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Notes
1 The Chinese government defines Western China as encompassing the municipality of Chongqing; the provinces of Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan; and the three autonomous regions of Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang.
2 Initially, many other projects purported to be part of the BRI but served neither the ‘strategic’ nor ‘soft’ objectives. Beijing gradually clamped down on these outliers, as discussed in the next chapter.
3 National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building [the] Silk Road Economic Belt and [the] 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, 28 March 2015, http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html.
4 Xi Jinping, ‘Full Text of President Xi’s Speech at [the] Opening of [the] Belt and Road Forum’, Xinhuanet, 14 May 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201705/t20170527_678618.html.
5 ‘China Unveils Vision for “Polar Silk Road” across Arctic’, Reuters, 26 January 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-arctic-idUSKBN1FF0J8.
6 Albert Buixadé Farré et al., ‘Commercial Arctic Shipping through the Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources, Governance, Technology, and Infrastructure’, Polar Geography, vol. 37, no. 4, 2014, pp. 298–324, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769.
7 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’, https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
8 AidData, Global Chinese Finance Dataset, Version 2.0, 2021, https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddatas-global-chinese-development-finance-dataset-version-2-0.
9 Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Can Europe Expect Trade Gains?’, China & World Economy, vol. 25, no. 6, 2017, pp. 84–99, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12222; and Suprabha Bania, Nadia Rocha and Michele Ruta, ‘Trade Effects of the New Silk Road: A Gravity Analysis’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8694, World Bank, January 2019, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31138/WPS8694.pdf.
10 Bania, Rocha and Ruta, ‘Trade Effects of the New Silk Road: A Gravity Analysis’.
11 Fortune, ‘Fortune Global 500 List of Companies 2021’, https://fortune.com/fortune500/.
12 There was overcapacity too in the chemicals industry, oil refining, and the manufacture of paper and paperboard, but the BRI played no obvious part in Beijing’s strategy to address the problem in these sectors.
13 Ryan Rutkowski, ‘Will China Finally Tackle Overcapacity?’, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 22 April 2014, https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/will-china-finally-tackle-overcapacity. See also European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ‘Overcapacity in China: Causes, Impacts and Recommendations’, 2009, https://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-archive/27/Overcapacity_in_China_Causes_Impacts_and_Recommendations; and European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ‘Overcapacity in China: An Impediment to the Party’s Reform Agenda’, 2014, https://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-archive/405/Overcapacity_in_China_An_Impediment_to_the_Party_s_Reform_Agenda_.
14 ‘Going Abroad the Solution to China’s Overcapacity Woes – Ministry Official’, Reuters, 22 July 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/china-industry-overcapacity-idINL3N10230E20150722.
15 He Yafei, ‘China’s Overcapacity Crisis Can Spur Growth through Overseas Expansion’, South China Morning Post, 7 January 2014, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1399681/chinas-overcapacity-crisis-can-spur-growth-through-overseas.
16 Financial Times, ’fDi Markets Database’.
17 Kang Wu, ‘China’s Energy Security: Oil and Gas’, Energy Policy, vol. 73, 2014, pp. 4–11, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.040.
18 Zhong Xiang Zhang, ‘China’s Energy Security, the Malacca Dilemma and Responses’, Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 12, 2011, pp. 7612–5, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.033.
19 In exchange for oil, Chinese oil importers paid into an escrow account that was then used to pay off the original loan (or provide security for it). The same resource-backed lending was repurposed elsewhere for cocoa, diamonds and platinum.
20 Deborah Bräutigam and Kevin P. Gallagher, ‘Bartering Globalization: China’s Commodity- backed Finance in Africa and Latin America’, Global Policy, vol. 5, no. 3, 2014, pp. 346–52, https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12138.
21 Shi Hongtao, ‘中国的“马六甲困局’ [China’s ‘Malacca dilemma’], 中国青年报 [China Youth Daily], 15 June 2004, http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2004-06/15/content_888233.htm.
22 The other corridors – the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh– China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor – were less relevant to China’s energy strategy. Despite suggestions that CPEC would involve building a major oil terminal at Gwadar Port and pumping oil by pipeline from Gwadar across the Himalayas to Western China, the economics never made sense and the project has not been pursued.
23 David Mihalyi, Aisha Adam and Jyhjong Hwang, ‘Resource Backed Loans: Pitfalls and Potential’, Natural Resource Governance Initiative, 2020, https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/resource-backed-loans-pitfalls-and-potential.pdf.
24 Elsie Hung, ‘Baker Institute China Oil Map, Update 2020 Q1’, Baker Institute, 11 March 2020, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/baker-institute-china-oil-map-updates/.
25 American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, ‘China Global Investment Tracker’, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.
26 BP, ‘Statistical Review of World Energy 2021’, pp. 43–4, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf.
27 Elvira Kadyrova, ‘Tajikistan Builds First Tunnel for the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline Line D’, News Central Asia, 30 January 2020, http://www.newscentralasia.net/2020/01/30/tajikistan-builds-first-tunnel-for-the-central-asia-china-gas-pipeline-line-d/.
28 National Development and Reform Commission, ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building [the] Silk Road Economic Belt and [the] 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’.
29 ‘“Made in China 2025” to Focus on Ten Key Sectors’, People’s Daily, 22 May 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150717013144/http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0522/c98649-8895998.html.
30 ‘China’s Bid for EU Investment Fund Trips on Complex Rules’, EURACTIV with Reuters, 13 July 2015, https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/china-s-bid-for-eu-investment-fund-trips-on-complex-rules/.
31 World Internet Conference Wuzhen Summit, ‘Agenda’, 15 December 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20160121194747/http://www.wuzhenwic.org/agenda.html.
32 Xi Jinping, ‘Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, speech at the Belt and Road Forum, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201705/t20170527_678618.html.
33 In East Africa, Huawei has announced that it has completed a digital-railway solution for the Chinese-built and BRI-linked Mombasa– Nairobi rail project. The digital solution includes a full suite of core systems, such as a railway-operational communications system; a large-bandwidth unified transmission system, which adopts soft and hard pipes to protect train-control and mission-critical activities; a modular and highly efficient power-supply system; and an environmental-monitoring system.
34 Xi Jinping, ‘自主创新推进网络强国建设’ [Independent innovation promotes the building of a network power], Speech at China’s National Cybersecurity and Informatisation Work Conference, 21 April 2018, Xinhuanet, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-04/21/c_1122719810.htm.
35 Meia Nouwens et al., ‘China’s Digital Silk Road: Integration into National IT Infrastructure and Wider Implications for Western Defence Industries’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2021/02/china-digital-silk-road-implications-for-defence-industry.
36 Ren Wei and Xie Jianwen, ‘Virtual One Belt One Road Expands Cooperation between China and One Belt One Road Partner Countries’, China News, 20 August 2021, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/2021/08-20/9547983.shtml.
37 ‘Huawei to Develop Konza Data Centre and Smart City’, Kenyan Wallstreet, 29 April 2019, https://kenyanwallstreet.com/huawei-to-develop-konza-data-centre%EF%BB%BF-and-smart-city/; ‘華為項目落址肯亞科技城，6年來科技城第一棟樓仍未 完工’ [Huawei’s project [for] the Kenyan Science and Technology City have [sic] not been able to finish its first building despite 6 years time], 每日头条 [Everyday headlines], 29 April 2019, https://kknews.cc/tech/r5oxqgx.html.
38 CPEC Authority, ‘Cross-border Optical Fiber Cable, Project (Khunjrab - Rawalpindi)’, CPEC Authority website, http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/40.
39 Megvii, ‘Megvii Deploys Signature Smart Industrial Park Solution for Karot Hydropower Project’, 29 September 2020, https://en.megvii.com/news_detail/id/174.
40 Thomas S. Eder, Rebecca Arcesati and Jacob Mardell, ‘Networking the “Belt and Road” – the Future Is Digital’, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 28 August 2019, https://merics.org/en/tracker/networking-belt-and-road-future-digital.
41 AidData, ‘China Eximbank Provides $85 Million USD PBC Loan for 5900km South Atlantic Inter Link (SAIL)’, 29 September 2021, https://china.aiddata.org/projects/58439/.
42 Paul Triolo, ‘Special Report: China’s Digital Silk Road to Gain Traction in 2018’, Eurasia Group, 5 February 2018, https://library.eurasiagroup.net/document/open/9ba94f58-ed55-49b5-a5a5-9cd0a6d85e8d/9ba94f58-ed55-49b5-a5a5-9cd0a6d85e8d.pdf/7c4a8678-5a8e-417f-ab91-f0d0a40a1144.
43 Huawei, ‘2019 Annual Report’, 2019, https://www.huawei.com/uk/annual-report/2019; Tencent Holdings Limited, ‘2019 Annual Report’, 2019, https://static.www.tencent.com/uploads/2020/04/02/ed18b0a8465d8bb733e338a1abe76b73.pdf; and Alibaba Group, ‘FY 2019 Annual Report’, 2019, https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/a/NYSE_BABA_2019.pdf.
44 Alex Alley, ‘China Telecom Europe Launches PoP in Lamda Hellix’s Athens, Greece Data Center’, Data Centre Dynamics Ltd, 7 November 2019, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/lamda-hellix-lets-china-telecom-europe-establish-pop-athens-greece/.
45 IISS, ‘China Connects’, 2022, https://chinaconnects.iiss.org/.
46 Brian Fung, ‘How China’s Huawei Took the Lead over U.S. Companies in 5G Technology’, Washington Post, 10 April 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/10/us-spat-with-huawei-explained/.
47 Ibid.
48 Laurens Cerulus, ‘Huawei Challenges Legality of 5G Bans in Poland, Romania’, POLITICO, 2 November 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/huawei-hints-at-legal-action-against-5g-bans-in-poland-romania/; US Department of State, ‘United States – Republic of Lithuania Memorandum of Understanding on 5G Security’, 17 September 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/united-states-republic-of-lithuania-memorandum-of-understanding-on-5g-security/index.html; and Alice Taylor, ‘Albania Joins US ‘the Clean Network’, Pledges Not to Use Huawei 5G’, exit news, 13 August 2020, https://exit.al/en/2020/08/13/albania-joins-us-the-clean-network-pledges-not-to-use-huawei-5g/.
49 Nouwens et al., ‘China’s Digital Silk Road: Integration into National IT Infrastructure and Wider Implications for Western Defence Industries’.
50 ‘Made in China 2025’ to Focus on Ten Key Sectors’.
51 Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Guidance on Promoting the Green Belt and Road’, 8 May 2017, https://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/Policies/policies/Frameworkp1/201706/t20170628_416864.shtml.
52 An Baijie and Wang Xiaodong, ‘China and WHO to Jointly Create “Health Silk Road”’, China Daily, 20 January 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017wef/2017-01/20/content_28007208.htm.
53 Yingli Green Energy Holding Company Ltd, ‘Yingli Green Energy Wins 233 MW of Solar PV Project in Algeria’, Cision PR Newswire, 16 December 2013, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/yingli-green-energy-wins-233-mw-of-solar-pv-projects-in-algeria-235994141.html.
54 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’.
55 Rebecca Ray et al., ‘Geolocated Dataset of Chinese Overseas Development Finance’, Boston University Global Development Policy Center, http://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/7WUXV.
56 The period from the launch of the BRI in October 2013 to the end of 2016.
57 American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, ‘China Global Investment Tracker’.
58 Ibid.
59 Financial Times, ‘fDi Markets Database’.
60 United Nations, ‘UN Comtrade Database’, https://comtrade.un.org/data.
61 ‘Top 10 Solar Companies and Manufacturers in 2022’, EnergySage, 6 January 2022, https://news.energysage.com/best-solar-panel-manufacturers-usa/.
62 UN, ‘UN Comtrade Database’.
63 Global Wind Energy Council, ‘GWEC Released Global Wind Turbine Supplier Ranking for 2020’, 23 March 2021, https://gwec.net/gwec-releases-global-wind-turbine-supplier-ranking-for-2020/.
64 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Chinese State Council, ‘中共中央 国务院 印发《“健康中国2030”规划纲要’ [‘Healthy China 2030’ planning outline], 25 October 2016, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-10/25/content_5124174.htm.
65 ‘Facing Forwards along the Health Silk Road’, Lancet Global Health, vol. 5, October 2017, https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2214-109X%2817%2930349-2; and Jiang Xingguang, ‘China Calls for Joint Efforts in Building Health Silk Road’, National Health and Family Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China, 18 August 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20170915161649/http://en.nhfpc.gov.cn/2017-08/18/c_72266.htm.
66 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Joint Statement of the High-level Video Conference on Belt and Road International Cooperation: Combating COVID-19 with Solidarity’, 19 June 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202006/t20200619_679632.html.
67 ‘China Providing Vaccine Aid to 53 Developing Countries: FM Spokesperson’, Xinhuanet, 8 February 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-02/08/c_139730308.htm.
68 Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative, ‘标准联通, 一带一路‛行动计 划 (2015–2017)’ [Action plan on Belt and Road standard connectivity (2015–17)], Belt and Road Portal, 22 November 2017, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/35977.htm.
69 Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative, ‘标准联通共建“一带一路” 行动计划 (2018–2020年)’ [Action plan for standardisation connectivity to build the One Belt and One Road (2018–2020)], Belt and Road Portal, 11 January 2018, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/43480.htm.
70 Xi Jinping, ‘Fostering a New Development Paradigm and Pursuing Mutual Benefit and Win–Win Cooperation’, keynote speech at APEC CEO Dialogues, 19 November 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-11/19/c_139527192.htm.
71 Standardisation Administration of the People’s Republic of China, ‘2020 Standardisation Key Areas of Work’, translation by Deutsches Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), GIZ Global Project Quality Infrastructure, 19 March 2020, https://www.gpqi.org/news_en-details/policy-monitoring-sac-issued-2020-key-areas-for-standardisation-work-in-china.html?file=files/upload/china/news/2020%20Standardisation%20Key%20Areas%20of%20Work_Translated%20by%20GIZ.pdf. See also Emily de La Bruyère and Nathan Picarsic, ‘China Standards 2035: Beijing’s Platform Geopolitics and “Standardization Work in 2020”’, Horizon Advisory, April 2020, https://issuu.com/horizonadvisory/docs/horizon_advisory_china_standards_series_-_standard.
72 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘习近平：国家中长期经济社会发展 战略若干重大问题’ [Some major issues of the national medium- and long-term economic and social development strategy], 31 October 2020, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-10/31/content_5556349.htm.
73 Lingling Wei, ‘China’s Xi Speeds Up Inward Economic Shift’, Wall Street Journal, 12 August 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-speeds-up-inward-economic-shift-11597224602.
74 ‘2020 Central Economic Work Conference Readout’, Xinhuanet, 18 December 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-12/18/c_1126879325.htm?mc_cid=533e59ca3f&mc_eid=2d0ff21c40.
75 Xi Jinping, ‘国家中长期经济社会发展战略若干重大问题’ [Certain major issues for our national medium- to long-term economic and social development strategy], Qiushi 求 是, November 2020, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0235_Qiushi_Xi_economy_EN-1.pdf.
76 Ibid.
77 Xinhua, ‘十四五’规划和2035年远景目标纲 要’ [The 14th Five-year Plan and long-range objectives through 2035 full text], Sina, 13 March 2021, https://finance.sina.com.cn/china/gncj/2021-03-13/doc-ikkntiam0007627.shtml.
78 ‘一带一路”战略意义深远’ [ The profound strategic significance of BRI], CPCNews.cn, 23 June 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0623/c136457-28471766.html; and ‘一带一路的意义’ [ The significance of BRI], Xinhua News Silk Road Portal, 25 October 2019, https://www.imsilkroad.com/news/p/66876.html.
79 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), ‘Diplomatic Allies’, 1 March 2022, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=1294&sms=1007#Accesskey_U.
80 Thomas J. Shattuck, ‘The Race to Zero? China’s Poaching of Taiwan’s Diplomatic Allies’, Orbis, vol. 64, no. 2, March 2020, pp. 334–52, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7102519/; and Sigrid Winkler, ‘Biding Time: The Challenge of Taiwan’s International Status’, Brookings, 17 November 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/research/biding-time-the-challenge-of-taiwans-international-status/.