Regional crises and European fiscal preferences: how regional Covid-19, economic downturn, and migration shape support for EU risk sharing

Figures & data

Figure 1. Daily 14-day case notification rate per 10,000 population by region and country. Note: The grey area indicates the survey data collection period. Daily minimum and maximum incidence values highlighted via dashed lines. The solid non-transparent line indicates the country mean.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics by country.

		Weekly excess mortality		GDP drop since 2008		Net migration difference since 2013		Crisis composite measure
Country	N (obs)	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
France	8,556	0.55	0.64	−5684	2788	−0.37	0.84	−0.55	0.56
Germany	8,598	0.06	0.07	−7797	1230	4.75	1.26	−0.12	0.56
Italy	9,600	0.88	1.02	−2973	1049	2.12	2.75	1.05	0.72
The Neth-erlands	9,246	0.49	0.37	−8055	1615	1.22	0.91	−0.82	0.45
Spain	8,940	1.55	1.56	−3860	1388	−1.39	2.07	0.35	1.16
Total	44,940	0.71	1.03	−5634	2676	1.26	2.73	0.00	1

Table 2. Conjoint experiment – wording of the conjoint dimensions.¹⁷

Dimension 1: Budgetary conditions
Are there budgetary policy conditions that countries must fulfil to get support?	- No conditions - Countries should reduce their public debt in good economic times; otherwise they will not receive support in bad times.
Dimension 2: Redistribution
May some countries receive more support from the programme than they pay into it?	- No, over the long run countries cannot receive more support from the programme than they pay into the programme. - Yes, over the long run countries can receive more support from the programme than they pay into the programme.
Dimension 3: Taxation
What is the long-term impact on the taxes that people in your country have to pay?	- No impact over the long-run: the level of taxes stays the same in your country - Over the long run, taxes increase by 1% of income only for the rich in your country
Dimension 4: Fines
Are there any extra penalties for governments that violate the conditions of the European budgetary support programme?	- No automatic termination of budgetary support, but reasons for non-compliance will be examined - Budgetary support shall be terminated and countries pay an additional fine.

Figure 2. Marginal means of package support by conjoint dimensions and excess mortality rate, with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3. Marginal means of package support by conjoint dimensions and regional GDP drop (2008–2019 vs. 2000–2007), with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4. Marginal means of package support by conjoint dimensions and regional net migration rate change (2013–2016 vs. 2010–2012), with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5. Marginal means of package support by conjoint dimensions and regional composite measure, with 95% confidence intervals.

Table 3. Standardised interaction coefficients from the linear multilevel regressions explaining package support.

	Model 1: Risk factor: Excess mortality	Model 2: Risk factor: GDP difference	Model 3: Risk factor: Migration difference	Model 4: Risk factor: Crisis composite
Policy dimensions
Budgetary conditions (Ref.: no conditions)
budgetary conditions × risk factor	−0.0131**	−0.0316***	0.0221***	−0.0345***
	(0.00443)	(0.00442)	(0.00443)	(0.00941)
Redistribution (Ref.: no redistribution)
anyone can benefit × risk factor	0.00649	0.0219***	−0.00870	0.0297*
	(0.00542)	(0.00541)	(0.00542)	(0.0115)
Taxation (Ref.: no change)
1% increase for the rich × risk factor	0.00859	−0.0166****	−0.000560	−0.0126
	(0.00543)	(0.00542)	(0.00541)	(0.0115)
Fines (Ref.: no termination and fines)
termination and fines × risk factor	−0.0117**	−0.0184***	0.00162	−0.0429***
	(0.00443)	(0.00442)	(0.00442)	(0.00941)

Note: Full (unstandardised) results in Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.