Are Boards Designed to Fail? The Implausibility of Effective Board Monitoring

References

• Abdullah, S. N., Ku Ismail, K. N. I., & Nachum, L. (2015). Does having women on boards create value? The impact of societal perceptions and corporate governance in emerging markets. Strategic Management Journal. Advance online publication. doi:10.1002/smj.2352
   Google Scholar
• Abernethy, M. A., Kuang, Y. F., & Qin, B. (2014). The influence of CEO power on compensation contract design. The Accounting Review. Advance online publication. doi:10.2308/accr-50971
   Google Scholar
• Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance, 62(1), 217–250.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009a). Strong managers, weak boards? CESifo Economic Studies, 55(3–4), 482–514.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009b). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291–309.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 58–107.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Adams, R. B., Licht, A. N., & Sagiv, L. (2011). Shareholders and stakeholders: How do directors decide? Strategic Management Journal, 32(12), 1331–1355.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. (2015). Connecting the dots – bringing external corporate governance into the corporate governance puzzle. Academy of Management Annals, 9(1), 483–573.
   Google Scholar
• Aguilera, R. V., Filatotchev, I., Gospel, H., & Jackson, G. (2008). An organizational approach to comparative corporate governance: Costs, contingencies, and complementarities. Organization Science, 19(3), 475–492.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Alexander, J. A., Fennell, M. L., & Halpern, M. T. (1993). Leadership instability in hospitals: The influence of board-CEO relations and organizational growth and decline. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(1), 74–99.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Allcock, D., & Filatotchev, I. (2010). Executive incentive schemes in initial public offerings: The effects of multiple-agency conflicts and corporate governance. Journal of Management, 36(3), 663–686.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
   Google Scholar
• Almazan, A., & Suarez, J. (2003). Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal governance structures. Journal of Finance, 58(2), 519–548.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Anderson, D. W., Melanson, S. J., & Maly, J. (2007). The evolution of corporate governance: Power redistribution brings boards to life. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 15(5), 780–797.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Anderson, R. C., Duru, A., & Reeb, D. M. (2009). Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States. Journal of Financial Economics, 92(2), 205–222.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board composition: balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2), 209–237.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ararat, M., Aksu, M., & Cetin, A. T. (2015). How board diversity affects firm performance in emerging markets: Evidence on channels in controlled firms. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 23(2), 83–103.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Arfken, D. E., Bellar, S. L., & Helms, M. M. (2004). The ultimate glass ceiling revisited: The presence of women on corporate boards. Journal of Business Ethics, 50(2), 177–186.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Armstrong, C. S., Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2014). Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency? Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 383–403.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Arthurs, J. D., Hoskisson, R. E., Busenitz, L. W., & Johnson, R. A. (2008). Managerial agents watching other agents: Multiple agency conflicts regarding underpricing in IPO firms. Academy of Management Journal, 51(2), 277–294.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Baldenius, T., Melumad, N., & Meng, X. (2014). Board composition and CEO power. Journal of Financial Economics, 112(1), 53–68.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Banerjee, S., Humphery-Jenner, M., & Nanda, V. (2015). Restraining overconfident CEOs through improved governance: evidence from the Sarbanes–Oxley act. Review of Financial Studies. Advance online publication. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv034
   Google Scholar
• Bange, M. M., & Mazzeo, M. A. (2004). Board composition, board effectiveness, and the observed form of takeover bids. Review of Financial Studies, 17(4), 1185–1215.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Barnes, J. H., Jr. (1984). Cognitive biases and their impact on strategic planning. Strategic Management Journal, 5(2), 129–137.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bateman, T. S., & Zeithaml, C. P. (1989). The psychological context of strategic decisions: A model and convergent experimental findings. Strategic Management Journal, 10(1), 59–74.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Baysinger, B., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1990). The compositions of boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy. Academy of Management Review, 15(1), 72–87.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bear, S., Rahman, N., & Post, C. (2010). The impact of board diversity and gender composition on corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(2), 207–221.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Beatty, R. P., & Zajac, E. J. (1994). Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing - a study of executive-compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(2), 313–335.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bebchuk, L. A., Grinstein, Y., & Peyer, U. (2010). Lucky CEOs and lucky directors. Journal of Finance, 65(6), 2363–2401.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bednar, M., Love, E. G., & Kraatz, M. (2014). Paying the price? The impact of controversial governance practices on managerial reputation. Academy of Management Journal. Advanced online publication. doi:10.5465/amj.2012.1091
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bell, G., Aguilera, R. V., Filatotchev, I., Fiss, P., Cambré, B., & Marx, A. (2013). Corporate governance and configuration research: The case of foreign IPOs listing in London. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 38, 159–180.
   Google Scholar
• Belliveau, M. A., O'Reilly, C. A.III, & Wade, J. B. (1996). Social capital at the top: Effects of social similarity and status on CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 39(6), 1568–1593.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Belot, F., Ginglinger, E., Sloyin, M. B., & Sushka, M. E. (2014). Freedom of choice between unitary and two-tier boards: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 112(3), 364–385.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Bertoni, F., Meoli, M., & Vismara, S. (2014). Board independence, ownership structure and the valuation of IPOs in continental Europe. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 22(2), 116–131.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (1999). The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance. Business Lawyer, 54(3), 921–963.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board indpendence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27(2), 231–273.
   Google Scholar
• Bhagat, S., Brickley, J. A., & Lease, R. C. (1985). Incentive effects of stock purchase plans. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(2), 195–215.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Biggerstaff, L., Cicero, D. C., & Puckett, A. (2015). Suspect CEOs, unethical culture, and corporate misbehavior. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 98–121.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Black, B. S. (1998). Shareholder activism and corporate governance in the United States. New York: Groves Dictionaries.
   Google Scholar
• Bodolica, V., & Spraggon, M. (2009). The implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts around M&A transactions. Strategic Management Journal, 30(9), 985–1011.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boeker, W. (1992). Power and managerial dismissal: Scapegoating at the top. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(3), 400–421.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boivie, S., Lange, D., McDonald, M. L., & Westphal, J. D. (2011). Me or we: The effects of CEO organizational identification on agency costs. Academy of Management Journal, 54(3), 551–576.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boone, A. L., Casares Field, L., Karpoff, J. M., & Raheja, C. G. (2007). The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(1), 66–101.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• de Bos, A., & Donker, H. (2004). Monitoring accounting changes: Empirical evidence from the Netherlands. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 12(1), 60–73.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bosse, D., & Phillips, R. (2014). Agency theory and bounded self-interest. Academy of Management Review. Advance online publication. doi:10.5465/amr.2013.0420
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boyer, M. M., & Ortiz-Molina, H. (2008). Career concerns of top executives, managerial ownership and CEO succession. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 16(3), 178–193.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brandes, P., Dharwadkar, R., & Suh, S. (2015). I know something you don't know!: The role of linking pin directors in monitoring and incentive alignment. Strategic Management Journal. Advance online publication. doi:10.1002/smj.2353
   Google Scholar
• Brenner, S., & Schwalbach, J. (2009). Legal institutions, board diligence, and top executive pay. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 17(1), 1–12.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brick, I. E., Palmon, O., & Wald, J. K. (2006). CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 403–423.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brochet, F., & Srinivasan, S. (2014). Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation. Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), 430–449.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brush, T. H., Bromiley, P., & Hendrickx, M. (2000). The free cash flow hypothesis for sales growth and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 21(4), 455–472.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bruynseels, L., & Cardinaels, E. (2014). The audit committee: Management watchdog or personal friend of the CEO? Accounting Review, 89(1), 113–145.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Buchholtz, A. K., Amason, A. C., & Rutherford, M. A. (2005). The impact of board monitoring and involvement on top management team affective conflict. Journal of Managerial Issues, 14(3), 405–422.
   Google Scholar
• Bukszar, E., & Connolly, T. (1988). Hindsight bias and strategic choice: Some problems in learning from experience. Academy of Management Journal, 31(3), 628–641.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do outside directors monitor managers - evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 195–221.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Campbell, J. T., Campbell, T. C., Sirmon, D. G., Bierman, L., & Tuggle, C. S. (2012). Shareholder influence over director nomination via proxy access: implications for agency conflict and stakeholder value. Strategic Management Journal, 33(12), 1431–1451.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cannella, A. A. Jr., & Lubatkin, M. (1993). Succession as a sociopolitical process: Internal impediments to outsider selection. Academy of Management Journal, 36(4), 763–793.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cao, Y., Dhaliwal, D., Li, Z., & Yang, Y. G. (2015). Are all independent directors equally informed? Evidence based on their trading returns and social networks. Management Science, 61(4), 795–813.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Capezio, A., Shields, J., & O'Donnell, M. (2011). Too good to be true: Board structural independence as a moderator of CEO pay-for-firm-performance. Journal of Management Studies, 48(3), 487–513.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., Neal, T. L., & Riley, R. A. (2002). Board characteristics and audit fees. Contemporary Accounting Research, 19(3), 365–384.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carpenter, M. A., Geletkanycz, M. A., & Sanders, W. G. (2004). Upper echelons research revisited: Antecedents, elements, and consequences of top management team composition. Journal of Management, 30(6), 749–778.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carpenter, M. A., & Westphal, J. D. (2001). The strategic context of external network ties: Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal, 4(4), 639–660.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Castaner, X., & Kavadis, N. (2013). Does good governance prevent bad strategy? A study of corporate governance, financial diversification, and value creation by French corporations, 2000–2006. Strategic Management Journal, 34(7), 863–876.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chancharat, N., Krishnamurti, C., & Tian, G. (2012). Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 20(2), 144–163.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chen, C. R., & Huang, Y. (2011). Mutual fund governance and performance: A quantile regression analysis of morningstar's stewardship grade. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 19(4), 311–333.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chen, E. T., & Nowland, J. (2010). Optimal board monitoring in family-owned companies: Evidence from Asia. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 18(1), 3–17.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chen, G., Luo, S., Tang, Y., & Tong, J. Y. (2014). Passing probation: Earnings management by interim CEOs and its effect on their promotion prospects. Academy of Management Journal, 58(5), 1389–1418.
   Google Scholar
• Chen, H. L. (2011). Does board independence influence the top management team? Evidence from strategic decisions toward internationalization. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 19(4), 334–350.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chen, Q., Goldstein, I., & Jiang, W. (2008). Directors’ ownership in the US mutual fund industry. Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2629–2677.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chiang, H. T., & He, L.-J. (2010). Board supervision capability and information transparency. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 18(1), 18–31.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chiu, P. C., Teoh, S. H., & Tian, F. (2013). Board interlocks and earnings management contagion. Accounting Review, 88(3), 915–944.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cho, D. S., & Kim, J. (2007). Outside directors, ownership structure and firm profitability in Korea. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 15(2), 239–250.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chowdhury, S. D., & Wang, E. Z. (2009). Institutional activism types and CEO compensation: A time-series analysis of large Canadian corporations. Journal of Management, 35(1), 5–36.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity, and compliance. The Handbook of Social Psychology (4th ed.). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
   Google Scholar
• Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405.
   Google Scholar
• Cohen, J. R., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. M. (2007). The impact of roles of the board on auditors’ risk assessments and program planning decisions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 26(1), 91–112.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., & Malloy, C. J. (2012). Hiring cheerleaders: Board appointments of “independent” directors. Management Science, 58(6), 1039–1058.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329–356.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2014). Co-opted boards. Review of Financial Studies, 27(6), 1751–1796.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Coles, J. W., & Hesterly, W. S. (2000). Independence of the chairman and board composition: Firm choices and shareholder value. Journal of Management, 26(2), 195–214.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Coles, J. W., McWilliams, V. B., & Sen, N. (2001). An examination of the relationship of governance mechanisms to performance. Journal of Management, 27(1), 23–50.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Combs, J. G., Ketchen, D. J. Jr., Perryman, A. A., & Donahue, M. S. (2007). The moderating effect of CEO power on the board composition-firm performance relationship. Journal of Management Studies, 44(8), 1299–1323.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Consuelo Pucheta-Martinez, M., & Garcia-Meca, E. (2014). Institutional investors on boards and audit committees and their effects on financial reporting quality. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 22(4), 347–363.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. L. (1998). Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 146–157.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Coombes, P., & Watson, M. (2000). Three surveys on corporate governance. McKinsey Quarterly, (4), 74–77.
   Google Scholar
• Cooper, A. C., Willard, G. E., & Woo, C. Y. (1986). Strategies of high-performing new and small firms: A reexamination of the niche concept. Journal of Business Venturing, 1, 247–260.
   Google Scholar
• Cordeiro, J. J., Vehyath, R., & Romal, J. B. (2007). Moderators of the relationship between director stock-based compensation and firm performance. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 15(6), 1384–1393.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Core, J. E. (2002). Discussion of the roles of performance measures and monitoring in annual governance decisions in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(2), 519–527.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371–406.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cornelli, F., Kominek, Z., & Ljungqvist, A. (2013). Monitoring managers: Does it matter? Journal of Finance, 68(2), 431–481.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cramton, C. D. (2001). The mutual knowledge problem and its consequences for dispersed collaboration. Organization Science, 12(3), 346–371.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cyert, R. M., Kang, S. H., & Kumar, P. (2002). Corporate governance, takeovers, and top-management compensation: Theory and evidence. Management Science, 48(4), 453–469.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., & McConnell, J. J. (2008). Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(1), 73–100.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A., Jr. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 371–382.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., Ellstrand, A. E., & Dalton, D. R. (1998). Compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 209–220.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Certo, S. T., & Roengpitya, R. (2003). Meta-analyses of financial performance and equity: Fusion or confusion? Academy of Management Journal, 46(1), 13–26.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19(3), 269–290.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999). Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 674–686.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dalton, D. R., & Dalton, C. M. (2011). Integration of micro and macro studies in governance research: CEO duality, board composition, and financial performance. Journal of Management, 37(2), 404–411.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007). The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation. Academy of Management Annals, 1(1), 1–64.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dalton, D. R., & Kesner, I. F. (1985). Organizational performance as an antecedent of inside/outside chief executive succession: An empirical assessment. Academy of Management Journal, 28(4), 749–762.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Datta, D. K., Musteen, M., & Herrmann, P. (2009). Board characteristics, managerial incentives, and the choice between foreign acquisitions and international joint ventures. Journal of Management, 35(4), 928–953.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• David, P., Kochar, R., & Levitas, E. (1998). The effect of institutional investors on the level and mix of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 200–208.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davidson, R., Dey, A., & Smith, A. (2015). Executives’ “off-the-job” behavior, corporate culture, and financial reporting risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 5–28.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davis, G. F. (1991). Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate network. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 583–613.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davis, G. F. (2005). New directions in corporate governance. Annual Review of Sociology, 31, 143–162.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Del Guercio, D., Dann, L. Y., & Partch, M. M. (2003). Governance and boards of directors in closed-end investment companies. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(1), 111–152.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Denis, D. J., & Denis, D. K. (1995). Performance changes following top management dismissals. The Journal of Finance, 50(4), 1029–1057.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Desender, K. A., Aguilera, R. V., Crespi, R., & García-Cestona, M. (2013). When does ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior. Strategic Management Journal, 34(7), 823–842.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Desender, K. A., Aguilera, R. V., Lópezpuertas-Lamy, M., & Crespi, R. (2014). A clash of governance logics: Foreign ownership and board monitoring. Strategic Management Journal. Advance online publication. doi:10.1002/smj.2344
   Google Scholar
• Deutsch, Y., & Ross, T. W. (2003). You are known by the directors you keep: Reputable directors as a signaling mechanism for young firms. Management Science, 49(8), 1003–1017.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dollinger, M. J. (1984). Environmental boundary spanning and information processing effects on organizational performance. Academy of Management Journal, 27(2), 351–368.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Donnelly, R., & Mulcahy, M. (2008). Board structure, ownership, and voluntary disclosure in Ireland. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 16(5), 416–429.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dowell, G. W. S., Shackell, M. B., & Stuart, N. V. (2011). Boards, CEOs, and surviving a financial crisis: Evidence from the internet shakeout. Strategic Management Journal, 32(10), 1025–1045.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., & Ozbas, O. (2010). When are outside directors effective? Journal of Financial Economics, 96(2), 195–214.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57–74.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ellis, A. P. J. (2006). System breakdown: The role of mental models and transactive memory in the relationship between acute stress and team performance. Academy of Management Journal, 49(3), 579–589.
   Google Scholar
• Ellstrand, A. E., Tihanyi, L., & Johnson, J. L. (2002). Board structure and international political risk. Academy of Management Journal, 45(4), 769–777.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Elsbach, K. D., & Barr, P. S. (1999). The effects of mood on individuals’ use of structured decision protocols. Organization Science, 10(2), 181–198.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Eminet, A., & Guedri, Z. (2010). The role of nominating committees and director reputation in shaping the labor market for directors: An empirical assessment. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 18(6), 557–574.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., & Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of director diversity and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(2), 102–111.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Erkens, D. H., Subramanyam, K. R., & Zhang, J. (2014). Affiliated banker on board and conservative accounting. Accounting Review, 89(5), 1703–1728.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Maber, D. A. (2012). Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 118–144.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• van Essen, M., Otten, J., & Carberry, E. J. (2015). Assessing managerial power theory: A meta-analytic approach to understanding the determinants of CEO compensation. Journal of Management, 41(1), 164–202.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Evans, J. H., III, Nagarajan, N. J., & Schloetzer, J. D. (2010). CEO turnover and retention light: Retaining former CEOs on the board. Journal of Accounting Research, 48(5), 1015–1047.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., & Stulz, R. M. (2010). Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors? Journal of Financial Economics, 97(1), 12–32.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Falato, A., Kadyrzhanova, D., & Lel, U. (2014). Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value? Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 404–426.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160–181.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 14(3), 301–325.
   Google Scholar
• Farber, D. B. (2005). Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter? Accounting Review, 80(2), 539–561.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Farrell, K. A., & Hersch, P. L. (2005). Additions to corporate boards: the effect of gender. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1), 85–106.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Faulkender, M., & Yang, J. (2013). Is disclosure an effective cleansing mechanism? The dynamics of compensation peer benchmarking. Review of Financial Studies, 26(3), 806–839.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M. A., & Raposo, C. C. (2011). Board structure and price informativeness. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(3), 523–545.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance, 59(3), 1087–1111.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance, 61(2), 689–724.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2007). Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2), 306–336.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fich, E. M., Starks, L. T., & Yore, A. S. (2014). CEO deal-making activities and compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 114(3), 471–492.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2013). Are busy boards detrimental? Journal of Financial Economics, 109(1), 63–82.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Filatotchev, I., & Bishop, K. (2002). Board composition, share ownership, and ‘underpricing' of UK IPO firms. Strategic Management Journal, 23(10), 941–955.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Finkelstein, S. (1992). Power in top management teams - dimensions, measurement, and validation. Academy of Management Journal, 35(3), 505–538.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Finkelstein, S., & Daveni, R. A. (1994). CEO duality as a double-edged-sword - how boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1079–1108.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1996). Strategic leadership: Top executives and their effects on organizations. New York: West.
   Google Scholar
• Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. (2009). Strategic leadership: Theory and research on executives, Top management teams, and boards. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Finkelstein, S., & Mooney, A. C. (2003). Not the usual suspects: How to use board process to make boards better. Academy of Management Executive, 17(2), 101–113.
   Google Scholar
• Fiss, P. C. (2006). Social influence effects and managerial compensation evidence from Germany. Strategic Management Journal, 27(11), 1013–1031.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Flickinger, M., Wrage, M., Tuschke, A., & Bresser, R. (2015). How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective. Strategic Management Journal. Advance online publication. doi:10.1002/smj.2382
   Google Scholar
• Forbes, D. P., & Milliken, F. J. (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. Academy of Management Review, 24(3), 489–505.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fracassi, C., & Tate, G. (2012). External networking and internal firm governance. Journal of Finance, 67(1), 153–194.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fredrickson, J. W., Davis-Blake, A., & Sanders, W. M. G. (2010). Sharing the wealth: Social comparisons and pay dispersion in the CEO's top team. Strategic Management Journal, 31(10), 1031–1053.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Galbraith, J. R. (1974). Organization design: An information processing view. Interfaces, 4(3), 28–36.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Garg, S. (2013). Venture boards: Distinctive monitoring and implications for firm performance. Academy of Management Review, 38(1), 90–108.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• George, J. M. (1992). Extrinsic and intrinsic origins of perceived social loafing in organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 35(1), 191–202.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gillespie, J., & Zweig, D. (2010). Money for nothing: How the failure of corporate boards is ruining American business and costing Us trillions. New York: Free Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gladstein, D. L. (1984). Groups in context: A model of task group effectiveness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29(4), 499–517.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Golden, B. R. (1992). The past is the past--or is it? The use of retrospective accounts as indicators of past strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 35(4), 848–860.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goodstein, J., & Boeker, W. (1991). Turbulence at the top - a new perspective on governance structure changes and strategic change. Academy of Management Journal, 34(2), 306–330.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 241–250.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grant, A. M., & Berry, J. W. (2011). The necessity of others is the mother of invention: Intrinsic and prosocial motivations, perspective taking, and creativity. Academy of Management Journal, 54(1), 73–96.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gruenfeld, D. H., Mannix, E. A., Williams, K. Y., & Neale, M. A. (1996). Group composition and decision making: How member familiarity and information distribution affect process and performance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67(1), 1–15.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gulati, R., & Westphal, J. D. (1999). Cooperative or controlling? The effects of CEO-board relations and the content of interlocks on the formation of joint ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(3), 473–506.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Guthrie, K., Sokolowsky, J., & Wan, K. M. (2012). CEO compensation and board structure revisited. Journal of Finance, 67(3), 1149–1168.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hagendorff, J., Collins, M., & Keasey, K. (2010). Board monitoring, regulation, and performance in the banking industry: Evidence from the market for corporate control. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 18(5), 381–395.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hambrick, D. C., Finkelstein, S., & Mooney, A. C. (2005). Executive job demands: New insights for explaining strategic decisions and leader behaviors. Academy of Management Review, 30(3), 472–491.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hambrick, D., Misangyi, V., & Park, C. (2015). The quad model for identifying a corporate director's potential for effective monitoring: Toward a new theory of board sufficiency. Academy of Management Review, 14(3), 323–344.
   Google Scholar
• Han, S. H., Lee, B.-S., & Song, M. (2014). Frequent stock repurchases, false signaling, and corporate governance: Evidence from Korea. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 22(6), 482–500.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harford, J. (2003). Takeover bids and target directors’ incentives: The impact of a bid on directors’ wealth and board seats. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(1), 51–83.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harrison, D. A., Price, K. H., & Bell, M. P. (1998). Beyond relational demography: Time and the effects of surface- and deep-level diversity on work group cohesion. Academy of Management Journal, 41(1), 96–107.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harrison, D. A., Price, K. H., Gavin, J. H., & Florey, A. T. (2002). Time, teams, and task performance: Changing effects of surface- and deep-level diversity on group functioning. Academy of Management Journal, 45(5), 1029–1045.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hay, D., Knechel, W. R., & Ling, H. (2008). Evidence on the impact of internal control and corporate governance on audit fees. International Journal of Auditing, 12(1), 9–24.
   Google Scholar
• Hayes, R. H., & Abernathy, W. J. (1980). Managing our way to economic decline. Harvard Business Review, 58(4), 67–77.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Haynes, K. T., & Hillman, A. (2010). The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 31(11), 1145–1163.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Henderson, A. D., & Fredrickson, J. W. (1996). Information-processing demands as a determinant of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 39(3), 575–606.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hermalin, B. E. (2005). Trends in corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 60(5), 2351–2384.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review, 88(1), 96–118.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hill, C. W. L., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1987). Strategy and structure in the multiproduct firm. Academy of Management Review, 12(2), 331–341.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 383–396.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hillman, A. J., Nicholson, G., & Shropshire, C. (2008). Directors’ multiple identities, identification, and board monitoring and resource provision. Organization Science, 19(3), 441–456.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hillman, A. J., Shropshire, C., Certo, S. T., Dalton, D. R., & Dalton, C. M. (2011). What I like about you: A multilevel study of shareholder discontent with director monitoring. Organization Science, 22(3), 675–687.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hinds, P. J., & Bailey, D. E. (2003). Out of sight, out of sync: Understanding conflict in distributed teams. Organization Science, 14(6), 615–632.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hinsz, V. B., Tindale, R. S., & Vollrath, D. A. (1997). The emerging conceptualization of groups as information processors. Psychological Bulletin, 121(1), 43–64.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Kim, H. (1997). International diversification: Effects on innovation and firm performance in product-diversified firms. Academy of Management Journal, 40(4), 767–798.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Holmstrom, B. (1987). Incentive compensation: Practical design from a theory point of view. Incentives, Cooperation, and Risk Sharing, 176–185.
   Google Scholar
• Holmstrom, B., & Roberts, J. (1998). The boundaries of the firm revisited. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), 73–94.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hooghiemstra, R., & van Manen, J. (2004). The independence paradox: (Im)possibilities facing non-executive directors in the Netherlands. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 12(3), 314–324.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hoskisson, R. E., Castleton, M. W., & Withers, M. C. (2009). Complementarity in monitoring and bonding: More intense monitoring leads to higher executive compensation. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(2), 57–74.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Huang, H., Lobo, G. J., & Zhou, J. (2009). Determinants and accounting consequences of forming a governance committee: Evidence from the United States. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 17(6), 710–727.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Huber, G. P. (1991). Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the literatures. Organization Science, 2(1), 88–115.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Huson, M. R., Parrino, R., & Starks, L. T. (2001). Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: A long-term perspective. Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2265–2297.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hwang, B. H., & Kim, S. (2009). It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(1), 138–158.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ibarra, H. (1992). Homophily and differential returns: Sex differences in network structure and access in an advertising firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 72, 422–447.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ingley, C., & Van der Walt, N. (2003). Board configuration: Building better boards. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 3(4), 5–17.
   Google Scholar
• Jehn, K. A. (1995). A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of intragroup conflict. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 256–282.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jehn, K. A., & Mannix, E. A. (2001). The dynamic nature of conflict: A longitudinal study of intragroup conflict and group performance. Academy of Management Journal, 44(2), 238–251.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–350.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225–264.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. L., Daily, C. M., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1996). Boards of directors: A review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 22(3), 409–438.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Hitt, M. A. (1993). Board of director involvement in restructuring - the effects of board versus managerial controls and characteristics. Strategic Management Journal, 14, 33–50.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K., & Hill, A. D. (2013). Board composition beyond independence: Social capital, human capital, and demographics. Journal of Management, 39(1), 232–262.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jones, G. R., & Hill, C. W. L. (1988). Transaction cost analysis of strategy-structure choice. Strategic Management Journal, 9(2), 159–172.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Joseph, J., Ocasio, W., & McDonnell, M. H. (2014). The structural elaboration of board independence: Executive power, institutional logics, and the adoption of CEO-only board structures in us corporate governance. Academy of Management Journal, 57(6), 1834–1858.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Judge, W. Q., & Zeithaml, C. P. (1992). Institutional and strategic choice perspectives on board involvement in the strategic decision process. Academy of Management Journal, 35(4), 766–794.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kalbers, L. P., & Fogarty, T. J. (1998). Organizational and economic explanations of audit committee oversight. Journal of Managerial Issues, 14(3), 129–150.
   Google Scholar
• Kang, E., & Kroll, M. (2014). Deciding who will rule: Examining the influence of outside noncore directors on executive entrenchment. Organization Science, 25(6), 1662–1683.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kao, L. F., Chiou, J. R., & Chen, A. L. (2004). The agency problems, firm performance and monitoring mechanisms: the evidence from collateralised shares in Taiwan. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 12(3), 389–402.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kaplan, S. N. (2008). Are U.S. CEOs overpaid? Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(2), 5–20.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kaplan, S. N., & Minton, B. A. (1994). Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards determinants and implications for managers. Journal of Financial Economics, 36(2), 225–258.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kaufman, A., & Englander, E. (2005). A team production model of corporate governance. Academy of Management Executive, 19(3), 9–22.
   Google Scholar
• Kerr, N. L., & Tindale, R. S. (2004). Group performance and decision making. Annual Review of Psychology, 55(1), 623–655.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Khanna, P., Jones, C. D., & Boivie, S. (2013). Director human capital, information processing demands, and board effectiveness. Journal of Management, 40(2), 557–585.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board composition and corporate performance: How the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 189–205.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kim, Y., & Cannella, A. A., Jr. (2008). Toward a social capital theory of director selection. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 16(4), 282–293.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 33(3), 375–400.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Klijn, E., Reuer, J. J., Van den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. (2013). Performance implications of IJV Boards: A contingency perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 50(7), 1245–1266.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Knapp, J. R., Dalziel, T., & Lewis, M. W. (2011). Governing top managers: Board control, social categorization, and their unintended influence on discretionary behaviors. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 19(4), 295–310.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013). The supply of corporate directors and board independence. Review of Financial Studies, 26(6), 1561–1605.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kor, Y. Y. (2006). Direct and interaction effects of top management team and board compositions on R&D investment strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 27(11), 1081–1099.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kor, Y. Y., & Misangyi, V. F. (2008). Outside directors’ industry-specific experience and firms’ liability of newness. Strategic Management Journal, 29(12), 1345–1355.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kosnik, R. D. (1990). Effects of board demography and directors’ incentives on corporate greenmail decisions. Academy of Management Journal, 33(1), 129–150.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krause, R., & Bruton, G. (2014). Agency and monitoring clarity on venture boards of directors. Academy of Management Review, 39(1), 111–114.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krause, R., Semadeni, M., & Cannella, A. A. (2013). External COO/presidents as expert directors: a new look at the service role of boards. Strategic Management Journal, 34(13), 1628–1641.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kroll, M., Walters, B. A., & Le, S. A. (2007). The impact of board composition and top management team ownership structure on post-IPO performance in young entrepreneurial firms. Academy of Management Journal, 50(5), 1198–1216.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kroll, M., Walters, B. A., & Wright, P. (2008). Board vigilance, director experience, and corporate outcomes. Strategic Management Journal, 29(4), 363–382.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kroszner, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (2001). Bankers on boards: Monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability. Journal of Financial Economics, 62(3), 415–452.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kumar, P., & Sivaramakrishnan, K. (2008). Who monitors the monitor? The effect of board independence on executive compensation and firm value. Review of Financial Studies, 21(3), 1371–1401.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lan, L. L., & Heracleous, L. (2010). Rethinking agency theory: The view from law. Academy of Management Review, 35(2), 294–314.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lant, T. K., Milliken, F. J., & Batra, B. (1992). The role of managerial learning and interpretation in strategic persistence and reorientation: An empirical exploration. Strategic Management Journal, 13(8), 585–608.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laux, C., & Laux, V. (2009). Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management. Accounting Review, 84(3), 869–891.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laux, V. (2008). Board independence and CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(1), 137–171.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Leblanc, R., & Gillies, J. (2005). Inside the boardroom: What directors, investors, managers and regulators must know about boards of directors. Mississaugua, ON: John Wiley & Sons.
   Google Scholar
• Lee, G. K., & Cole, R. E. (2003). From a firm-based to a community-based model of knowledge creation: the case of the linux kernel development. Organization Science, 14(6), 633–649.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lel, U., & Miller, D. P. (2015). Does takeover activity cause managerial discipline? Evidence from international M&A laws. Review of Financial Studies, 28(6), 1588–1622.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Levit, D., & Malenko, N. (2015). The labor market for directors and externalities in corporate governance. The Journal of Finance. Advance online publication. doi:10.1111/jofi.12287
   Google Scholar
• Li, Y., & Aguilera, R. V. (2008). Target director turnover in acquisitions: A conceptual framework. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 16(6), 492–503.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Liao, C. H., & Hsu, A. W. H. (2013). Common membership and effective corporate governance: Evidence from audit and compensation committees. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 21(1), 79–92.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lim, E. N. T., & McCann, B. T. (2014). Performance feedback and firm risk taking: The moderating effects of CEO and outside director stock options. Organization Science, 25(1), 262–282.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lin, C., Officer, M. S., Wang, R., & Zou, H. (2013). Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and loan spreads. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(1), 37–60.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 308–328.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2009). The effects and unintended consequences of the Sarbanes–Oxley act on the supply and demand for directors. Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3287–3328.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lorsch, J. W., & MacIver, E. (1989). Pawns or potentates: The reality of America's corporate boards. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lubatkin, M., & O'Neill, H. M. (1987). Merger strategies and capital market risk. Academy of Management Journal, 30(4), 665–684.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lynall, M. D., Golden, B. R., & Hillman, A. J. (2003). Board composition from adolescence to maturity: A multitheoretic view. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 416–431.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mace, M. L. (1986). Directors: Myth and reality (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
   Google Scholar
• Makri, M., Lane, P. J., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2006). CEO incentives, innovation, and performance in technology-intensive firms: A reconciliation of outcome and behavior-based incentive schemes. Strategic Management Journal, 27(11), 1057–1080.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• March, J. G. (1999). The pursuit of organizational intelligence. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Markarian, G., & Parbonetti, A. (2007). Firm complexity and board of director composition. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 15(6), 1224–1243.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2011). Are all inside directors the same? Evidence from the external directorship market. Journal of Finance, 66(3), 823–872.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2014). Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy? Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), 406–429.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McCann, M., & Ackrill, R. (2015). Managerial and disciplinary responses to abandoned acquisitions in bidding firms: A new perspective. Corporate Governance: An International Review. Advance online publication. doi:10.1111/corg.12104.
   Google Scholar
• McDonald, M. L., Westphal, J. D., & Graebner, M. E. (2008). What do they know? The effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 1155–1177.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McLeod, P. L., & Lobel, S. A. (1992). The effects of ethnic diversity on idea generation in small groups. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Proceedings.
   Google Scholar
• Melis, A. (2005). Corporate governance failures: To what extent is Parmalat a particularly Italian case? Corporate Governance-an International Review, 13(4), 478–488.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Melkumov, D., Breit, E., & Khoreva, V. (2015). Directors’ social identifications and board tasks: Evidence from Finland. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 23(1), 42–59.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Miller, C. C., Burke, L. M., & Glick, W. H. (1998). Cognitive diversity among upper-echelon executives: Implications for strategic decision processes. Strategic Management Journal, 19(1), 39–58.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Miller, C. C., Washburn, N. T., & Glick, W. H. (2013). Perspective—the myth of firm performance. Organization Science, 24(3), 948–964.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Miller, D. T., & McFarland, C. (1987). Pluralistic ignorance: When similarity is interpreted as dissimilarity. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 53(2), 298–305.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Millstein, I. M., & MacAvoy, P. W. (1998). The active board of directors and performance of the large publicly traded corporation. Columbia Law Review, 98(5), 1283–1321.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Misangyi, V. F., & Acharya, A. G. (2014). Substitutes or complements? A configurational examination of corporate governance mechanisms. Academy of Management Journal, 57(6), 1681–1705.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mizruchi, M. S. (1983). Who controls whom? An examination of the relation between management and boards of directors in large American corporations. Academy of Management Review, 8(3), 426–435.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moscovici, S., & Doise, W. (1994). Conflict and consensus: A general theory of collective decisions. London: Sage.
   Google Scholar
• Nicholson, G. J., & Kiel, G. C. (2004). A framework for diagnosing board effectiveness. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 12(4), 442–460.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nowak, M. J., & McCabe, M. (2003). Information costs and the role of the independent corporate director. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(4), 300–307.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nyberg, A. J., Fulmer, I. S., Gerhart, B., & Carpenter, M. A. (2010). Agency theory revisited: CEO return and shareholder interest alignment. Academy of Management Journal, 53(5), 1029–1049.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Oldroyd, J. B., & Morris, S. S. (2012). Catching falling stars: a human resource response to social capital's detrimental effect of information overload on star employees. Academy of Management Review, 37(3), 396–418.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• O'Reilly, C. A., III, Caldwell, D. F., & Barnett, W. P. (1989). Work group demography, social integration, and turnover. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34, 21–37.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• O'Reilly, C. A., III, Snyder, R. C., & Boothe, J. N. (1993). Effects of executive team demography on organizational change. In G. P. Huber & W. H. Glick (Eds.), Organizational change and redesign (pp. 147–175). New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Osma, B. G. (2008). Board independence and real earnings management: The case of R&D expenditure. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 16(2), 116–131.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Osma, B. G., & Noguer, B. G. D. A. (2007). The effect of the board composition and its monitoring committees on earnings management: Evidence from Spain. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 15(6), 1413–1428.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Palich, L. E., Cardinal, L. B., & Miller, C. C. (2000). Curvilinearity in the diversification-performance linkage: An examination of over three decades of research. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 155–174.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Peasnell, K. V., Pope, R. F., & Young, S. (2005). Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(7–8), 1311–1346.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pelled, L. H., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Xin, K. R. (1999). Exploring the black box: An analysis of work group diversity, conflict, and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 1–28.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pepper, A., & Gore, J. (2015). Behavioral agency theory: New foundations for theorizing about executive compensation. Journal of Management, 41(4), 1045–1068.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Perry, T., & Peyer, U. (2005). Board seat accumulation by executives: A shareholder's perspective. The Journal of Finance, 60(4), 2083–2123.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(2), 218–228.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Porac, J. F., Wade, J. B., & Pollock, T. G. (1999). Industry categories and the politics of the comparable firm in CEO compensation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1), 112–144.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Post, C., & Byron, K. (2014). Women on boards and firm financial performance: a meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 58(5), 1546–1571.
   Google Scholar
• Radin, R. F., & Stevenson, W. B. (2006). Comparing mutual fund governance and corporate governance. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 14(5), 367–376.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Raelin, J. D., & Bondy, K. (2013). Putting the good back in good corporate governance: The presence and problems of double-layered agency theory. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 21(5), 420–435.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Raheja, C. G. (2005). Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate boards. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 40(2), 283–306.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Randoy, T., & Jenssen, J. I. (2004). Board independence and product market competition in Swedish firms. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 12(3), 281–289.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ravasi, D., & Zattoni, A. (2006). Exploring the political side of board involvement in strategy: A study of mixed-ownership institutions. Journal of Management Studies, 43(8), 1671–1702.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rediker, K. J., & Seth, A. (1995). Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal, 16(2), 85–99.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reuer, J. J., Klijn, E., & Lioukas, C. S. (2014). Board involvement in international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 35(11), 1626–1644.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reuer, J. J., Zollo, M., & Singh, H. (2002). Post-formation dynamics in strategic alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 23(2), 135–151.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rhoades, D. L., Rechner, P. L., & Sundaramurthy, C. (2000). Board composition and financial performance: A meta-analysis of the influence of outside directors. Journal of Managerial Issues, 14(3), 76–91.
   Google Scholar
• Roberts, J., McNulty, T., & Stiles, P. (2005). Beyond agency conceptions of the work of the non-executive director: Creating accountability in the boardroom. British Journal of Management, 16, S5–S26.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Romano, R. (2005). The Sarbanes–Oxley act and the making of quack corporate governance. Yale Law Journal, 114(7), 1521–1754.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rose, J. M., Rose, A. M., Norman, C. S., & Mazza, C. R. (2014). Will disclosure of friendship ties between directors and CEOs yield perverse effects? The Accounting Review, 89(4), 1545–1563.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rosenstein, J., Bruno, A. V., Bygrave, W. D., & Taylor, N. T. (1993). The CEO, venture capitalists, and the board. Journal of Business Venturing, 8(2), 99–113.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(2), 175–191.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ross, S. (1973). The economic theory of agency: the principal's problem. American Economic Review, 63(2), 134–139.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rutherford, M. A., Buchholtz, A. K., & Brown, J. A. (2007). Examining the relationships between monitoring and incentives in corporate governance. Journal of Management Studies, 44(3), 414–430.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ryan, H. E., & Wiggins, R. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(3), 497–524.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sanders, W. G., & Carpenter, M. A. (1998). Internationalization and firm governance: The roles of CEO compensation, top team composition, and board structure. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 158–178.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Santalo, J., & Joachim Kock, C. (2009). Division director versus CEO compensation: New insights into the determinants of executive pay. Journal of Management, 35(4), 1047–1077.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sauerwald, S., Lin, Z., & Peng, M. W. (2014). Board social capital and excess CEO returns. Strategic Management Journal. Advance online publication. doi:10.1002/smj.2339
   Google Scholar
• Schiehll, E., & Bellavance, F. (2009). Boards of directors, CEO ownership, and the use of non-financial performance measures in the CEO bonus plan. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 17(1), 90–106.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schnatterly, K., & Johnson, S. G. (2014). Independent boards and the institutional investors that prefer them: Drivers of institutional investor heterogeneity in governance preferences. Strategic Management Journal, 35(10), 1552–1563.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schwartz-Ziv, M., & Weisbach, M. S. (2013). What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(2), 349–366.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schwenk, C. R. (1984). Cognitive simplification processes in strategic decision-making. Strategic Management Journal, 5(2), 111–128.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shaw, M. E. (1981). Group dynamics: Psychology of small groups (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
   Google Scholar
• Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829–1853.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sonnenfeld, J. A. (2002). What makes great boards great. Harvard Business Review, 80(9), 106–113.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sundaramurthy, C., & Lewis, M. (2003). Control and collaboration: Paradoxes of governance. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 397–415.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Taylor, R. N. (1975). Age and experience as determinants of managerial information processing and decision making performance. Academy of Management Journal, 18(1), 453–470.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.
   Google Scholar
• Tosi, H. L., Katz, K. P., & GomezMejia, L. R. (1997). Disaggregating the agency contract: Effects of monitoring, incentive alignment, and term in office on agent decision making. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 584–602.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tuggle, C. S., Sirmon, D. G., Reutzel, C. R., & Bierman, L. (2010). Commanding board of director attention: Investigating how organizational performance and CEO duality affect board members’ attention to monitoring. Strategic Management Journal, 31(9), 946–968.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tushman, M. L., & Nadler, D. A. (1978). Information processing as an integrating concept in organizational design. Academy of Management Review, 3(3), 613–624.
   Google Scholar
• Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1), 113–142.
   Google Scholar
• Van den Berghe, L. A. A., & Baelden, T. (2005). The monitoring role of the board: One approach does not fit all. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 13(5), 680–690.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Van Den Berghe, L. A., & Levrau, A. (2002). The role of the venture capitalist as monitor of the company: A corporate governance perspective. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 10(3), 124–135.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Van Essen, M., Otten, J., & Carberry, E. J. (2012). Assessing managerial power theory: A meta-analytic approach to understanding the determinants of CEO compensation. Journal of Management, 41(1), 164–202.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• de Villiers, C., Naiker, V., & van Staden, C. J. (2011). The effect of board characteristics on firm environmental performance. Journal of Management, 37(6), 1636–1663.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wade, J., Oreilly, C. A., & Chandratat, I. (1990). Golden parachutes - CEOs and the exercise of social-influence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(4), 587–603.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Walsh, J. P. (1995). Managerial and organizational cognition: Notes from a trip down memory lane. Organization Science, 6(3), 280–321.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990). On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 421–458.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ward, A. J., Brown, J. A., & Rodriguez, D. (2009). Governance bundles, firm performance, and the substitutability and complementarity of governance mechanisms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(5), 646–660.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Watson, W. E., Kumar, K., & Michaelsen, L. K. (1993). Cultural diversity's impact on interaction process and performance: Comparing homogeneous and diverse task groups. Academy of Management Journal, 36(3), 590–602.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D. (1998). Board games: how CEOs adapt to increases in structural board independence from management. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(3), 511–537.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D. (1999). Collaboration in the boardroom: behavioral and performance consequences of CEO-board social ties. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 7–24.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Bednar, M. K. (2005). Pluralistic ignorance in corporate boards and firms’ strategic persistence in response to low firm performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(2), 262–298.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Fredrickson, J. W. (2001). Who directs strategic change? Director experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 1113–1137.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Graebner, M. E. (2010). A matter of appearances: How corporate leaders manage the impressions of financial analysts about the conduct of their boards. Academy of Management Journal, 53(1), 15–44.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Khanna, P. (2003). Keeping directors in line: Social distancing as a control mechanism in the corporate elite. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(3), 361–398.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Milton, L. P. (2000). How experience and network ties affect the influence of demographic minorities on corporate boards. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(2), 366–398.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Stern, I. (2007). Flattery will get you everywhere (especially if you are a male caucasian): How ingratiation, boardroom behavior, and demographic minority status affect additional board appointments at U.S. companies. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2), 267–288.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1994). Substance and symbolism in CEOs long-term incentive plans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), 367–390.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1995). Who shall govern? CEO/board power, demographic similarity, and new director selection. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 60–84.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1997). Defections from the inner circle: social exchange, reciprocity, and the diffusion of board independence in US corporations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), 161–183.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1998). The symbolic management of stockholders: Corporate governance reforms and shareholder reactions. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(1), 127–153.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012). Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), 581–606.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking. Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 133–153.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Withers, M. C., Hillman, A. J., & Cannella, A. A. (2012). A multidisciplinary review of the director selection literature. Journal of Management, 38(1), 243–277.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Woidtke, T. (2002). Agents watching agents? Evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 63(1), 99–131.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185–211.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Young, G. J., Stedham, Y., & Beekun, R. I. (2000). Boards of directors and the adoption of a CEO performance evaluation process: Agency and institutional theory perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 37(2), 277–295.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291–334.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1994). The costs and benefits of managerial incentives and monitoring in large U.S. corporations: when is more not better? Strategic Management Journal, 15(S1), 121–142.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1995). Accounting for the explanations of CEO compensation - substance and symbolism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(2), 283–308.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1996). Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(3), 507–529.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zenger, T., & Lawrence, B. S. (1989). The differential effects of age and tenure distributions on technical communication. Academy of Management Journal, 32(2), 353–376.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zhang, L., Ji, W., Tao, J., & Wang, Q. (2011). Who shall leave? How CEO preference and power affect executive turnover in Chinese listed companies. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 19(6), 547–561.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zhu, D. H. (2013). Group polarization on corporate boards: Theory and evidence on board decisions about acquisition premiums. Strategic Management Journal, 34(7), 800–822.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zhu, D. H. (2014). Group polarization in board decisions about CEO compensation. Organization Science, 25(2), 552–571.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zhu, D. H., & Chen, G. (2015). Narcissism, director selection, and risk-taking spending. Strategic Management Journal, 14(3), 2075–2098.
   Google Scholar
• Zhu, H., & Yoshikawa, T. (2015). Contingent value of director identification: the role of government directors in monitoring and resource provision in an emerging economy. Strategic Management Journal. Advance online publication. doi:10.1002/smj.2408
   Google Scholar
• Zona, F., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Withers, M. C. (2015). Board interlocks and firm performance toward a combined agency–resource dependence perspective. Journal of Management. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/0149206315579512
   Google Scholar
• Zona, F., & Zattoni, A. (2007). Beyond the black box of demography: Board processes and task effectiveness within Italian firms. Corporate Governance-an International Review, 15(5), 852–864.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar