172
Views
1
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Articles

Enemies by kinship: securitizing language and the Russian diaspora in escalated gray zone conflict

 

ABSTRACT

Russia’s February 2022 intervention in Ukraine transformed the socioeconomic landscape for the Russian diaspora most profoundly since the Soviet Union’s collapse. Diaspora members have been labeled as a security risk and acting as Moscow’s “agents.” Since Russia’s militarized intervention in Ukraine, Kyiv and the European Union closed their borders with Russia, limiting the movement of people. In turn, this has severed families and longstanding sociocultural and economic ties with the homeland. However, Russia’s militarized intervention should not be treated in isolation from the preceding eight years of hostility with Kyiv and NATO which occurred predominantly in the “gray zone.” This paper explores language policy conditions in Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia that enabled Russia’s unconventional and militarized interventions. The paper argues that by rejecting ownership of the Russian language and assigning it to Moscow, Kyiv, Riga, and Tallinn weaponized language and empowered Russia’s “compatriots protection” policy. In other words, militarized deterrence against Russia has achieved limited success while the underlying factors enabling Moscow’s interventions remained outside the deterrence discussion. Thus in an era of gray zone conflict, deterrence must incorporate civilianized institution-building mechanisms. To prove this, the paper compares minority language policies and their connection to the intensity of Russia’s intervention.

RÉSUMÉ

L'intervention russe de février 2022 en Ukraine a transformé le paysage socioéconomique de la diaspora russe de la manière la plus profonde depuis l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique. Des membres de la diaspora ont été qualifiés de risques pour la sécurité et « d'agents » de Moscou. Depuis l'intervention militarisée de la Russie en Ukraine, Kiev et l'Union européenne ont fermé leurs frontières avec la Russie, limitant la circulation des personnes. En retour, cette situation a entraîné la rupture des familles et des liens socioculturels et économiques de longue date avec le pays d'origine. Cependant, l'intervention militarisée de la Russie ne doit pas être traitée indépendamment des huit années précédentes d'hostilité avec Kiev et l'OTAN, qui se sont déroulées principalement dans la « zone grise ». Cet article examine les conditions de la politique linguistique en Ukraine, en Lettonie et en Estonie, qui ont permis les interventions non conventionnelles et militarisées de la Russie. L'article affirme qu'en rejetant la propriété de la langue russe et en l'attribuant à Moscou, Kiev, Riga et Tallin ont militarisé la langue et renforcé la politique de « protection des compatriotes » de la Russie. En d'autres termes, la dissuasion militarisée contre la Russie a connu un succès limité, alors que les facteurs sous-jacents permettant les interventions de Moscou sont restés en dehors du débat sur la dissuasion. Ainsi, à l'ère des zones grises, la dissuasion doit intégrer des mécanismes civilisés de mise en place d'institutions. Afin de le prouver, l'article compare les politiques linguistiques des minorités et leur lien, avec l'intensité de l'intervention de la Russie.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Dani Belo

Dr. Dani Belo is a teacher and scholar of international relations, specializing in conflict management and security. He is currently an Assistant Professor of International Relations and leads the Global Policy Horizons Research Lab at Webster University in St. Louis, USA. Belo is also a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in Ottawa, Canada. His research focuses on gray-zone and hybrid conflicts, transatlantic security, grand strategy, NATO-Russia relations, ethnic conflicts and the post-Soviet region. He also worked as a policy analyst for the Government of Canada.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.