economic damage caused by a failed JT of the UK mine closures between the 1980s and 1990s, this paper argues that former coal mining communities in the UK today continues to face similar problems identified in the past, which makes them uniquely vulnerable against the current process of JT. This paper utilises the multi-level perspective [MLP] theory by fleshing out the role of politics and policy in enabling a JT, using a case study approach to the coal mine closure in the North of England. This paper identifies the failed JT at every stage of the MLP theory. It concludes that the example of the coal mine closures provides a valuable lesson for a successful JT today such as stronger key stakeholder cooperation and a place-based response through significant decentralisation.

KEYWORDS:

• Just transition
• coal mine closure
• North England
• Thatcher
• trade union

Introduction

Boris Johnson declared proudly that the British public should be grateful for Margaret Thatcher to having closed the British coal mines which gave the UK ‘a big early start' in the Just Transition [JT] process (Harrabin, 2021). This statement garnered much controversy, not least because it was made in the months leading up to the COP26 which was held in Scotland (Harrabin, 2021) where the memory of the damage caused by deindustrialisation under the Thatcher government still haunt communities (The Herald, 2013). At present, the literature which analyse the policies aimed towards former coal mining communities is focused on either the 1970s before Thatcher takes office (Perchard & Gildart, 2022, p. 237; Phillips, 2013, p. 104) or the New Labour era (National Audit Office, 2009, p. 11; Rising et al., 2021, p. 12; Waddington et al., 2001, pp. 166–167). Few focus on the policy responses of the Thatcher government after the mine closures. This paper addresses this gap in literature by assessing the way in which the Thatcher government pursued the coal mine closures from the perspective of JT. It asks what caused the unjust transition in mining communities, and what lessons can be learned from their experience?

The concept of JT, according to the International Labour Organisation [ILO] refers to ‘greening the economy in a way that is fair and inclusive as possible to everyone concerned, creating decent work opportunities and leaving no one behind' (International Labour Organisation, 2021). The term was first developed in the United States in the 1980s, over justice for manufacturing workers (Young, 1998). At the time of the coal mine closures under the Thatcher government, the current notion of JT defined by the ILO did not factor in the decision-making process. However, despite the coal mine closures not being seen as a JT at the time, the energy transition process itself and the ensuing regional inequalities which resulted in the creation of ‘left-behind' regions provide an important insight into the consequences of an unjust transition.

This paper reassesses the Thatcher government’s policy towards the closure of the coal mines using the Multi-Level Perspectives [MLP] theory as its theoretical framework. It uses each level of the MLP theory (landscape, regime and regime response) to analyse how it resulted in an unjust transition. This paper incorporates the Critical Realist [CR] approach in its use of the MLP theory. In particular, the CR approach to structure and agency will be adopted in this paper. A more thorough discussion of the main theoretical concepts is provided in the methodology section. This paper offers two main contributions to the existing literature on JT. Using the MLP theory as the guiding framework, this paper provides a systematic analysis of how an unjust transition could occur using the UK’s coal mine closures as a case study. The second contribution this paper makes is theoretical, by using the CR approach in the MLP theory framework, which to the best of the author’s knowledge is a first.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section presents a literature review of JT and the discourse surrounding Thatcher and the coal mine closures. It argues that the literature on the latter is mainly split into two halves, with one half focused on structural arguments and the other on agency-based arguments. The two have hitherto developed in parallel with minimal crossover, a limitation in the existing literature which this paper overcomes by incorporating both the structural and agency-led arguments. This paper argues that the coal mine closure was rationalised under Thatcherism as a practical response to the declining economic viability of coal (structural), but the way in which coal mine closures were pursued was informed by neoliberal ideology (agency).

The second section of this paper explains what the MLP theory is, and how it has been adopted in this paper as a theoretical framework. The MLP theory was developed as a framework to make sense of technological change and the obstacles against such moves, and in more recent iterations, it is used to explain how a JT does or does not occur. This is followed by an introduction of the CR approach to the structure and agency debate. The third section is organised in accordance with each level of the MLP theory: landscape, political regime, and regime response.

This paper concludes by arguing that the reason for the unjust nature of the transition from the perspective of JT in the case of the coal mine closure under the Thatcher government can be traced to failures at every stage of the MLP framework. In the first stage, the ‘landscape' the situation of the coal mining industry in the UK was in a long-term state of decline. Despite see-sawing policies towards the industry, by the time the Thatcher government was established, the focus was on how to manage the decline. However, in the ‘political regime', the problem was the contrasting views towards the future of the coal mining industry between the key stakeholders, the Thatcher government and the National Union of Miners [NUM] under Arthur Scargill. In the ‘regime response', the problem was the neoliberal response immediately after the coal mine closures which failed to take into account the place-sensitive issues that former coal mining communities would face without additional government support. Finally, the paper argues that the consequence of the unjust transition created long-term socio-economic harm to former coal mining communities. Two key lessons emerge from the analysis as a result, namely the need for a stronger key stakeholder partnership and more place-based policies through greater decentralisation. The next section provides an overview of the concept of JT followed by a literature review of the current academic discussions on the explanations for the coal mine closures under the Thatcher government.

Just Transition, Thatcherism and neoliberalism

The concepts of neoliberalism and Thatcherism are intrinsically intertwined. Understanding the former teases out the shortcomings of the neoliberal economic strategy adopted by the Thatcher government in its response to the coal mine closures. However, this allows us to only comprehend a small segment of the issues regarding the ways in which the coal mines were closed, namely its focus on employment issues. JT provides a way towards greater justice for the former coal mining communities.

Just Transition

The original concept of the JT comes from labour movements in the United States back in the 1980s–1990s. Back then the idea of justice revolved around only labour justice. This was developed in the backdrop of fears over the inevitability of job losses as part of a transition into a world in which the new norm was one of ‘a global economy and environmental sustainability' (Young, 1998, p. 43). Since then, the JT literature has evolved and expanded, covering new forms of justice such as social, economic, legal and environmental justice (Heffron & McCauley, 2018). In addition, there was focus on the who, namely whose justice needs to be protected as well as what kind of justice needs protecting. Some discuss this in terms of the most vulnerable from the impact of climate change. Those who lack resources to move out from places that are endangered due to climate change such as those in developing countries or those living in small island nations were considered as some of the most exposed to the damages of climate change (Arıkan & Günay, 2021). This is despite their relatively small carbon footfall (Vousdoukas et al., 2023). The concept of JT also forces us to think more about the possible trade-offs between the pursuit of sustainability and inclusivity, making the failure of JT result in failure of either or both (Ciplet & Harrison, 2020, p. 441).

There is also the discussion of who is responsible for delivering such justice. Some view this to lie with those with the greatest means such as governments and business leaders (Crowe & Li, 2020). Others view it as a collective responsibility and argue for both a top-down and bottom-up approach (Snell, 2018). In general, there seems to be an agreement that a JT requires the involvement of a wide range of key stakeholders (Hess et al., 2021). JT differs from simple transitions in that it has clear goals, which makes JT purposeful rather than inevitable (Geels, 2011; Smith et al., 2005). In short, the JT process requires multiple stakeholders to actively take part in striving for purposeful change which balances a better future for individuals, communities, and the environment.

One of the key obstacles identified in the JT literature has been that of the incumbents, those who are embedded into the current economic system of extraction (Geels, 2014). They can frustrate attempts towards a successful transition away from their industry to a greener one by lobbying those in decision-making positions to preserve their interests (Geels, 2014). The role played by incumbents is complex with differences existing in terms of the amount resources they have and their response to change (Turnheim & Sovacool, 2020). They exist within intricate networks that overlap (Stirling, 2019), and they themselves could be victims in the JT process (namely communities and labourers in the fossil fuel industry) (Sovacool, 2021). The coal mining industry is a key example of such an incumbent which is also a victim. Returning to the tumultuous period of the coal mine closures and ensuing miners’ strike in the UK in the 1980s provides an important addition to the JT literature’s focus on the incumbents. The following section explores the current literature on Thatcher and the coal mine closures.

Structure versus agency: explanations for coal mine closures under the Thatcher government

The current understanding of the tumultuous years of the decline of the UK coal mining sector under the Thatcher government in the 1980s is vibrant yet contentious (Ashworth & Pegg, 1986; Evans, 1999; Hall & Jacques, 1983; Perchard, 2013). Broadly speaking, the literature can be divided into two, following the divide between structural arguments and agency-based arguments. The structural arguments are mostly in the field of economic history (Ashworth & Pegg, 1986; Ray, 1989; Rutledge & Wright, 1985). Here, the focus is on how British coal had been facing permanent decline in the global market as well as the domestic market (Ashworth & Pegg, 1986). From this perspective, the decline of the British coal mines was an inevitable result of market forces making coal obsolete, and the Thatcher government’s response was, if not necessarily justifiable, at least understandable. The arguments presented in general do not provide a qualifiable judgment of whether the process of the restructuring was right. Instead, it provides an overview of unfavourable market conditions faced by the coal mining industry.

The agency-based argument, on the other hand, is focused on Thatcherism and how it influenced the way in which the coal mines were closed (Hall & Jacques, 1983; Kelliher, 2021; Perchard, 2013). Such arguments are mostly presented in the field of political studies, and much of the focus is on the ideological underpinning of the policy choices (Hall & Jacques, 1983). In general, the argument is that the Thatcher government’s decision of closing the coal mines were fuelled by the desire to reduce the influence of trade union power, and a deliberate move away from the post-war consensus which pursued full employment (Evans, 1999; Hall & Jacques, 1983; Kelliher, 2021). Under the Thatcher government, the focus was on the withdrawal of government influence on economic activity through market liberalisation and an emphasis on individualism and trickle-down economics (Rising et al., 2021, p. 15). These characteristics are combined and understood to be the main ideas of Thatcherism (Gamble, 1994, p. 4).

Both strands of literature offer a compelling explanation as to why coal mine closure was pursued. Structuralists would argue that it was an inevitable result of decline in demand for British coal through greater import of cheap coal, rise in gas and oil as alternative sources of fossil fuel energy (Ashworth & Pegg, 1986; Rutledge & Wright, 1985). Technological advancement in the sector has been credited to some larger coal mines increasing their profitability while reducing their workforces (Rutledge & Wright, 1985). However, such structuralist arguments have the danger of accepting the way in which coal mine closures were pursued as an inevitability, that this was the only option available. International comparisons have shown that the UK was not alone in facing greater competition from cheaper imported coal, decline in the demand for coal, and a rise in the cost of domestic coal (Brauers et al., 2020; Nishinarita, 1994; Waddington & Parry, 2003). However, countries such as Spain and Germany had opted for a slower transition using subsidies to pay for the losses made, infrastructure investment, training and support for miners in acquiring new skills and helping to relocate miners into more economically viable coal mines (del Río, 2017, p. 11; Waddington & Parry, 2003, p. A52). In both cases, the subsidies were identified as problematic, yet ultimately the policy was pursued due to successful pressuring from regional governments and trade unions (Waddington & Parry, 2003, p. A52). This makes the case of the UK stands out for its seeming lack of targeted support for former mines through social and labour market policies.

On the other hand, an agency-led argument provides a more convincing explanation when it comes to this puzzle. This strand of literature argues that the best explanation for the decision of coal mine closures can be found in Thatcherism (Evans, 2019; Hall, 1998). Thatcherism is at once instantly identifiable, an embodiment of a mix of personality, ideology, and politics. For Hall (1998, p. 9), Thatcherism was a ‘radical change’ that steered the country away from collectivism, a political ‘project' with a grounding ‘philosophy' in the form of neoliberalism exemplified with its cohesive arguments. Evans (2019, p. 5) provides a different interpretation, defining it as ‘a series of interconnected political attitudes, rather than a coherent body of thought'. The reason for such challenge in defining Thatcherism despite its ubiquity may owe to the fact that the concept broadly developed among critics of the Thatcher government rather than as an intentional or strategic policy of the government (Jessop, 2015, p. 17). Arguably, one of the issues of the agency-led argument is that it can overestimate the cohesiveness and rationality of Thatcherism and underplay the structural constraints and inconsistencies that typify other governments (Vinen, 2019).

Above all, the different interpretations of Thatcherism may stem from the fact that it champions seemingly contradictory causes (Kerr, no date). Using the definition provided by Gamble (1994, p. 4) on Thatcherism, it is about bringing back authority to the central government and the pursuit of neoliberalism, but it is forever tempered by a desire for electoral success. The desire for a strong state, the idea that the central government can command control and respect, stands in conflict with the idea of a free and market-led growth which calls for reduced role of the government. Both the call for a strong state and neoliberalism are examples of a clear and strong ideology. However, such ideological leanings are also tempered by the desire for electoral success which calls for pragmatism over ideologically led action. Such inconsistencies may have been one of the reasons why Thatcherism as a concept has been discussed extensively over whether or not to call it an ideology, a political project (Gamble, 1994), or a reflection of personality (Evans, 2019). The agency-focused literature thus views the demise of the coal mining communities as deliberate result of, or at least an accepted side effect of, Thatcherism which has been interpreted to be the comprehensive defeat of socialism (Evans, 1999; Hall & Jacques, 1983). For the purposes of this paper, this paper treats Thatcherism is treated as an ideology that underpins the policy choices of the Thatcher government, thus accepting on the one hand the influence of ideology such as neoliberalism in the design of the policy, but also tempered with a dose of realism from the structural context in which the policy finds itself.

While the two literatures have hitherto developed in parallel to each other, each provides a compelling analysis as to why the decision to undertake mine closure was pursued, as well as key limitations. This paper argues that the MLP theory allows for the analysis of both structural and agency-focused analysis which is presented in the next section.

Methodology

This paper uses the framework established by the MLP theory and uses it to analyse the role of politics in the JT process. It will also use the approach taken by CR in terms of the MLP theory’s position on structure and agency in divergence from prior research. In adopting the MLP theory, this paper expands on the political component of the theory by providing empirical evidence. The data collected for this paper consists of a mixture of archival data, mainly the declassified documents available from the Margaret Thatcher Foundation and the Office for National Statistics. Parliamentary acts, statutory instruments, and Hansard records also form the main primary sources collected for this analysis. Academic papers from a breadth of different disciplines such as politics, economic history, energy, and labour studies were collected as secondary sources in order to ensure that the paper did not rely on a single discipline and covered a broad range of perspectives. The diversity of different disciplinary sources allowed the paper to overcome one of the limitations of prior research which was its siloed nature. This section introduces the MLP theory’s concept of three layers (landscape, regime, regime response), which provides the main framework of this paper. At each layer, this paper analyses what structural and agency constraints led to an unjust transition in the process of the coal mine closures in the UK. In terms of the structure and agency approach, this paper adopts the CR’s position that agents react to the structural constraints, which allows this paper to pinpoint where the policy responses failed while also acknowledging the wider political as well as economic constraints that existed.

Multi-level perspective theory

MLP theory was first proposed by Geels (2002) who combined the literature on technology studies and evolutionary economics to explain how and when technological transitions occur. The two key ideas that this theory focuses on are first to explain how technological change occurs, and second how its adoption is thwarted by entrenched interests. This is intrinsically linked to the concept of JT as it provides a framework in which to understand what would enable or hinder such a transition. In terms of the framework, Geels (2002, pp. 1259–1260) identifies three hierarchical layers. The first layer is the ‘landscape' which is the wider socio-economic context which presents structural constraints as well as opportunities, the next is the ‘patchwork of regimes' which accounts for the role of businesses and political actors in enabling or obstructing the development of the new technology, and lastly the ‘niche' where the most radical innovations occur. The literature of MLP theory has expanded in recent years, with some focusing on the expansion of the business perspective (Wainstein & Bumpus, 2016), the financial perspective (Geddes & Schmidt, 2020), and the application to different policy areas such as agricultural policy (Kamel & El Bilali, 2022).

In subsequent work, Geels (2014, p. 28) further expanded the MLP theory by focusing on the role played by incumbents or ‘regime actors' who stands to lose out from a transition. In this study (2014), the focus was on fossil fuel industries (including coal) as incumbents and how their ties with the government led to the delays in the adoption of renewable energy. They can also conspire with political powers to maintain the status quo (Unruh, 2000, p. 823). Others are more optimistic of the role of politics, viewing them to ‘[provide] a mechanism for brokering deals, buying-off opposition, compensating lowers, and compelling compliance' (Meadowcroft, 2009, p. 337). Thus, the MLP theory views politics as central in the JT process, and for the purpose of this paper, it provides a compelling reason to focus on the Thatcher government’s policies. Following on from the works by Unruh (2000), Meadowcroft (2009), and Geels (2014), this paper uses the MLP theory as a framework to analyse the Thatcher government’s response to the coal mine closures to understand how at each level the government’s actions coupled with the structural constraints ultimately resulted in an unjust transition.

While the MLP theory provides an essential framework to this paper, there are some limitations to its use. The MLP theory discusses the role of the ‘’green’ niche-innovations' which present a destabilising factor to the more established ‘fossil-based regimes' (Geels, 2014, p. 25). In the case of the 1980s UK, it is harder to spot what could be characterised as fitting such a niche. On the one hand, the harmful impact of coal was already taking hold within academia at the time. For instance, opening new coal mines was opposed on the basis of ‘serious environmental challenges' for communities (North & Spooner, 1978, p. 255). It was also under the Thatcher government that policymakers started to take interest in environmental issues which also coincided with the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988 (Agrawala, 1998). In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Thatcher herself declared nuclear energy to be the ‘most environmentally safe form of energy' (Thatcher, 1989). However, a combination of persistent technological challenges, high costs and delays in construction (O’Brien, 2017, p. 19) made it difficult for the government to commit to fully relying on nuclear power. Thus, nuclear power failed to destabilise coal power. Thus, instead of focusing on the niche, this paper uses the other layers of the MLP theory to analyse the policy response under the Thatcher government. This paper seeks to primarily examine why the transition away from coal resulted in an unjust transition using the MLP theory as a framework to analyse how at each level of the MLP theory, opportunities for JT was missed. The CR approach is adopted in addition to provide an epistemological consistency.

Structure and agency, the critical realist approach

One of the criticisms that Geels has responded to in the past has been the theory’s position on structure and agency (Geels & Schot, 2007). At first Geels and Schot (2007) argued that the MLP theory adopts a ‘multi-dimensional agency' approach citing the work of Giddens (1984). Geels and Schot (2007, p. 403) argue that the agency embodies the structural rationale thereby making the distinction between structure and agency void. Geels (2011) seems to have slightly moved on from the argument presented in Geels and Schot (2007) by covering a greater breadth of different ontological standpoints. He states that MLP is a ‘flexible' theoretical framework, and while he views the theory’s ontological position to be a cross between ‘power theories and structurations', he argues that the flexibility of the theory allows it to be open to other ontological positions to be adopted (Geels, 2011, p. 508).

This paper adopts a different ontological position to that presented by Geels (2011) by adopting the CR approach. The CR approach allows for the flexibility that was advocated by Geels (2011) while overcoming the critique that the theory is overtly structuralist (Smith et al., 2005, p. 1492). The CR approach presents a clear process to the structure and agency debate while incorporating both their roles into its analysis. CR views the structural context to exist prior to the agency (Archer, 1995; Newman, 2019). The agency in turn is understood to be at once constrained by the structure, but also capable of making their own choices which allows for both change and continuity of the structure. This cycle, known as the morphogenetic cycle, coined by Archer (1995) provides an alternative theoretical underpinning to the MLP theory. Using the MLP theory through the lens of the CR perspective, the landscape (structure) is both a constraint and enabler of the regime (agency), but it is left to the agents to make the decision to either preserve or change the existing structure (Unruh, 2000). In short, the adoption of the CR position as the ontology of MLP theory enables the paper to maintain its consistency while attempting to bridge the aforementioned gap between the structural and agency argument that characterise the current literature. The following sections are presented in accordance with the MLP theory by beginning with the description of the landscape (the situation surrounding the coal mining industry), this is followed by an analysis of the regime (disagreements between the NUM and the Thatcher government), and the regime response (the policy responses under the Thatcher government).

The Thatcher neoliberal economic strategy and the coal mine closure programme

Landscape of the coal mining industry

Following the MLP theory, the first focus is on the landscape, which refers to the broad context of the British coal industry prior to the coal mine closures under the Thatcher government. The industry was facing terminal decline, a reality that changed little between successive UK governments. Available national data on historical coal production and employment show that the employment figures had been in decline since 1920 when it recorded the largest number of miners at 1.2 million, and coal production has been in terminal decline with 1913 being the highest point of production at 292 million tonnes of coal (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2021). The combination of decline of domestic demand due to the importation of cheaper coal from other coal-producing countries such as Australia as well as the emergence of alternative cheaper energy sources such as oil and gas was critical in reducing the demand for British coal as a source of energy (Ritchie et al., 2020). In particular, the commercialisation of North Sea oil and gas accelerated in the 1970s with the discovery and development of the fields by British Petroleum and Shell (Larminie et al., 1987), presented a key alternative to coal. Furthermore, the National Coal Board [NCB] which operated the nationalised mines was a major loss maker. In 1981/82, it recorded a £428 m deficit which the government subsidised (Berry et al., 1985, p. 5). There only seemed to be one direction the industry could go, and that was down.

The fortunes of the coal mining industry, while in general heading southwards were far from a linear trajectory, resulting in much see-sawing. In the immediate post-war period, there was still a sense that the industry, despite the decline in terms of employment and production figures, was in a better state than where it found itself in the past. The nationalisation of the coal mining industry in 1947 by the Labour government has been widely understood as not only to having been born out of a desire to improve productivity, but also it critically brought tangible improvements to the working conditions for the miners (Haynes, 1953). Thus, nationalisation was generally welcomed among the coal miners and industrial relations remained relatively stable during this time compared to the time prior to nationalisation (Tomlinson, 2008, p. 235). However, despite the improving working conditions, between 1957 and 1967, the number of coal mines continued to decrease rapidly, with the number of mines reduced to 406 from 822 (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2021). This mirrored the employment figures which slumped from 710,000 in 1957 to 390,000 in 1967 (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2021).

Coal mine closures were common practice under the Wilson governments which oversaw 263 mine closures in the 1960s and 1970s, more than the 154 mines that was closed under the Thatcher government (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2021). The decline of the industry amplified the sense of existential threat among the coal miners as the optimism after nationalisation evaporated, leading to a rise in militancy among the trade unions. This also coincided with change to the leadership in the trade unions, such as the election of Michael McGahey as president of the Scottish branch of the NUM (NUMSA) in 1967 who took on a more militant approach (Phillips, 2013, pp. 107–108). In 1968, a nuclear power plant was established instead of a coal-powered one in a heavily coal mining area in Durham which further signalled a shift away from coal (North & Spooner, 1978, p. 258) just as the militancy was on the rise. The optimism in the immediate post-war period after nationalisation and improved working conditions thus made way for increased tensions as the industry continued to see decline.

However, this did not mean that coal mining was seen as an industry of the past. There was still a belief that coal would be an essential source of energy with the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 which created a sudden increase in oil costs, which in turn staved off further pushes towards shrinking the industry (Turnheim & Geels, 2012). In light of the 1973 oil shock, the 1974 Plan for Coal included more optimism towards the future of the coal industry, resulting in the investment and preservation of older mines, building new ones, and expanding the output of existing mines to the tune of 42 m additional tonnes of coal (North & Spooner, 1977, p. 16; Spooner, 1985, p. 217). The expansion of the Selby coalfield formed part of such plans (Manners, 1976, p. 222) and indicated a shift in policy which put pause to the decline of coal. However, this was subsequently reversed when it became clear that the demand for coal did not substantively increase due to the unfavourable exchange rate conditions which helped to keep foreign coal prices low such as those from Australia (Ray, 1989). By 1982, most of the capital investment (82 per cent) in the coal mining industry went to the Yorkshire and the Humber region which housed more than half of all coal mines at the time as the smaller coal mines closed (Spooner, 1985, p. 217). Thus, taking a CR approach by focusing on the structural conditions to analyse the agency response, the landscape of British coal mining industry showed a state of steady decline even before the Thatcher government took power. However, it also showed that the energy policy response at the time was see-sawing as it went through phases of optimism and pessimism as to the future of the coal industry. Fundamentally, at this point the main thinking was to focus resources on places that looked to have a future in coal such as the Yorkshire and the Humber region. In terms of what this meant for JT, there was no strong view that a transition had to take place as it was not expected that the entire industry will fold. It also shows that the Thatcher government had inherited a landscape in which the industry was already in a state of decline, making the question not one of whether to close the mines, but how to manage the closures.

Regime: contrasting views

Turning once again to the MLP theory, government and the established business sector are often assumed to be the ones that push back against the introduction of new technology in the niche that presents a threat of overthrowing the established status quo (Geels, 2014; Turnheim & Geels, 2012). Under the MLP theory, such established interests of the government and the business sector are treated as the ‘regime'. However, in the case of the Thatcher government the clash occurred within regimes rather than between the regime and niche. The Thatcher government’s policy was to focus on reforming the supply side economics, increasing productivity, reducing inflation, pursing economic growth through laissez-fare economics which characterised the neoliberal approach (Coutts et al., 1981). The trade unions such as the NUM took a sharper turn to the left in 1981 with the election of Arthur Scargill who won a comfortable majority of 70 per cent (Edgar, 2014). Scargill argued for all mines, including those considered ‘uneconomic' to remain open. Thatcher argued that the dispute was and should be between the NCB and the NUM, stating that

[a]fter the offer to the miners it must be abundantly clear that this is not a plain, straightforward industrial dispute. I do not think there is a role for the Government other than the one it is now actively playing. (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1984)

While the government thus viewed it as an industrial dispute, Scargill framed the conflict as a wider political struggle (Edgar, 2014). Such contrasting views towards the future of the coal mining industry inevitably led to a clash between the two (Turner, 1995).

For both sides, winning this argument was critical. As the previous section on the landscape argued, the situation surrounding the coal mining industry was one of permanent decline, with a pressing sense of threat of further coal mine closures in the future. Such fears were proven correct with the government having discussed a further 75 coal mines to be closed in the next three years, substantively more than the 20 which had already been announced by the NCB at the time (Higham, 2014). The government also faced political pressure, having promised in the 1979 Conservative Party manifesto that it would tackle the high numbers of strikes (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1979). With the memory of the previous Conservative government having been brought down by the miners’ strike still fresh, and having already been forced to U-turned due to pressure from the NUM in 1981 (BBC News, 1981), it was essential for the government to win this fight. Public opinion was also strongly in favour of a resolution being reached, with 40 per cent of the public placing industrial disputes as their primary concern, and nearly half viewing trade union power to have overextended (Ipsos MORI, 2011). Such views were likely fuelled by the combination of concern over the number of strikers having reached 2.1 million in 1982 (Office for National Statistics, 2015), but also the predominantly negative coverage of the miners’ strike in the media which disproportionately focused on the violence that ensued (Wade, 1985). In short, both sides held vastly opposing views towards the future of the industry, their views shaped by a combination of personal conviction and the people they hoped to represent. This also meant that from the standpoint of JT, there was once again no real interest towards making plans for JT as coal was still viewed by both sides as part of the future of the UK energy mix.

Despite such forceful rhetoric that characterised the period of conflict, discussions were ongoing as to the future of the coal mining industry and the coal mining communities. As the negotiations between the NUM, NCB, and the government faced challenges and breakdowns, the government sought dialogue with others such as the Trade Union Congress [TUC] and the Democratic Union of Mineworkers [DUM]. The continued dialogue with the government as discussions continued to stagnate between the NUM and the government (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1985). Thus, while the Thatcher government introduced legislation which tried to curb the influence of the trade unions, and in particular the NUM such as the ban on fly picketing, allowing workers to have a choice on the trade union they joined, such measures also helped give a democratic mandate to the actions of the trade unions as the measures also required votes to be cast in preparation of strikes (Employment Act, 1980).

However, the Thatcher government remained cautious. It insisted that any discussions held with the DUM to be kept a secret for fear that this would signal that the government was more willing to negotiate with the DUM over the NUM (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1985). The TUC acted as a bridge between the NUM and the government by holding individual discussions with both sides as well as submitting proposals for job creation support in coal mining communities through the Manpower Service Commission (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1985). However, such discussions were overshadowed by the ongoing dispute between the NUM and the government. In other words, the inability of the two sides to come to an agreement created the obstacle posed by an incumbent, which is identified by the MLP theory as acting as a spoiler towards a JT. In short, while there was no intention from the Thatcher government to pursue JT, the fact that the key stakeholders in the process of closing the coal mines – namely the government and the trade unions having failed to form a partnership and work collaboratively, meant that an opportunity to develop greater tailored support for coal mining communities was lost.

Regime response: the neoliberal policy response

In March 1984, the miners’ strike began its year-long industrial action with 20,000 workers walking out. There have been several explanations given as to why this strike failed to achieve its objectives. In explaining the success of the Thatcher government, the Ridley Report has often been cited as evidence for a planned attack on coal mines. First leaked in The Economist in 1978, it was described as a ‘blue-print' for the Thatcher government strategy towards the coal mining industry (Saville, 1985, p. 296). Works such as Dorey (2013) offers extensive examples of policies under the Thatcher government that are linked with recommendations set out in the Ridley Report. These include a push towards privatising smaller industries, selecting managers that were more sympathetic to government positions, cutting back on welfare support for strikers, use of police, and paying high wages to miners to stave off strikes (Dorey, 2013). It is certainly the case that the policies have echoes of what was suggested in the initial report. However, such interpretations hold the danger of conflating the Thatcher government’s policy response as being purposeful, rather than it being a response to events that relied on tried and tested methods. It also poses the danger of strengthening the image that the Thatcher government was somehow so powerful as to be able to achieve every policy goal by following a secret winning formula in the form of the Ridley Report. In other words, it poses the danger of an excessive focus on the agency over structural constraints.

The Thatcher government was not always successful in dealing with the striking miners. In 1981, the government was unable to close down 23 coal mines after facing opposition from the NUM then headed by Joe Gormley, an example of a successful industrial action (BBC News, 1981). The stockpiling of coal, which is generally regarded as having been successful against the 1984–1985 miners’ strike, is in line with one of the recommendations from the Ridley Report. However, it was not a particularly groundbreaking strategy for the government, with some of the recommendations clearly inspired by the strategies adopted in the 1926 general strike. Back in 1926, the government had also made extensive preparations prior to the strike, stockpiling on food and coal, preparing the use of troops and volunteers to help transport goods, and rationing the use of coal once the strikes started (British Library, 2019, p. 386; Mason, 1969, p. 10; Robertson, 1926). Middle-class citizens were tasked to operate trains and buses during the 1926 general strike (Working Class Movement Library, no date). The volunteers who played a critical role in allowing for the day-to-day services to continue back in 1926 were by 1980s considered impractical to assume possible (Clement, 2015). The Ridley Report laments that ‘the idea must be rejected of a strikebreaking corps of trained volunteers standing by to run the mines, the trains, or the power stations' (Economic Reconstruction Group, 1977, p. 10), and instead argued that the government should ‘arrange for certain haulage companies to recruit in advance a core of non-union lorry drivers to help us move coal where necessary' (Economic Reconstruction Group, 1977, p. 25). Thus, such parallels and references to the 1926 general strike indicate that the Thatcher government’s preparedness for industrial action was in line with previous practices and not necessarily an indication of strategic positioning against the trade unions.

There were also strategic mistakes made which weakened the overall bargaining power of the NUM during the 1984/85 miners’ strike. Starting the strike in spring rather than winter when energy demand is at its highest, as well as the availability of oil, have been pointed out as examples of organisational failures on the part of the NUM (Lane, 1996). Division within the industry with some coal mines such as those in Nottinghamshire which continued working during the strike also suggested that the NUM had failed to win over workers to their cause (Rees, 1985, p. 400). Such divisions may also owe to the fact that a ballot was not called for the strike, which was one of the reasons why the Labour Party under Niel Kinnock did not support the strike (Sparrow, 2009). In terms of broader structural constraints, the deindustrialisation push had severely weakened the manufacturing sector, and in 1984/1985, other unions such as the steel industry not joining the NUM in striking also presented a blow to the effectiveness of the strike (Pattinson, 2015). This is not to say that the movement had no public support. Some women’s groups organised and took the debate internationally to drum up support (Rowbotham & McCrindle, 1986), and some support groups were organised outside of coal mining communities (Kelliher, 2014).

However, there were also tactical constraints placed over the striking miners due in part to the Thatcher government policies. For instance, the 1980 Employment Act (Employment Act, 1980) had introduced a ban on fly picketing, the practice of closed shops, and granted employees the ability to choose their union. These changes meant that it was harder to organise and deploy miners on strike. During the strike, the government introduced the Social Security (No.2) Act 1980 Specified Sum Order 1984 (The Social Security (No. 2) Act, 1980 Specified Sum Order 1984, 1984) which increased the amount of benefits that the NUM were to pay for the striking miners’ families. However, this left the striking miners and their dependents unable to access state support which was a critical source of financial support that the miners relied on and were encouraged to take up by the NUM in the strike of 1972 (Booth & Smith, 1985, p. 365, 369–370). This enabled the government to argue that the destitution of striking miners was the responsibility of the NUM, not the state.

To further incentivise the striking miners to return to work, the government introduced the Mineworkers Payment Scheme in 1984 (The Redundant Mineworkers and Concessionary Coal (Payment Schemes) Order, 1984). This followed the 1968 Redundant Mineworkers Payment Scheme as well as the Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme introduced in 1977 which gave miners 60 years of age and above ‘a lump sum followed by weekly payments until they qualified for pension at 65' (Ashworth & Pegg, 1986, p. 412). The Redundant Mineworkers Payment Scheme of 1984 did not deviate much from this, consisting of an expansion of the eligibility criteria to include those between the ages of 55 and 65 (The Redundant Mineworkers and Concessionary Coal (Payment Schemes) Order, 1984). Thatcher repeatedly stated that ‘no government of any party political complexion of this country has EVER offered the miners a better deal than they are getting and no government has ever offered them as good a deal as this one is getting' (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1984) in reference to the lump sum of money on offer. Indeed, the lump sum of payment was arguably generous set at £1000 per year of service (equivalent of £3015.49 in 2023 accounting for inflation (Bank of England, 2023)) for younger miners aged between 21 and 50 (The Redundant Mineworkers and Concessionary Coal (Payment Schemes) Order, 1984, p. 1408). Outwardly, this looked to be a generous scheme and an attempt to provide sufficient compensation for coal miners who lost their jobs. However, there were of course caveats to the generous redundancy payment which was restricted to mineworkers who had ‘not less than 10 years’ employment' (The Redundant Mineworkers and Concessionary Coal (Payment Schemes) Order, 1984, p. 1400). This meant that the lump sum of pay was open to older workers, with little being done for younger miners.

Such policies may present an image of the Thatcher government meticulously introducing legislation strategically to defeat the NUM and the mining community. In reality, the harsh measures were hoped to dampen prospects of future strike actions and the government remained uncertain over the long-term repercussions. There were calls to differentiate treatment between the striking miners and working miners so that those on strike would not have been perceived to have been benefiting (Alison, 1985; Thatcher, 2010; Walker, 1985; Wybrew, 1985). One example of this was discussions over moving coal miners who were willing to work in the larger and newer coal mines such as the Selby coal mine. This was envisioned to help separate the striking miners and the working miners to reduce the likelihood of clashes between the two, but also as a way to reward miners who were willing to work. This approach showcases that the Thatcher government was far from certain that their policies would spell victory for them in their continued clashes with the NUM. Once again, from the perspective of JT, the focus was not necessarily on supporting miners and their communities to make the necessary transition into new employment.

This section explored the neoliberal economic strategy of the Thatcher government in closing the coal mines, using the MLP theory as a guiding framework. It finds that in terms of the ‘landscape', the coal mining industry had been on a state of permanent decline. However, a managed and JT process were not sought as a result of contrasting views in terms of the future of the coal mining industry between the Thatcher government and the NUM. However, the neoliberal economic policy response of the Thatcher government exemplified short-term responses in dealing with the crisis at hand, contributing to the unjust transition. The following section explores the social and environmental impacts of the policy choices.

The economic, social and environmental impacts of closure – a case of unjust transition?

The economic, social, and environmental impacts of the coal mine closure left coal mining communities divided and impoverished. The long industrial dispute had pitted the working miners and the striking miners against each other. The state cutting resources towards striking miners had left many with financial difficulties, with some using most of the redundancy pay towards paying off debt incurred during the miners’ strike (Rees & Thomas, 1991). Under the Thatcher government, the coal mining industry had shrunk by around 80 per cent with employment contracting from 242,000 workers to just 49,000 workers by the end of her premiership (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2021). Overall unemployment was more than 11 per cent (Office for National Statistics, 2023) and the higher rate of unemployment was concentrated in former industrialised areas (Salt, 1985). The Institute of Fiscal Studies conducted research into the economic impact of the coal mine closures and found that even those who were able to find jobs saw an income deduction of 40 per cent in the first year and 20 per cent deduction over the next fifteen years (Rud et al., 2021, p. 11). Following on from the position that the responsibilities towards striking miners were to be left to the NUM, the Thatcher government took the position that the bulk of the job creation efforts were to be left to the enterprise branch of the NCB, the British Coal Enterprise (ThamesTv, 1985). The NCB offered retraining and support for new and established businesses (Hansard, 1984a). The Manpower Services Commission, which operated the Youth Training Scheme [YTS], was also tasked to provide retraining opportunities (Hansard, 1984b; Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1985, p. 24).

Perhaps one of the ironies of the deindustrialisation push under the Thatcher government was that in contrast to the neoliberal ideology, state funding was increased to deal with the increasing problem of rising unemployment in former coal mining communities. The NCB budget went from £10 m in 1984 to £40 m to handle job creation (Hudson & Sadler, 1987, p. 108). In the local context, despite the Thatcher government’s push to reduce their budget (Cornock, 2014), the Regional Development Grants and Regional Selective Assistance continued to be sources of grants and loans towards deindustrialised areas (Hudson & Sadler, 1992, p. 318). The Redundant Mineworkers Scheme had cost the government more than £2bn (Glyn, 1988; Woodward & Silverwood, 2023, p. 357). In other words, despite the rhetoric of the reduced involvement of the government, in reality the government was forced to increase expenditure in order to deal with the economic problems arising from deindustrialisation.

Despite this, coal mining communities have never quite recovered from the closures. The aforementioned retraining programmes had in some respects succeeded in bringing women into employment, but the linkage between skills taught and business needs remained tenuous (Begg et al., 1991; Dolton et al., 1994; Upward, 2002). Even as unemployment rates steadily declined, the new jobs that entered former mining communities tended to be characterised by low pay (Strangleman, 2001), a loss of pride and sense of community (Turner, 2000), and at present are still in danger of loss due to automation. Thus, the unjust transition under the Thatcher government has left former coalmining communities vulnerable to future transitions.

Justice has been slow to reach these communities. It was only recently that the Miners’ Strike (Pardons) (Scotland) Act 2022 came into effect on 26 July 2022 in recognition of the injustices suffered by the striking miners in Scotland, who were disproportionately more likely to have faced incarceration compared to their counterparts in England (BBC News, 2020; Miners’ Strike (Pardons) (Scotland) Act, 2022, 2022; Phillips, 2023, p. 293). This offers some belated legal justice to the injustices cased during the 1984/1985 miners’ strike, and in particular those affected in Scotland. There are similar discussions which are currently ongoing over whether striking miners who were arrested during the Battle of Orgreave could be given similar restitution (Hansard HC Deb, 2023). However, it also highlights the challenging road towards reconciliation when justice has been sought for so long. Thus, from multiple perspectives, the case of the UK is an example of a failed JT.

Concluding reflections: what a JT strategy could look like for the mining communities

This paper explored what went wrong in the process of the coal mine closures under the Thatcher government, and how from the perspective of JT, it resulted in an unjust transition. To be clear, this paper does not argue that the Thatcher government pursued a JT when making policy decisions. While the pursuit of environmental or social justice – ideas that are central to JT, did not feature in the Thatcher government’s response, a reassessment of the policy choices from the perspective of JT allowed for lessons to be drawn out. The application of the MLP theory enabled a reanalysis of the Thatcher government policy choices which transcends the structure or agency-led arguments that dominate the current literature (Ashworth & Pegg, 1986; Evans, 1999). The main findings from a re-evaluation of the decisions made under the Thatcher government using the MLP theoretical framework reveals that at every level, opportunities for a JT were lost partially due to the wider structural issues, but also due to deliberate policy choices stemming from Thatcherism. In the ‘landscape' level, the coal mining industry was facing decline well before the Thatcher took office, but coal was still seen as an important part of the UK’s energy mix. In the ‘political regime' level, one problem was the inability of the key stakeholders to reach an agreement as to the future of the coal mining industry. Both Thatcher and Scargill had personal conviction as well as people they believed they represented. However, mistakes were also made such as Thatcher’s pursuit of neoliberal policies which neglected critical aspects of JT such as long-term sustained support for retraining and a path towards alternative employment. Scargill’s insistence that ‘uneconomic' mines should remain open and the failure to call for a ballot before holding the strikes had weakened his position. The acrimony also meant that the government and the NUM could not work together to develop a medium- to long-term transition plan for the miners and their communities. Moreover, the violent crackdown on striking miners through the use of police brutality and the withdrawal of access to unemployment benefits divided and impoverished the coal mining communities forever severing the opportunity of a JT.

In terms of the ‘regime response', this paper finds that the miners’ strike was thwarted not by long-term planning by the government, but a result of a combination of a failed strategy on the side of the NUM, and the changes to legislation which in practice made a long-term strike impossible. Ultimately, the consequence of the ‘regime response' was one of long-term negative impact on coal mining communities. In contrast to the aims of Thatcherism of reducing the role of the state, the deindustrialisation policies also resulted in the need for substantive state intervention in an attempt to reduce unemployment rates. However, since the Thatcher government had not pursued a JT process which would have included long-term planning to soften the impact of coal mine closures, the result was to push former coal mining communities into long-term socio-economic deprivation (Beatty et al., 2007, 2019; Rising et al., 2021).

Reflecting these findings, this paper presents some lessons that could be drawn from the unjust nature of the transition in the UK coal mines. Here, this paper unpacks how future attempts at JT could avoid some of the mistakes that were made in the UK. While this is not an exhaustive list of recommendations and adds to an already existing list from the World Bank (2018), greater attention to each point would enable a JT. The key lessons consist of the need to have stronger key stakeholder partnership and a greater place-based response through decentralisation.

Stronger key stakeholder partnership

The disagreement over whether or not to close ‘uneconomic' mines created a serious bottleneck to discussions between the key stakeholders during the Thatcher government. The fact that the key stakeholders were unable to agree on a shared vision for the future of the industry and concentrate efforts in ensuring JT. The World Bank (2018, p. 11) recommendations echo this point in that it argues that mitigation against adverse impact of mine closures ‘is best achieved when multiple agencies participate in policy development', and requires ‘[g]enuine stakeholder consultation'. The process of decommissioning of coal mines takes at least several years to complete and requires ‘multi-disciplinary expertise' for a full evaluation, meaning that ‘multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary consultations become an essential part of a mine closure framework' (Srikanth & Nathan, 2018, p. 35). Extended disagreement cuts into the time it takes to formulate a long-term plan for communities undergoing rapid change. The World Bank (2018, p. 11) has thus emphasised that consultation between key stakeholders is needed at every stage of the transition process, which will in turn allow for preparations to be made ‘[p]re-layoff'. This could be in the form of targeted financial support such as housing benefits, stipends towards living costs, training, and move out costs which could be offered by the government. Trade unions also could play a central role as job councillors in helping former mines into new professions. Such measures would have helped avoid the rapid and volatile restructuring of the coalmining industry as was the case under the Thatcher government.

Place-based support through greater decentralisation

The understanding that places would have endogenous factors was developed post-1990s (Krugman, 1991), and contrasted to Thatcher’s neoliberalism which took on a place-blind view in believing that entrepreneurism would be the solution to economic woes regardless of location. The isolated nature of former coal mining communities owes much to its geographical location and the way in which such communities historically developed in a self-contained fashion (Hopkinson, 1976; Price, 1971; Turncock, 2003). This isolated nature of coal mining communities further exacerbated existing vulnerabilities such as the high levels of people on health-related benefits (Beatty et al., 2019), a prevalence of low-skilled (Turner, 2000) and low-paid work (Strangleman, 2001). Despite such clear place-based nature of the impact of the coal mine closures, policy interventions under the Thatcher government had focused on neoliberal policy that prioritised centralisation of power, effectively (Wolman, 1988, p. 426). Although efforts continued to demand a more place-based support for former coal mining communities at the local authority and EU level at the time (Fothergill, 1995), the fruits of their labour were to be realised later in the form of Coalfields Regeneration Trust, National Coalfields Programme, and Coalfields Enterprise Fund (Coalfield Regeneration Review Board, 2010; National Audit Office, 2009). The UK has gone through several stages of decentralisation processes since the 1980s, leading it to be described as a churn, pendulum swing, and patchwork (Pike et al., 2016; Pope, 2022). In essence, recent decentralisation processes have been patchy, and the UK is yet to have a truly bottom-up approach to regional development that sufficiently takes into account the local context in designing policy responses. In short, one of the weaknesses of the Thatcher government’s neoliberal policy response was that it lacked a place-based focus, and the lack of a greater bottom-up approach may reflect the stronger centralisation process that took place under the Thatcher government. Today, it is understood that to develop policies towards JT in former coal mining communities require a greater place-based and bottom-up approach (Swarnakar & Singh, 2022), which in turn relies on both a fiscal and political decentralisation (Rodríguez-Pose & Ketterer, 2020). Thus, to achieve JT, it is essential that the policies are place-based, and this will only be feasible with greater decentralisation so that the policies are developed in a bottom-up manner.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to those at the Third EU Cohesion Policy Conference 2022 for their feedback on a very early version of this paper. Thank you to Professor David Bailey and Gill Bentley for their support, and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. Finally, thank you to Jack Newman and James Kaizuka for their generous time giving feedback to my work.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sara Kaizuka

The author recently received a PhD from the University of Leeds, School of Politics and International Studies. She is an early career researcher specialising in regional development issues in the UK. Her wider research interests include British politics, EU cohesion policy, political economy, and public policy. She is currently working on a think tank report on UK disinformation.